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This dissertation consists of three loosely related essays resident in the in-
dustrial organization literature. All three analyze recent policies, namely, a
prohibition of disposal, a reduction in fine for convicted cartelists, and the re-
cent loose monetary policy. I study how these policies affect firms’ strategies
and their consequences for consumers. The structure follows the timeline of
the policies’ adoption.
In the first chapter, I study the loi anti-gaspillage (anti-waste law)
recently debated in France, expected to come into effect in 2023. According
to a government estimate, each year new products worth $900 million are
discarded all over France. The policy aims at mitigating the waste of re-
sources: unsold products have to be donated or recycled, and it is prohibited
to dispose of them in one way or another.
The less firms dispose of, the more products are on the market and prices
are lower, thereby benefiting consumers. However, firms do not intentionally
manufacture products to discard them: disposal typically results from a lower
than expected demand. By forcing firms to recycle or donate their produced
goods, firms’ disposal costs increase; otherwise, cost minimizing firms would
have already donated or recycled their products without the regulation. With
higher costs for unsold products, firms reduce their production, resulting in
a lower trade volume.
Moreover, the policy may affect the production timing on top of quantities
produced. Firms may outsource their production for cost reasons. Goods
produced abroad have to be transported to the home market and therefore
require to be produced earlier.
Take, for example, the fashion industry: The biggest players on the Eu-
ropean market are Hennes & Mauriz (H&M) and Inditex, which holds Zara,
Pull&Bear, Massimo Dutti, and more. H&M mainly produces in Asia and
ships its products to the European market; Inditex largely manufactures in
Europe, close to the market. It claims that within two weeks of the original
design clothes are in retail. Merely the shipment from Asia to Europe takes
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more time. In the fast fashion industry, multiple products are introduced on
a weekly basis. Accordingly, H&M produces earlier to compete with Inditex.
As a consequence, firms that produce later to manufacture with more
information benefit from the policy. Their competitors decrease their pro-
duction to mitigate costs if demand is lower than expected, resulting in a
competitive advantage for the former. Depending on disposal costs, firms
postpone their production leading to a change in the market structure.
In general, the policy accomplishes to decrease disposal, yet at the con-
sumers’ cost.
In the second chapter with Winand Emons, we analyze a policy en-
couraging private settlement negotiation following anti-competitive convic-
tions. Victims of an anti-competitive infringement may claim for damages.
Private damage actions enforce antitrust rules in addition to the public en-
forcement by competition authorities. They are, however, rare in Europe
compared to the US. To encourage private damage action, the EU recom-
mends subtracting a part of the redress paid to the victim from the fine.
Some jurisdictions have followed this recommendation. In 2014, the Is-
raeli Antitrust Tribunal approved a consent decree reached between Israeli
banks and the Israeli Antitrust Authority to subtract the entire settlement
payment from the wrongdoers’ fine. Likewise, the Swiss Competition Com-
mission subtracted half of the bid-rigging construction companies’ settlement
payment to the victim, the canton of Graubünden, from the wrongdoers’ fines
in 2019.
The rebate has two effects. First, the surplus created by an out of court
agreement goes up. Second, the defendant’s marginal costs decrease: for
each unit the plaintiff receives the defendant only pays a share of it. Since
negotiations are voluntary, both parties get a share of the surplus. The first
effect thus benefits the plaintiff and the defendant. The second affects the
defendant’s bargaining behavior: the defendant settles for larger amounts.
In our framework, the first effect dominates the second resulting in a lower
payment for the defendant.
A leniency program is the most important investigative tool for detecting
cartel activity. The leniency applicant does not pay a fine. Consequently,
there is no fine that can be reduced; the measure does not affect a leniency
applicant. However, it decreases the other cartelists’ payment, thereby re-
ducing the relative advantage of blowing the whistle. Overall, a leniency
program may be weakened due to this policy.
Cartelists typically know the damage caused by their illegal activity better
than consumers. Consequently, a defendant has an information advantage
compared to the plaintiff when it comes to a trial. We study the case when
the plaintiff has all the bargaining power yet an information disadvantage.
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Due to the information asymmetry, some cases end up in court, although
this is inefficient. Rebating part of the fine decreases the number of cases
resulting in a ruling and thereby relieves courts. Nonetheless, the defendant’s
expected payment decreases due to the redress.
The policy accomplishes an increase in the settlement amount, thereby
benefiting victims of anti-competitive conducts, yet it also lowers deterrence.
Consumers may therefore suffer from augmented anti-competitive manner.
In the third chapter, I study how the current monetary policy affects
firms’ collusive behavior. Low interest rates mark the last decade: as a
reaction to the financial crisis, central banks worldwide lowered the nominal
interest rate to boost the economy. The real interest rate peaked around
2009 and has declined since. Nowadays, with the additional challenge of a
pandemic, central banks are expected to continue their loose monetary policy.
It is well known that the interest rate determines the time value of money.
When interest rates are low, a dollar today has almost the same value as a
dollar tomorrow; future values are little discounted.
Colluding firms set higher prices than if they competed to make addi-
tional profits to the detriment of consumers. A cartelist could, however,
deviate from the collusive agreement: by undercutting the price, the deviat-
ing firm could capture a large market share and ensure an even higher profit.
Yet, when a cartelist undercuts the collusive price, the cartel breaks down.
After a firm’s deviation, firms no longer collude and start competing, result-
ing in lower future profits. Consequently, if interest rates are low, a large
immediate profit does not outweigh constant high future profits, and cartels
are stabilized.
In my framework, an additional effect comes into play. Typically, firms
finance their production with outside capital borrowed on the financial mar-
ket. The interest rate thereby directly affects a firm’s balance sheet: the
higher the interest rate, the higher the firm’s costs. If costs are high, it is not
profitable to serve a large market share. Thus, it does not pay to undercut
the cartel price to increase demand. By contrast, if interest rates are low and
thus costs are low, firms can inexpensively invest in their production. They
have the financial means to serve large parts of the market. Thus, deviat-
ing from the collusive agreement is more profitable. Accordingly, cartels are
destabilized if interest rates are low.
While the former effect facilitates cartel formation in times of low interest
rates, the latter fosters break-ups. The time value of money is most affected
by low interest rates: it is doubled if the interest rate moves from 1% to
2%, yet less than doubled if it increases from 2% to 3%. By contrast, the
latter effect is small for low interest rates. The cost increase cause firms to
serve fewer customers. The lost consumers are, however, the ones with the
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lowest willingness to pay, i.e., the least valuable customers. Accordingly, for
a low interest rate the first effect dominates, and for a relatively high interest
rate, the second effect dominates, resulting in a U-shaped relation between
a cartel’s stability and the interest rate.
Analyzing a dataset of 615 firms active in 114 cartels convicted by the Eu-
ropean Commission yields empirical evidence supporting the theory. Cartels
are stable if interest rates are low or relatively high and are vulnerable for
intermediate values. More precisely, stability is measured as the probability
that a cartel does not break-up or, alternatively, as the duration of a firm’s
participation in the cartel. The empirical evidence has to be treated with
caution since only convicted cartels are in the dataset resulting in a biased
sample.
The current loose monetary policy is, thus, accompanied by the adverse
effect of stabilizing existing cartels and encouraging new ones’ formations.
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This chapter studies the disposal costs’ effect on consumer surplus and firms’
profits. The costlier disposal, the less is disposed of, firms’ competition for
market shares increases, thereby benefiting consumers. Yet firms decrease
their production to mitigate costs, affecting consumer surplus negatively.
We present a model with ex ante homogeneous firms producing inventories
either early at low cost and with little information about demand, or later
with more information yet at higher costs. Unsold products are disposed of.
In equilibrium, firms may be asymmetric. Disposal goes down with costs
but so do inventories. In our set-up, the negative effect on the trade volume
dominates decreasing consumer surplus and firms’ profits. We show, however,
that low disposal costs substitute information about demand. Increasing
disposal costs improve a firm’s information advantage and may increase its
profits.
1.1 Introduction
A wide variety of commodities is produced in advance. Firms manufacture
their products anticipating future demand, determining inventories while
their product’s popularity is unknown. Accordingly, production costs are
sunk when products are put for sale. If demand turns out to be lower than
expected, firms may hold back some quantity to increase the market price.
This behavior has been increasingly observed over the last years. Inves-
tigative journalists have uncovered several cases where firms have discarded
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new, unsold products. One of the most infamous scandals was uncovered
in 2010 by the New York Times. A Hennes and Mauritz (H&M) store in
New York City discarded new clothes at their back entrance, cutting them
to make sure they will never be worn. The same course of action was used
by a Nike store in 2017. In reaction to the negative headlines, firms usually
pledge improvement, yet disposing of unsold products is an open secret in
the fashion industry.1
Discarding new products is not confined to the apparel industry. French
Amazon dumped almost 3 million unsold products in 2018. All over France,
new products worth $900 million are discarded each year according to an
estimate by the government.2 The disposal of unused products is considered
as a waste of resources and an environmental burden, which led the French
government to legislate.
In 2016 France already passed a law prohibiting grocery stores from dis-
posing of food as long as it is still edible. With the new loi anti-gaspillage
(anti-waste law), regulators broaden the prohibition of disposal to non-food
products, including textiles, electronics, and daily hygiene products. Unsold
products must be donated or recycled.3 The new regulation is expected to
come into effect in 2023.
This chapter studies how firms respond to a regulatory increase in their
disposal costs and the effects on consumer surplus. The literature on this sub-
ject is scarce.4 Environmental economists usually discuss policies to reduce
waste and increase recycling.5 The focus is usually on the failure of the first
welfare theorem resulting from externalities. Instead of looking at an efficient
mechanism to reduce disposal, we focus on the costly disposal’s effect in a
market with imperfect competition, thereby abstracting from externalities.
1Not all firms keep it a secret. Burberry literally burnt almost $40 million of stock in
2018. The fashion brand reported the deed in their annual report and specified that the
energy was used to make the process environmentally friendly.
2https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/world/europe/france-unsold-products.html
(last accessed September 30, 2020).
3Projet de loi relatif à la lutte contre le gaspillage et à l’économie circulaire
(TREP1902395L).
4The literature on operation research considers the costs of unsold products for the
inventory’s optimization. Choosing the optimal inventory is known as the newsvendor
problem, e.g., Rosenfield (1989) or van der Laan and Salomon (1997).
5For example, Dinan (1993) argues that taxing disposal instead of a virgin tax can
increase efficiency in newspaper markets. In his model, disposing of newspapers creates
a cost, which is internalized by taxing total output. A virgin tax, however, only leads to
the substitution of input factors, i.e., firms use recycled old newspapers instead of virgin
material.
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The larger disposal costs are, the less firms dispose of. Thus, given its
inventory, a firm competes more aggressively for a larger market share if dis-
posal is costly, thereby benefiting consumers. However, firms adjust their
inventory strategy in response to costly disposal. They decrease their inven-
tories to mitigate costs if demand is lower than expected. Disposal decreases,
yet consumers are negatively affected. Firms, furthermore, may adjust their
location choice if disposal costs increase leading to a change in the market
structure.
In our model, firms first choose their manufacturing location, which de-
termines their production timing. They produce their commodities either
abroad at low costs and with little information about demand, or at home
close to the market with more information yet at higher costs. If demand is
lower than expected, firms can hold back quantities to increase the market
price. Restrained or unsold products are not perfectly reversible; firms may
even incur a per-unit cost to dispose of commodities. Each unsold unit is,
therefore, not only a loss in revenue, it also increases costs.
There exist three different types of equilibria in pure strategies: (i) If
demand is highly uncertain, both firms produce close to the market. They
delay their production until they have full information. Consequently, firms
dispose of nothing, and an increase in disposal costs has no effect. (ii) If de-
mand is reasonably predictable, both firms produce abroad at low costs. An
increase in disposal costs decreases the expected disposal yet also expected
consumer surplus and firms’ expected profits.
(iii) For intermediate levels of demand uncertainty, one firm produces
abroad, while the other one close to the market. The firm abroad manu-
factures at lower costs, yet the firm close to the market has an information
advantage. The higher disposal costs are, the lower is the expected disposal.
Consumer surplus, however, is also lower. The abroad firm’s expected profits
decrease, while the other one’s increase. The information advantage is more
valuable, the higher disposal costs. At some point, the abroad firm may
postpone its production closer to the market, too. Due to the change in the
market structure, profits and consumer surplus may change discontinuously.
The subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is unique, except for
type (iii), where an equivalent equilibrium exists with the firms’ label in-
terchanged. Although firms are ex ante symmetric, they may choose an
asymmetric market structure. The ordering of firms’ profits is ambiguous:
The firm abroad has a cost advantage, while the other an information advan-
tage. The former’s reaction to a demand below expectations is expensive if
disposal costs are high. Due to this costly reaction to new information, the
latter’s information advantage is more valuable if disposal is expensive.
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By contrast, without disposal costs, the firm producing abroad does not
incur additional costs. Any reaction to new information comes for free. Low
disposal costs substitute information about demand. To be more specific,
take the example of a monopolist. If demand realization is known, the firm
produces the monopoly quantity. Now suppose demand is uncertain, yet
the firm’s inventory is perfectly reversible, i.e., disposal costs are zero. The
monopoly produces its inventory equal to the monopoly quantity for the
greatest possible demand. If a lower demand materializes, the monopolist
reverses parts of its inventory and sells again the monopoly quantity, equiv-
alent as if the firm had known its demand. Information about demand is,
therefore, more valuable if disposal is costly.
In our set-up, a regulatory increase in disposal costs fulfills its purpose to
decrease expected disposal. Yet, consumers are generally worse off. Although
competition for market shares increase, firms decrease their production and
thereby the trade volume. We extend our model to test the robustness of
the negative effect’s domination over the positive competitive effect. First,
we allow firms to produce in both locations. Firms manufacture first their
inventory at low costs while demand is uncertain. Both firms can then re-
act to new information about demand either by disposing of or producing
additional quantities. In the unique, symmetric equilibrium, the disposed of
amount decreases. Yet consumer surplus and firms’ profits also decrease.6
Second, we study the same model when firms observe their competi-
tor’s quantity. Companies announce their targeted sales to inform investors.
These targets are publicly announced. Thus, competitors may not directly
observe the inventory but can infer its size. If inventories are observed,
there may exist additional asymmetric equilibria. Extensive stocks send the
message of large intended sales. The firm with a larger inventory can only
credibly commit to selling large parts if disposal is costly. This effect benefits
the larger firm. However, costly disposal increases the costs to adjust to de-
mand below expectations. Due to the two opposing effects, the larger firm’s
expected profits are ambiguous, precisely, U-shaped in disposal costs. The
smaller firm produces mainly after the demand’s realization. Its information
advantage becomes more valuable with costly disposal, resulting in higher
expected profits. Consequently, both firms’ profits may increase in disposal
costs, yet consumer surplus decreases.
Furthermore, we discuss different forms of competition, namely, perfect
competition and price competition. In general, a regulatory increase in dis-
6In the supplementary materials, we study an extension to N ≥ 2 firms - consumer
surplus increases in the number of firms, yet the disposal, too. Competition increases at
the cost of a larger number of disposers. Policymakers concerned about the disposed of
amount face a trade-off between competition and the disposed of amount.
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posal costs decreases the disposed of amount. Yet the expected trade volume
decreases, thereby putting consumers in a worse position.
Related Literature. The literature on inventory is closely linked to the
capacity literature. Technically, firms first choose an upper bound of their
next stage’s sales volume. In a capacity game, firms have to incur additional
costs in the second stage, while production costs are sunk in an inventory
game. Whenever the costs in the second stage are normalized to zero, the
games are therefore formally equivalent. In their seminal paper, Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) show that capacity choice followed by price competition
yields an outcome equivalent to the Cournot outcome.
Their result depends on the rationing rule (see, e.g., Davidson and De-
neckere (1986)), furthermore a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist if un-
certainty is introduced (e.g. Hviid (1991) or Reynolds and Wilson (2000)).
Nonetheless, Young (2010) confirms the Cournot equivalence with a mul-
tiplicative demand shock and relatively high capacity costs. He avoids a
rationing rule by introducing product differentiation. A recent paper by
Montez and Schutz (2018) studies a similar game, in which firms can not
observe their competitor’s inventory and price. Firms’ may hold back some
of their inventories, which are at most partly reversible.7 When production
costs tend to full reversibility, the outcome ends to Bertrand competition.
Conclusively, the inventories’ observability determines the difference between
the Cournot and Bertrand outcome.
None of the previous papers allow for additional costs to discard unsold
products. By contrast, Saloner (1986) provides in his seminal paper a model
allowing for additional costs to dispose of. Inventory is not fully reversible,
and firms may even incur additional costs for unsold products. First, firms
choose (simultaneously or sequentially)8 their inventory, which is observed
by their competitor and later compete in sales volume. Since there is no
demand uncertainty, in the end, firms dispose of nothing. The higher the
disposal costs, the more credible it is for a firm to dispose of nothing. Inven-
tories indicate, therefore, intended sales. We rule out this effect by assuming
that inventories are unobserved by the competitors. However, we relax our
assumption in an extension.9
7Pashigian (1988) showed that clearance sale prices are below marginal costs in the
apparel industry, presenting empirical evidence for the imperfect reversibility.
8Maggi (1996) studies a reduced form model with demand uncertainty, which predicts
a sequential outcome in pure strategies. By contrast, Pal (1993) studies the Saloner model
with mixed strategies and argues that the sequential outcome is just a realization of a
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.
9Recently, different effects of inventory have been studied in the literature. Antoniou
and Fiocco (2019) analyze the inventory’s impact on future prices to prevent stockpiling of
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Mitraille and Moreaux (2013) study a two-period model where firms can
manufacture in each period. Storing is costly and observed by the competi-
tors. The stored commodities’ production costs are sunk, resulting in zero
effective marginal costs. When firms compete in the second stage, firms with
storage have thus a cost advantage.10 Firms seek leadership at the cost of
storing the commodity. Sales volume increases resulting in a lower market
price if firms can store.
By contrast, Thille (2006) finds in an infinitely repeated game that storage
does not affect prices in the absence of depreciation. With depreciation, firms
incur higher costs to maintain their stock of inventory, resulting in lower sales
are higher market prices.
We do not explicitly model storage costs. In our set-up, storing costs
would decrease the cost advantage of early production. Since inventories are
not observable and demand is uncertain, firms postpone their production.
Similar to the latter, sales go down and the price increases.
Dada and van Mieghem (1999) also study production timing. A mo-
nopolist chooses inventory, sales volume, and prices, either before or after
demand realization. The monopolist restrains some products to affect the
market clearing price. Anupindi and Jiang (2008) extend the model to a
three-stage version with competing firms, whereby firms invest in capacity
before demand materializes. Flexible firms produce after the demand re-
alization, while inflexible firms produce ex ante. Firms trade-off the value
of commitment to flexible production. None of these papers studies costly
disposal nor competition with unobserved inventories.
We follow Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and have a pre-game stage where
firms choose their production timing without committing to quantities. By
contrast, Liu (2005) and Wang and Xu (2007) study a sequential move game
where demand uncertainty decreases over time. In their set-up, the firm
producing in the second stage makes higher profits if its information advan-
tage is large. However, the authors implicitly assume infinitely high disposal
costs. If the other firm can adjust its sales volume to the demand realization,
their result remains only partly. We show that low disposal costs substitute
information about demand.
In our set-up, ex ante symmetric firms may choose different strategies, as
in Robson (1990). According to van Damme and Hurkens (1999), a sequential
equilibrium is only stable if the first mover has a cost advantage. This is
consumers. Similar to Mitraille and Thille (2014), who study the presence of speculators:
demand may be higher, but later competition increases due to the resellers. Dana and
Williams (2019) and Qu et al. (2018) discuss the effect of inventory on intertemporal price
discrimination.











Dispose q̄1 − q1 ≥ 0 at
marginal costs d > 0
Produce q2 at
marginal costs c ≥ 0
Figure 1.1: Timeline and production strategies.
also a necessary condition in our model. Additionally, we require a follower’s
information advantage and no free disposal for the existence of an asymmetric
equilibrium.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents
the model. We derive the equilibrium in section 1.3. Section 1.4 extends
the model to multiple manufacturing locations. Furthermore, we discuss
the effect of observable inventories; a formal analysis is contained in the
supplementary materials. Finally, we discuss other forms of competition.
Section 1.5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1.2 Model
Two firms produce a homogeneous commodity. Demand is linear. The in-
verse demand function’s slope is random, reflecting an unknown number
of identical consumers. Formally, let the inverse demand function in state
s ∈ {l, h} be Ps(Q) = a− bsQ, where Q is the total sales volume. The inter-
cept a > 0 denotes the maximal willingness to pay and is commonly known.
The slope bs takes on one of two values, bl = 1 + β or bh = 1− β, each with
equal probability. The difference between the two is measured by β ∈ [0, 1),
which we refer to as demand uncertainty. If bh materializes, the willingness
to pay is higher for any quantity. Therefore, we refer to bh (bl) as the high
(low) demand state. With this set-up, the expected inverse demand function
is independent of β.11
11Commonly, demand uncertainty is modeled with a linear demand curve and a random
intercept (e.g. Gilpatric and Li (2015) or a random slope (e.g. Daughety and Reinganum
(1994) or Malueg and Tsutsui (1996)). In Klemperer and Meyer (1986), firms facing
a random slope prefer to fix quantities and let prices adjust depending on the demand
realization. In our model, firms also prefer to fix quantities and let prices adjust if disposal
costs are high.
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First, firms choose their location, determining their timing of production.
They either produce the quantity q̄1 in the first period at marginal costs
normalized to zero or postpone their production until the demand has mate-
rialized and manufacture q2,s at marginal costs c ∈ [0, a/2]. Producing at an
early stage is less expensive, e.g., firms have time to adjust processes to sub-
stitute input factors. Firms can off-shore their production to decrease their
costs. However, products manufactured abroad need to be shipped to the
home market. Production, therefore, has to precede in time. Firms trade-off
costs and uncertainty: producing at a lower cost with less information or
defer the manufacturing until more information is available, yet production
is more expensive.
We denote the strategy to produce (abroad) before the demand materi-
alizes by A and the strategy to produce in the second stage by H (home). If
a firm chooses strategy A, it can hold back its goods after the demand has
materialized. Let a firm’s sales volume be q1,s, thus q̄1 − q1,s is the quantity
held back. We denote its marginal cost as d > 0, reflecting costs to dispose
of products.12 We restrict parameters such that the consumers’ willingness
to pay is relatively large, formally a ≥ 2c + d. This assumption guarantees
that both firms are active in equilibrium. Figure 1.1 summarizes the timing
strategies.13
Henceforth, we suppress the state index s for quantities. Formally, the
two strategies’ expected profits are
E[π1(q1, q̄1)] = E[Ps(Q)q1 − d(q̄1 − q1)], (1.1)
E[π2(q2)] = E[Ps(Q)q2 − cq2], (1.2)
where Q is the sum of the firms’ sales volume; (1.1) refers to the strategy A
and (1.2) to strategy H.
Firms simultaneously choose their location, which is observed by the com-
petitor. Thus, four cases exist in pure strategies: both firms choose strategy
A (A,A), both choose strategy H (H,H), and one chooses strategy A and the
other strategy H (A,H) and (H,A). By symmetry of the game, the latter two
differ only in the firms’ labels.
12The model can be generalized to costs of production in the first stage c̃ ≥ 0, with
costs of production in the second stage c ≥ c̃ and disposal costs d ≥ −c̃. Note that for
d ∈ [−c̃, 0) parts of the inventory is reversible. For example, if products are reused or sold
in a clearance sale. Our main results do qualitatively not change.
13We assume that only one timing strategy is feasible. We extend the model in section
1.4. For a model where firms can produce and sell in both periods, see, for example, Arvan
(1985) or Mitraille and Moreaux (2013).
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Table 1.1: Inventory and sales volume of the (A,A) subgame. Inventory equals
the sales volume in the high demand state.
1.3 Equilibrium
We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. Thus, we
solve the game by backward induction. We first derive all equilibria follow-
ing symmetric location strategies. Second, we derive all equilibria following
the asymmetric ones. Each location strategy pair has a unique subgame
equilibrium, which we then use to determine the firms’ equilibrium location
strategies.
Symmetric Subgames. Given firms choose the same location strategy,
the subgame is symmetric and we denote one firm by i and the other by
j. Furthermore, we use the index A to indicate equilibrium quantity and
profits of the (A,A) game and H for the (H,H) game. We start by deriving
the subgame equilibrium of the (A,A) game, i.e., both firms produce abroad.
After the demand realization, production costs are sunk, both firms take
their inventory as given. Both choose their sales volume qi ∈ [0, q̄i] to maxi-
mize
πi,s(qi|q̄i) = Ps(Q)qi − d(q̄i − qi), (1.3)














The best response function weakly decreases in the competitor’s sales volume,
and it can maximally sell its total inventory.
A firm’s sales volume given by (1.4) increases in d for any qj and q̄i. The
costlier disposal, the less is disposed of. If inventories are fixed, increasing
disposal costs make firms compete more aggressively for large market shares.
Firms do not observe their competitor’s inventory. Nonetheless, each
firm anticipates its own disposal behavior. Formally, the firms choose their
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inventory q̄i ≥ 0 to maximize (1.1) subject to (1.4). The optimal inventory
strategy of firm i can be written as

















The best response function is explicitly derived in the appendix. We show
that in the first part of the maximum operator, firm i sells its inventory
regardless of the demand state. In the second, it disposes of if demand is
below expectations. The inventory decreases with d. Firms decrease their
inventory to mitigate costs if demand is lower than expected, thereby giving
up profits in the high demand state.
We summarize the subgame’s equilibrium sales volume in Table 1.1. In
the high demand state, firms sell their total inventory, which decreases in d.
In the low demand state, firms dispose of if d < βa. Firms dispose of less, the
higher disposal costs are, the sales volume in the low demand state increases
in d. If d ≥ βa, nothing is thrown away, firms sell their total inventory
regardless of the demand’s size.14
Expected price, disposal, firm’s profit, and consumer surplus are summa-
rized in Lemma 1.1.
Lemma 1.1. The (A,A) game’s unique subgame perfect equilibrium implies





and expected disposal of
E[q̄A − qA] =
{
2(βa−d)
3(1−β2) , if d < βa;
0, if d ≥ βa.







, if d < βa;
a2
9
, if d ≥ βa,
(1.6)







, if d < βa;
2a2
9
, if d ≥ βa.
(1.7)
Disposal costs decrease expected disposal, firm’s profits, and consumer sur-
plus.
14For general c̃ > 0, the threshold can be rearranged to c̃ ≥ (βa− d)/(1 + β). Products
expensive in manufacturing are not disposed of.
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Expected prices are independent of d, while expected disposal decreases
with its costs. Firms’ profits decrease with d because any adjustment to a
lower than expected demand is costly and firms compete more fiercely. How-
ever, expected consumer surplus also decreases: firms decrease their inven-
tory and, thus, the expected trade volume. The lower inventories’ negative
effect dominates the positive effect of fiercer competition.
Next, we derive the equilibrium of the (H,H) game. Firms manufacture
close to the market, thus delay their production until demand has material-
ized. Both firms choose qi ≥ 0 to maximize (1.2), technically, the firms play










By contrast to the best response in (1.4), the sales volume is not restricted
anymore. Firms incur marginal costs of production c instead of disposal costs
d. Formally, the disposal costs are likewise a negative production cost, as
can be seen by comparing (1.4) to (1.8). Instead of incurring a cost for each
unit sold, firms with disposal costs incur a cost for each unit unsold.
The subgame’s equilibrium sales volume is qH,s = (a − c)/(3bs). Since
firms produce with full information, nothing is disposed of. The following
Lemma summarizes the expected price, firm’s profits, and consumer surplus.
Lemma 1.2. The (H,H) game’s unique subgame perfect equilibrium implies





Furthermore, a firm’s expected profits are
E[πH ] =
(a− c)2
9(1− β2) . (1.9)
and expected consumer surplus is
E[CSH ] =
2(a− c)2
9(1− β2) . (1.10)
Firms produce with full information about demand, therefore, nothing is dis-
posed of. Expected prices, profits, and consumer surplus are independent of
disposal costs.
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q1 high demand low demand












Table 1.2: Inventory and leader’s sales volume depending on the demand state.
Inventory equals the sales volume in the high demand state.
q2 high demand low demand
















Table 1.3: The follower’s sales volume depending on the demand state.
Asymmetric Subgame. Suppose one firm has chosen strategy A and the
other strategy H. We denote the former as leader (she) and the latter as
follower (he). The leader’s expected profit is given by equation (1.1) and the
follower’s expected profit by equation (1.2), with Q = q1 + q2.
In the second stage, the leader’s production costs are sunk. She chooses
her sales volume q1 ∈ [0, q̄1] to maximize (1.3) yielding the best response
function given by (1.4). The follower does not observe the leader’s inventory.
Yet, the leader anticipates her optimal disposal behavior. She maximizes
(1.1) subject to (1.4), yielding the optimal inventory strategy in (1.5).
The follower produces after the demand realization. His best response
function is given by equation (1.8). The leader’s inventory and sales volume
are given in Table 1.2.
The inventory of the leader decreases with disposal costs. She sells her
total inventory if demand is high and disposes of if demand is low. Disposal
costs increase the sales volume in the low demand state so that the disposed
of amount decreases. She gives up some profits in the high demand state to
mitigate costs if demand is low. If d ≥ β(a+ c)/2, nothing is thrown away.15
The follower’s sales volume given in Table 1.3 moves in the opposite
direction: if the leader decreases her sales volume, the follower increases his
15For general c̃ > 0, the threshold can be rearranged to c̃ ≥ (βa+ βc− 2d)/(2(1 + β)).
Similar as above, products expensive in manufacturing are not disposed of.
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and vice versa. The assumption a ≥ 2c + d ensures that the follower’s sales
volume is positive. Entry blocking is thus not possible due to relatively low
costs. Lemma 1.3 summarizes the expected price, disposal, firms’ profits,
and consumer surplus.
Lemma 1.3. The asymmetric location game’s unique subgame perfect equi-





and expected disposal of
E[q̄1 − q1] =
{
β(a+c)−2d)




0, if d ≥ β a+c
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.



























36(1−β2) , if d ≥ β a+c2 ,
(1.12)


















Expected disposal, leader’s profits, and consumer surplus decrease in disposal
costs, while the follower’s profits increase.
The expected price is independent of d, similar to the symmetric sub-
games. It only reflects production costs. In Lemma 1.1 both firms have zero
production costs, in Lemma 1.2 both incur costs c, and in Lemma 1.3 one
has zero costs, while the other has costs c. The realized price, however, de-
pends on d: The price is higher in the high demand state and the difference
between the materialized prices increases in d. Firms incur larger costs to
adjust their sales volume to the demand realization. If d is small, firms in-
expensively adjust to the materialized demand, thereby absorbing the effect
of demand on the price.
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Expected disposal decreases with its costs. The leader’s reaction to a low
demand becomes costlier if d increases. The follower’s information advantage
becomes more valuable. The competitors’ profits respond, therefore, opposed
to an increase in disposal costs. If inventory is, however, observable, disposal
costs may increase both firms’ profits. We discuss this case in section 1.4.
By assumption, the leader has lower production costs, while the follower
has superior information about demand. The ordering of profits is thus
ambiguous. The leader has an advantage if either disposal costs are low,
demand uncertainty is low, or both.
With fully reversible inventories, the follower’s information advantage is
worthless. The leader bears no cost to decrease her quantity in response to
low demand while having a cost advantage in production. By contrast, if
the leader has no cost advantage, the follower expects higher profits than
the leader. In the knife edge case of no cost advantage and fully reversible
inventory, both firms expect the same profit.
Location Game. A firm’s optimal location strategy maximizes its expected
profits. Since the competitor observes the location, firms can anticipate their
competitive behavior, respectively, the subsequent market structure. We
use the expected profits given in Lemmas 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 to derive the
equilibrium.
It is useful to define the following two threshold functions. We first de-
fine the threshold function where the leader is indifferent between producing
abroad or close to the market, let βH(d) := {β|E[πH ] = E[π1]}. Similarly,
we define the threshold function βA(d) := {β|E[πA] = E[π2]} such that the
follower is indifferent between strategy A and H. We derive explicit expres-
sions of the functions in the appendix and show that they weakly decrease
with d and βH(d) ≥ βA(d).
Proposition 1.1. Generically, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium.
(i) If demand is highly uncertain, i.e. β ≥ βH(d), both firms produce in
the first stage by choosing strategy H.
(ii) If demand is fairly predictable, i.e. β ≤ βA(d), both firms produce in
the second stage by choosing strategy A.
(iii) Otherwise, i.e. β ∈ [βA(d), βH(d)], one firm chooses strategy A and the
other strategy H.
Figure 1.2 illustrates Proposition 1.1. Depending on the choice of param-



























(d) High cost advantage (c = 1)
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium. In the diagonally gray (vetically black) shaded area, both
firms produce with strategy H (A). In the white area firms choose an asymmetric
strategy, one chooses A and the other H. (Demand intercept a = 10.)
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coexist, except by definition on the threshold function βA(d) and βH(d).
16
Due to the monotonic expected profit functions, the β functions are all de-
creasing: The information advantage is less crucial the lower the disposal
costs. Low disposal costs enable an inexpensive reaction to the demand re-
alization. Thus, there is a negative relationship between β and d.17
Firms face a trade-off between costs and information. They either produce
at an early stage with low costs yet with uncertain demand or postpone their
production until demand has materialized, yet production costs are higher.
Without the early production cost advantage, the trade-off does not exist:
both firms produce at a later stage. Whereas, if the cost advantage is large,
firms may produce at an early stage. Production abroad is an equilibrium
either if demand uncertainty is low, disposal costs are low, or both. An
asymmetric equilibrium only exists if there is a cost advantage from early
production, disposal is costly, and demand is uncertain.
Comparative Statics. Lemma 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 already show that although
disposal goes down with its costs, there is generally a negative effect on
consumer surplus and profits. Firms dispose of less and compete stronger for
market shares, yet inventories are lower. Firms give up some profits in the
good demand state to mitigate costs in the bad demand state. The expected
trade volume, therefore, decreases with d and accordingly, so does consumer
surplus.
The only market participant profiting from an increase in disposal costs
is the follower in the asymmetric equilibrium. Costlier disposal increases the
valuation of his information advantage.
It remains to analyze how consumers and firms are affected if an increase
in disposal costs leads to a change in the market structure. Firms may change
their manufacturing location in response to an increase in disposal costs. For
low disposal costs, both produce abroad. One firm may change its location
close to the home market if d increases. Furthermore, the firm producing
abroad may also change its location if d is costly.
Proposition 1.2 shows how expected disposal, expected consumer surplus,
and firm’s expected profits are affected by a regulatory increase in disposal
costs. It is useful to invert the threshold function from above by dH(β) :=
min{d|βH(d) = β}, thus, at dH(β) the leader is indifferent between producing
16By definition all equilibrium types can only be supported if βH(d) = βA(d). The only
exception where all equilibria coexist is at d = c and β → 1.
17In (iii) there also exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. Strategy H’s
probability being played increases in d. This follows directly since expected profits with
strategy A, precisely E[πA] and E[π1], decrease while expected profits under strategy
H, precisely E[π2] increase. In the supplementary materials, we show that the mixed
equilibrium’s expected profits are non-monotonic in d.
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abroad or close to the market. Similarly, the follower is indifferent between
strategy A and H at dA(β) := min{d|βA(d) = β}.
Proposition 1.2. A regulatory increase in disposal costs
(i) decreases the expected disposal;
(ii) decreases expected consumer surplus except;
1. the leader postpones her production close to the market, i.e.
d = dH(β), expected consumer surplus increases discontinuously.
(iii) decreases firms’ expected profits except;
1. one firm postpones its production becoming a follower, i.e. at
d = dA(β), the leader’s expected profits increase discontinuously;
2. in the asymmetric equilibrium, the follower’s expected profit in-
creases.
We now discuss the disposal costs’ effect throughout all types of equilib-
ria. Suppose that d is low, such that both firms manufacture abroad. An
increase in disposal costs decreases both firms’ profits: If demand is below
expectations, an increase in d induces firms to dispose of less, thereby, com-
pete more intensively for a larger market share. Furthermore, firms decrease
their inventory to mitigate costs if demand is low. Thus, the trade volume
in the high demand state decreases.
Less disposal and fierce competition benefit consumers. However, lower
trade volume decreases consumer surplus. The latter effect is stronger than
the former, leading to an expected loss in consumer surplus.
At some point, d = dA(β), a firm, labeled as firm 2, expects the same
profit from postponing its strategy close to the market. By definition of the
equilibrium, firm 2’s expected profits are continuous: he decides to postpone
his production at dA(β), which is simply the inverse of βA(d) where E[π2] =
E[πA]. The leader’s profits, however, increase discontinuously. The change
in the market structure results in a cost advantage for her. Although the
follower has superior information about demand, the leader has an advantage
if disposal costs are low. Low disposal costs enable an inexpensive reaction to
the state of demand; the follower’s information advantage is thus not crucial.
Expected consumer surplus decreases discontinuously due to the change
of the market structure. While both firms produce abroad, they compete at
equal strength and sell their total inventory if demand is above expectations.
With the market structure change, the leader still offers her total inventory
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in the high demand state. However, the follower can increase his production
and has monopoly power on the residual demand.
The leader’s inventory decreases with costlier disposal resulting in an
increase for the follower’s residual demand. Expected consumer surplus,
therefore, decreases further with d. The follower’s market power increases
and additionally, his information advantage becomes more valuable, resulting
in higher expected profits. At the same time, the leader’s profits decrease
due to her cost increase. Consequently, at some point, the follower expects
higher profits than the leader.
At d = dH(β), the leader’s expected profit is continuous by the same argu-
ment as above. She postpones her production close to the market and gives
up her cost advantage to gain information about demand. The follower’s
profits decrease discontinuously due to the change in the market structure.
He loses his information advantage, which is relatively valuable for high d.
Additionally, he loses his monopoly power on the residual demand. Firms
become equal and compete for the total demand, benefiting consumers. Con-
sequently, consumer surplus increases discontinuously at dH(β).
When both firms produce close to the market, disposal costs have no
effect. Firms only produce after demand has materialized, therefore, no
products are disposed of and disposal costs are irrelevant. Note that an
increase in d does not always lead to a change in the market structure, as
can be seen in figure 1.2: for low demand uncertainty, it is not possible to
influence the market structure such that both firms (or even one) postpone
its production.
1.4 Extensions
We now discuss several extensions to test our result’s robustness. First, we
relax the assumption of only one production location. Next, we allow firms
to observe their competitor’s inventory. Finally, we discuss alternative forms
of competition, namely perfect competition or price competition.
Multiple Manufacturing Sites. We relax the assumption of only one
production location and allow firms to manufacture at both locations. We
show that expected disposal decreases in its costs yet also expected profits
and consumer surplus decrease.
First, firms choose their inventory q̄i ≥ 0 at zero marginal costs. After
the demand’s realization, firms choose either to dispose of at marginal costs
d > 0 or to produce additional quantity at marginal costs c > 0. Firm i’s
expected profits can be written as
E[π(qi, q̄i)] = E[Ps(Q)qi − cmax{qi − q̄i, 0} − dmax{q̄i − qi, 0}], (1.14)
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Table 1.4: Inventory and sales volume with multiple manufacturing sites. Inven-
tory equals the sales volume in the high (low) demand’s state if d < min{βa, c}
(c < min{βa, d}).
with Q = qi + qj. The first term is the revenue, the second are the costs of
additional production to sell more than the inventory, and the third are the
disposal costs.
In the second stage, firms take their inventories as given. They choose
their sales volume qi ≥ 0 to maximize
π(qi|q̄i) = Ps(Q)qi − cmax{(qi − q̄i, 0} − dmax{(q̄i − qi, 0}.























Similar as before, sales volume are increasing in disposal costs. The
costlier it is to dispose of, the more firms compete for larger market share.
We maintain the assumption that inventories are not observed by the com-
petitor. Firm i therefore chooses her inventory q̄i to maximize (1.14) subject









qj,l, if d > c and qj,h − qj,l < 2(βa−c)1−β2 ;
a−d







qj,l − 1−β4 qj,h, else,
(1.16)
whenever it is larger than zero.
The best response function’s derivation is in the appendix. If marginal
production costs are larger than the disposal costs, i.e. c > d, the optimal
inventory strategy is equivalent to (1.5). With multiple manufacturing sites,
firms can produce in the second stage and thus lower their inventory.
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A firm’s equilibrium inventory and sales volume are shown in Table 1.4.
With low disposal costs, firms sell their inventory in the high demand state
and dispose of if demand is below expectations. Note that the equilibrium is
the same as in the last section: firms decrease their inventories as a response
to an increase in disposal cost to mitigate costs if demand is below expecta-
tions. By contrast, if production costs in the second period are low, firms sell
their inventory in the low demand state and produce additional quantities if
demand is higher than expected. If disposal and production are costly, firms
sell their inventory regardless of the demand.
We summarize expected prices, disposal, firms’ profits, and consumer
surplus in the following Proposition.





and expected disposal of
E[q̄i − qi] =
{
2(βa−d)
3(1−β2) , if d < min{βa, c};
0, else.
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, if c < min{βa, d}.
(1.17)
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2a2
9





, if c < min{βa, d}.
(1.18)
Expected disposal, firm’s profits, and consumer surplus decrease in disposal
costs.
With this set-up, firms always choose a symmetric strategy. None of the
two gives up the production abroad. Thus the results are comparable to the
ones in the last section. In the previous section, whenever it is less expensive
to dispose of manufactured products compared to produce new ones, d ≤ c,
both firms produce abroad. The models’ equilibrium is equivalent.
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The expected price is independent of d. It reflects again only the first
period production costs that we normalized to zero. Disposal decreases in
its cost, yet profits and consumer surplus decrease, too. Firms decrease their
inventories due to costly disposal and, therefore, the expected trade volume
is lower.
In the supplementary materials, we extend the model to N firms. Ex-
pected consumer surplus increases in the number of firms, yet also expected
disposal. An increasing number of firms results in a competitive market but
also a rise in the number of disposers. Total expected disposal decreases
stronger in its costs, the larger the number of firms.
However, firms expect a lower profit if disposal costs increase. Accord-
ingly, some firms may leave the market, resulting in a lower number of firms.
Competition is lowered, thereby additionally decreasing consumer surplus.
The firms staying in the market are negatively affected by higher disposal
costs, yet benefit from fewer competitors. Their expected profit may thus
increase. The positive effect of lower disposal and, thereby, more intense
competition for market shares is not noticeable for consumers. With this
set-up, competition may even decrease in response to an increase in disposal
costs.
Observable Inventories. We discuss in this section an extension to ob-
servable inventories. A formal analysis can be found in the supplementary
materials.18 In reality, firms may not perfectly observe their competitor’s
inventories. Public companies, yet, announce their targeted sales to inform
investors. Those announcements are observed by the competitors, who can
infer the inventory from it. For simplicity, we assume in our model that
inventories are perfectly observable.
If inventories are observable, an additional, opposing effect exists. With
higher disposal costs, firms sell large parts of their inventories even if demand
is lower than expected. Extensive inventories, therefore, send the message
of large intended sales. A firm can only credibly commit to selling its total
inventory if disposal is expensive.
Generally, disposal costs decrease inventories, yet, the neglected effect
works in the opposite direction. If firms observe their competitors’ inven-
tories, the equilibrium may not be unique, nor is it monotone, due to the
opposing effects. Although firms are ex ante symmetric, there may exist
asymmetric equilibria, where one firm has a larger inventory than the other.
The firm with the smaller inventory produces additional quantities if demand
is higher than expected, while the other disposes of if demand is lower than
18An earlier version of this chapter also contained an extension of the location game in
section 1.2. Results are qualitatively similar. Please contact the author to access it.
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expected. Expected disposal decreases in its costs. Furthermore, inventories
still decrease in disposal costs. Due to the lower trade volume, consumer
surplus decreases.
A regulatory increase in disposal costs fulfills its purpose to decrease the
disposed of quantity yet at the consumers’ cost. Competition for market
shares is not achieved by this policy, even if inventories are observable.
Similar to the main model, the firm producing (primarily) abroad is neg-
atively affected by an increase in disposal costs, since any reaction to new
information about demand becomes more costly. By contrast, observability
strengthens its dominant position in terms of market share. It can signify
large targeted sales with a large inventory. The costlier disposal, the less
does a firm dispose of its inventory. The inventory’s credibility to indicate
targeted sales increases with d, strengthening the firm’s competitive advan-
tage. Profits are, thus, ambiguously affected by an increase in disposal costs.
Precisely, the larger firm’s expected profits are U-shaped.
The other firm has a small inventory and manufactures large parts of its
production after the demand’s realization. Accordingly, it has an informa-
tion advantage, which is more valuable if the other firm’s reaction to new
information is costly. Similar to the main model, the smaller firm’s expected
profits increase with d.
To sum up, the increasing credibility benefits the larger firm if demand
is lower than expected, while the information advantage benefits the smaller
firm if demand is higher than expected. By contrast to unobserved invento-
ries, both firms’ expected profits may increase in disposal costs.
H&M and Zara19, the two most prominent players in the European fashion
market increased their recycling standards over the last years. According
to our model, this leads to higher costs, which may increase profits. Our
model is consistent with the market structure: H&M mainly produces in Asia
and ships its product to the European market; Zara manufactures mostly
in Europe. Zara manufactures close to the market. The firm claims that
within two weeks of the original design, clothes are in retail. The shipment
from Asia to Europe already takes more time. Consequently, H&M’s clothes
are manufacture earlier. In the fast fashion industry, multiple products are
introduced in a single week to stay on-trend. In order to compete trendily,
according to our model, H&M produces large parts of its inventory abroad
and has larger expected disposal than Zara. This is consistent with the fact
19Zara is part of the Inditex holding, which also includes Pull&Bear, Massimo Dutti,
Oysho, and others. Although we mean Inditex in lieu we refer to Zara because it is the
flagship of Inditex.
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that Zara only discards 10% of its products, which is half of the industry
average.
Besides the discussed asymmetric equilibria, there always exists the same
symmetric equilibrium described in Proposition 1.3.20 The difference be-
tween observable and unobservable inventories is, therefore, the asymmetric
equilibria’s existence. We use numerical simulations to compare the equilib-
ria and find that both firms’ expected profits may be higher in the symmetric
equilibrium. Note that the firms can guarantee to be in the symmetric equi-
librium if inventories are unobservable. However, there exists parameters,
where one firm, either the smaller or the larger, expects higher profits in an
asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. prefers if inventories are observable.
Perfect Competition. New firms may enter a profitable market in the long
run, resulting in a perfectly competitive market. Firms make zero expected
profits with both timing strategies. Higher disposal costs decrease firms’
inventories and consumer surplus: Suppose there are many firms in both
timing allocations and expected profits are zero. Firms with strategy A
may dispose of if demand is below its expectation, i.e., incur costs. They
have, therefore, to turn positive profits if demand is above expectations.
An increase in disposal costs forces those firms to decrease their inventory.
Otherwise, firms turn negative expected profits because the loss in the bad
state outweighs the gains in the good state. Due to the lower inventory, firms
in the second period increase their production, but these quantities come at
a higher production cost. Introducing additional costs in an efficient market
decreases consumer surplus.
Price Competition. Instead of quantity competition in the second stage,
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Montez and Schutz (2018) used price
competition. Both firms choosing timing strategy H results in zero profits à
la Bertrand. Both choosing timing strategy A results in a model similar to
de Frutos and Fabra (2011): firms end up with different capacity/inventory
levels. Given an asymmetric timing, the leader has to set prices weakly
below the follower’s marginal costs, or else the latter undercuts the price.
It depends on the rationing rule how demand is shared with equal prices.
For example, one could use equal demand sharing as de Frutos and Fabra
(2011). If the leader’s inventory is not large enough to satisfy total demand,
the follower becomes a monopolist for the residual demand. The follower sets
prices strictly above marginal costs and the leader tries to undercut them.
No pure strategy equilibrium may exist.
20Dubey and Shubik (1981) show generally that any pure strategy equilibrium with
unobservable inventories is also an equilibrium if inventories are observed.
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1.5 Conclusion
For each unit not sold firms incur a cost if inventory is not fully reversible. An
unsold unit is not only a loss in revenue, it also causes additional costs. As we
show in this chapter, firms thus discard less of their commodities if disposal
costs increase. Therefore, competition for sales increases. Accordingly, one
would expect consumer surplus to increase and firms’ expected profits to
decrease.
Although correct, this expectation is shortsighted. Firms adjust their in-
ventories if disposal costs increase. The higher the disposal costs, the costlier
it is for a firm to adjust to a demand below expectations. To mitigate costs,
a firm lowers its inventory, which leads to lower profits if demand is high.
In our model, firms either produce their inventory earlier, at a low cost
and little information about demand or later, with more information yet
at higher costs. Although firms are ex ante symmetric, firms may choose
asymmetric production strategies. We derive three necessary conditions for
an asymmetric equilibrium: First, early production has to yield a strict cost
advantage. Second, disposal has to be strictly costly. Third, demand has
to be uncertain, yet, not too much. If demand uncertainty is considerable,
firms jointly produce with more information, yet at higher costs. If demand
uncertainty is low, firms jointly produce at low costs with little information
about demand.
We showed that a regulatory increase in disposal costs decreases the ex-
pected disposal. Yet consumers do not benefit from increasing competition
for market sales. The lower trade volume impairs them. In general, con-
sumers do not benefit from an increase in disposal costs. There is, however,
an exception. In an asymmetric equilibrium, the firm manufacturing close to
the market has monopoly power over the residual demand. Increasing dis-
posal costs may change the market structure, and the competitor postpones
its production close to the market, too. Firms become equal and competition
increases, benefiting consumers.
Generally, firms expect a lower profit, the costlier disposal is. However,
there are also some exceptions. With an increase in disposal costs, informa-
tion about demand become more valuable. Disposing of products as response
to a demand below expectations becomes costlier. Firms may, therefore, post-
pone their production with increasing disposal costs. Changes in the market
structure may benefit a firm. Furthermore, in the asymmetric equilibrium,
one of the two firms has an information advantage. Since costlier disposal
increases the information’s value, the firm expects a higher profit.
We also discussed the case when firms observe their competitor’s inven-
tory. This gives rise to another effect: a firm’s inventory sends the message
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of its intended sales. However, a company can only credibly commit to sell-
ing large parts of its inventory if disposal is costly. Due to this opposing
effect, each firm’s profits may increase separately in disposal costs. Firms
may profitably agree on costlier disposal, e.g., in the form of higher recycling
standards. Expected disposal decreases, yet consumer surplus, too.
In our set-up, a regulatory increase in disposal costs impairs firms and
consumers. We discuss some exceptions, whereby firms may benefit more
often than consumers. Our model is consistent with the market structure
in the fashion market. Furthermore, our model explains the ‘reshoring’ of
firms. If cost advantages abroad decline or disposal costs increase, informa-
tion about demand becomes more valuable. Thus, firms produce closer to
their home market.
We studied demand uncertainty. However, in some markets, demand is
relatively predictable, but costs may vary due to input factor prices. Com-
modities that are expensive in production are less often disposed of. Study-
ing cost uncertainty may, therefore, be of interest.21 Another interesting
question is how disposal costs affect collusive behavior. Paha (2017) studies
collusion with capacities; Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) study the use of in-
ventory for strategic collusion. US data of the aluminum industry analyzed
in Rosenbaum (1989) reveals markups’ negative correlation with inventory,
but a positive with excess capacity. Low disposal costs allow an inexpensive
firm’s adjustment, it is thus easier to deviate, and strategic collusion may be
aggravated.
21In Thille (2006) the prediction of the model crucially depends on the primary un-
certainty. Less competitive market structures have a relatively low price variance when
uncertainty is primarily due to uncertain cost and relatively high price variance when
uncertainty is mainly due to uncertain demand.
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1.A Proofs
This section contains all Lemmas’ and Propositions’ proofs and derives the
best response (1.5) and (1.15).
Proof Equation (1.5). Firm i maximizes (1.1) subject to (1.4). Note that by
(1.4) the sales volume equals not always the inventory. To simplify notation,
we write q̄i explicitly whenever qi = q̄i and use q̂i when the sales volume is
lower than the inventory.
Suppose first, qj,h − qj,l ≤ 2β(a + d)/(1 − β2), thus, firm i’s expected
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(a− (1 + β)(q̂i + qj,l) + d)q̂i − dq̄i, else.
In the first part firm i sells its total inventory regardless of the demand’s
state, yielding the interior solution q̄i = a/2 − (1 + β)qj,l/4 + (1 − β)qj,h/4.
In the second part, firm i disposes of if demand is below expectations, yield-
ing the interior solution q̄i = (a − d)/(2(1 − β)) − qj,h/2. The third part
is strictly decreasing. Whenever 2(βa − d) ≤ (1 − β2)(qj,h − qj,l), the sec-
ond part is decreasing and the first interior solution is the global maximum.
Otherwise, the first part is increasing and the second interior solution is the
global maximum. This can be rewritten as the best response function given
in (1.5).
It remains to show that for qj,h − qj,l > 2β(a + d)/(1 − β2) no other
maximum exists. The second part of the expected profit function changes:
firm i disposes of in the high state and sells its inventory in the low demand
state. This implies that the sales volume in the high state is lower than in
the low state, qi,h ≤ qi,l. However, the right-hand side in the inequality above
is weakly positive, yielding a contradiction. Thus (1.5) is indeed firm i’s best
response.
Proof Lemma 1.1. We prove that the unique equilibrium is given in Table
1.1. Therefore, we look for fixpoints for the best response function of (1.4)
and (1.5). We go step by step through all three parts in (1.5) and derive
thereby all equilibria.
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First we show that q̄i = 0 is never an equilibrium. Therefore, we show
that qi,s = 0 is never an equilibrium. Both firms’ sales volumes are strictly














implying that qj,s ≤ min{(a + d)/bs, (a − d)/(1 − β)}. Accordingly, firm i’s
sales volume qi,s > 0. This proofs that both firms sell a strictly positive
quantity. Hence, q̄i > 0.
Next, suppose firm i sells its inventory in both demand state. Hence,
q̄i = a/2 − (1 + β)qj,l/4 − (1 − β)qj,h/4 and qi,l = qi,h = q̄i. Firm j’s best
response is q̄j = max{a/2− q̄i/2, (a− d/(2(1− β))− q̄i/2}.
Suppose first d < βa, hence, q̄j = qj,h = (a − d/(2(1 − β)) − q̄i/2 and
qj,l = (a + d)(2(1 + β)) − q̄i/2. Direct calculation imply q̄i = a/3, and
qj,h = (βa−d)/(2(1−β)). A necessary condition is that a/3 is the maximum
of (1.5), which simplifies to 3d ≥ 2a+ βa, which yields a contradiction, thus
there is no equilibrium where firm i sells its inventory in both states but firm
j disposes of.
Suppose now that also firm j sells its inventory in both states, d ≥ βa.
Direct calculation imply that q̄i = qi,l = qi,h = a/3, which forms a symmetric
equilibrium if d ≥ βa. This proofs the second part in Table 1.1.
Finally, suppose firm i disposes of if demand is below expectations, thus
q̄i = (a− d)/(2(1−β))− qj,h/2. By the arguments above q̄j = (a− d)/(2(1−
β))− qi,h/2. Direct calculations imply the symmetric equilibrium candidate
q̄i = qi,h = (a − d)/(3(1 − β)) and qi,l = (a + d)/(3(1 + β)). The necessary
condition that (a−d)/(3(1−β)) is the maximum of (1.5) simplifies to d < βa.
This proofs the first part in Table 1.1.
Hence, the equilibrium is unique. Plugging in the sales volume yields
the expected expressions in Lemma 1.1. Since β ∈ [0, 1), the negative effect
of d is more weighted than the positive. Thus, d’s negative effect follows
directly.
Proof Lemma 1.2. Firms know the demand’s state and maximize (1.2). Note
that similar as in Lemma 1.1, qi,s = 0 is never an equilibrium. Therefore, best
response functions are linearly and strictly decreasing in the relevant part
and a unique equilibrium exists. Exploiting the symmetry directly implies
qH,s = (a−c)/(3bs). Plugging in the sales volume yields the desired result.
Proof Lemma 1.3. The leader’s best response function is given by (1.5), the
follower’s by (1.8). Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.1, we analyze the best
response function step by step to find all equilibria.
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Suppose q̄1 = 0, directly implying q1,g = q1,b = 0 and thus q2,s = (a −
c)/(2bs). However, the leader’s best response is q̄1 > 0, hence there is no
equilibrium with zero inventory.
Next, suppose q̄1 = a/2− (1 +β)q2,b/4 + (1−β)q2,g/4, i.e. the leader sells
her inventory in both states. Combining this with the best response of the
follower yields q̄1 = (a+c)/3, which is indeed an equilibrium if β(a+c)/2 ≤ d.
Lastly suppose q̄1 = (a − d)/(2(1 − β)) − q2,g/2, combining this with
(1.8) yields q̄1 = (a − 2d + c)/(3(1 − β)), which is indeed an equilibrium if
β(a+ c)/2 > d.
No other equilibria exist since it would not be on firm 1’s best response
function. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. Plugging in the sales values
yields directly the expected expressions. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.1,
d’s effect follows directly.
Proof Proposition 1.1. Both firms choose strategy H if E[πH ] ≥ E[π1], where












, if d ≥ β a+c
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with β ≥ βH(d) the strategy pair (H,H) is an equilibrium. First, for d < β a+c2
the inequality can be rearranged to βd(a+ c) ≥ ac+ d2, hence, the first part
directly follows. Note that the left-hand side increases stronger in d than the
right-hand side, since d ≤ β(a + c). By definition, the first part of βH(d)
therefore decreases. For d ≥ β a+c
2
the inequality simplifies to β2(a+c)2 ≥ 4ac,
which concludes the proof of (i).
Both firms choose strategy A if E[πA] ≥ E[π2], where the expressions are
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, if d ≥ βa,
with β ≤ βA(d) the strategy pair (A,A) is an equilibrium. First, note that
βa ≥ β(a+c)/2. For d < β(a+c)/2 the inequality simplifies to βd ≤ c, which
concludes the first part. Obviously, it decreases in d. For d ∈ [β(a+c)/2, βa],
the inequality can be written as β2(a+c)(5a−7c)+8βad−16c(a−c)−4d2 ≤ 0.
The left-hand side is convex and at β = 0 negative and increasing. Hence,
the larger root is the relevant one, which is explicitly given in the second
part.
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We use the implicit function theorem to show βA(d)’s second part has a
negative slope. The left-hand side’s derivative with respect to d is 8(βa−d) >
0; the derivative with respect to β is 2β(a + c)(7a − 7c) ≥ 0. Hence, the
implicit function theorem implies that βA(d) decreases.
For d ≥ βa the inequality simplifies to β2(9a+7c) ≤ 16c, which concludes
the proof of (ii).
Inverting the inequalities proves (iii). It remains to show that βA(d) ≤
βH(d) to proof the generical uniqueness. We show in the following proof that
the inequality holds.
Proof Proposition 1.2. We first compare the leader’s and follower’s profits.
The leader’s profits are larger if and only if E[π1] ≥ E[π2], where the ex-










(3a−c)(a+c) , if d ≥ β a+c2 .
Thus, β ≤ βAH(d) implies E[π1] ≥ E[π2] and β ≥ βAH(d) implies E[π1] ≤
E[π2].
Hence, it is sufficient to show that βA(d) ≤ βAH(d) ≤ βH(d). If this
is the case, a firm’s profits increase discontinuously if the other delays its
production. Technically, at βA(d) by definition E[πA] = E[π2] and by the
inequality above E[π1] ≥ E[π2]. Similarly at βH(d) by definition E[πH ] =
E[π1] and by the inequality above E[π2] ≥ E[π1]. Thus, the leader’s profit
jumps up at βA(d) while the follower’s jumps down at βH(d).
For d < β(a+c)/2, the two inequalities above can be simplified to 2ac2 ≤
ac2−c3+ad2+cd2 ≤ 2ad2, i.e. for the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium
it has to hold that c2 ≤ d2. The two inequalities can be rewritten as (a +
c)(d2 − c2) > 0 and (a − c)(c2 − d2) < 0, which both are true whenever an
asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Since βH(d) and βAH(d) are continuous and constant while βA(d) decrease
for d ≥ β(a+ c)/2 the relevant inequality holds. This directly concludes the
proof for the firms’ part.
For the consumer surplus, we first show a discontinuous decrease at β =
βA(d) and finally we prove a discontinuous increase at β = βH(d).
First, at β = βA(d), E[CSA] > E[CSAH ], where the expressions are given
by (1.7) and (1.13). For d < β(a + c)/2 the inequality simplifies to 8ac −
2c2 +6d2 > 4βd(c−6a), where the left-hand side is strictly positive while the
right-hand side is strictly negative. For d ∈ [β(a + c)/2, βa), the inequality
simplifies to 32ac−64ad−8c2+32d2+β(a+c)(16a−8c)−2β2(a+c)2 > 0. The
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left-hand side is a concave function in β. Suppose β → 0, this implies d→ 0,
hence, the inequality is satisfied for low β. The left-hand side is positive and
increasing at β = 0, furthermore, its maximal value is at β = (4a−2c)/(a+c),
which is strictly larger than 1. Hence, the inequality holds for any β ∈ [0, 1).
Since the expected consumer surplus is continuous and constant for d ≥ βa,
this concludes the first part.
Next we show that at β = βH(d), E[CSH ] > E[CSAH ], where the ex-
pressions are given by (1.10) and (1.13). For d ≤ β(a + c)/2 the inequality
simplifies to 4βd(2a− c) > 2(4ac− 3c2 + d2). Plugging in βH(d) we can sim-
plify the expression to (d2− c2)(a− c) > 0. This is a necessary condition for
the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium as discussed above. Since both
functions are continuous and constant for d ≥ β(a+ c)/2 this concludes the
proof for the consumer surplus.
It remains to prove that expected disposal decreases in its cost. First
note that in the (H,H) subgame, expected disposal is always zero. Next,
using Lemma 1.1 and 1.3, we derive that expected disposal in the (A,A)
subgame equilibrium is larger than in the (A,H) if and only if β ≥ c/(3a).
This is independent of d. From Proposition 1.1 it follows directly that the
minimal uncertainty for (A,H) to form an equilibrium is β =
√
16c/(9a+ 7c).
The direct comparison yields that whenever (A,H) may be an equilibrium,
the expected disposal is lower since 9ac(a − c) + 135a2c − 7c3 > 0. This
concludes the proof.
Proof Equation (1.15). Similar as in Equation (1.5)’s proof we use again q̄i
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[(a− (1 + β)(q̂i + qj,l))q̂i−
max{d(q̄i − q̂i), c(q̂i − q̄i}], else.
In the first part, firm i sells its inventory in both states, yielding the
interior solution q̄i = a/2 − (1 + β)qj,l/4 + (1 − β)qj,h/4. In the second
part firm i disposes of if demand is below expectations, yielding the interior
solution q̄i = (a − d)/(2(1 − β)) − qj,h/2. In the third part, firm i produces
additional quantities if demand is above expectations, yielding the interior
solution q̄i = (a + c)/(2(1 + β)) − qj,l/2. The fourth part is strictly in or
decreasing, depending on c and d. If c = d there may exists multiple maxima,
where the firm disposes of if demand is below expectations or produces if it is
above expectations. However, all yield the same expected profit as if the firm
only produces, or only disposes of instead of doing both, since the expected
profit function is continuous.
If max{2(βa−c), 2(βa−d)} ≤ (1−β2)(qj,h−qj,l), the first part is indeed an
interior solution and the second part is strictly decreasing; the third strictly
increasing, hence it is the unique maximum. Furthermore, for the region’s
existence we need that qj,h−qj,l ≥ 2βa−(1+β)c−(1−β)d, which is satisfied
in equilibrium.
If d < c, and 2(βa− c) ≤ (1− β2)(qj,h− qj,l) ≤ 2(βa− d), the first part is
strictly increasing, the second has an interior solution and the third is strictly
increasing. Thus the second part is the global maximum.
Finally, if d > c and (1− β2)(qj,h− qj,l) ≤ 2(βa− d), the first and second
part are strictly decreasing and the third part is an interior solution. The
global maximum is thus the third part. This yields the best response function
(1.15).
Proof Proposition 1.3. By the similar argument as in Proposition 1.1’s proof
firm i’s sales volume is strictly positive in both demand states. The best
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where q̄i is given by (1.15). The inventory is strictly positive: production
is costly in the second stage, firms produce at least the low demand’s state
sales volume in the first period.
To derive all equilibria, we analyze the best response function step by
step.
We start with (1.15)’s first part: suppose q̄i = (a + c)(2(1 + β))− qj,l/2,
which implies qi,h = (a− c)/(2(1− β))− qj,h/2 and qi,l = q̄i.
First, suppose q̄j = qj,l = (a + c)(2(1 + β)) − qi,l/2 and qj,h = (a −
c)/(2(1− β))− qi,h/2. By symmetry we directly get qi,h = (a− c)/(3(1− β))
and q̄i = qi,l = (a+c)/(3(1+β)), which indeed forms a symmetric equilibrium
if c < min{βa, d}.





qi,l − 1−β4 qi,h. We directly get
that q̄j = a/3 and qi,h = (a + c)/(2(1 + β)) − a/6 and qi,l = (a − c)/(2(1 −
β)) − a/6. Hence, qi,h − qi,l = (βa − c)/(1 − β2), which has to be positive.
Yet in order to have firm j play a best response it has to be negative, hence,
a contradiction.
Lastly, note that q̄j = (a− d)(2(1− β))− qi,h/2 is never a best response
since it contradicts d > c. This concludes the first part of (1.15).
Next, suppose q̄i = a/2 − (1 + β)qj,l/4 − (1 − β)qj,h/4, which implies
qi,l = qi,h = q̄i.





qi,l − 1−β4 qi,h, by symmetry
we directly get q̄i = qi,h = qi,l = a/3, which indeed forms a symmetric
equilibrium if βa ≤ min{c, d}.
Second, suppose q̄j = qj,h = (a−d)(2(1−β))−qi,h/2 and qj,l = (a+d)(2(1+
β))−qi,l/2. Direct calculation yield q̄i = a/3 and qj,h = (a−d)/(2(1−β))−a/6
and qj,l = (a + d)/(2(1 + β)) − a/6, hence, qj,h − qj,l = (βa − d)/(1 − β2),
which has to be positive. Yet a necessary condition for firm i’s strategy to
be a best reply is d ≥ βa, yielding a contradiction.
This concludes the second part of (1.15). Finally, suppose q̄i = qi,h =
(a− d)(2(1− β))− qj,h/2 and qi,l = (a+ d)(2(1 + β))− qj,l/2. The remaining
case is the symmetric one for q̄j = qj,h = (a − d)(2(1 − β)) − qi,h/2 and
qj,l = (a+ d)(2(1 +β))− qi,l/2. We directly get q̄i = qi,h = (a− d)/(3(1−β))
and qi,l = (a + d)/(3(1 + β)), which forms a symmetric equilibrium if d <
min{βa, c}.
Plugging in the sale volumes yields the expected values. The disposal
cost’s negative effect immediately follows from Lemma 1.3.
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1.B Supplementary Materials
Mixed Equilibrium. This section derives the unique symmetric equili-
birum. Note that we have shown in section 1.3 that the equilibrium is unique
and symmetric whenever (A,A) or (H,H) forms an equilibrium, see Proposi-
tion 1.1 for details. Whenever the asymmetric equilibirum exists, there exists
a second asymmetric equilibrium with the firms label interchanged. Further-
more, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, where the
probability to play strategy H is
p =
E[πA]− E[π2]
E[πA]− E[π2] + E[πH ]− E[π1]
,











(E[πA]− E[π2] + E[πH ]− E[π1])2
≥ 0.
The sing follows from the expected profits derived in Lemma 1.1-1.3, further-
more, existence requires E[πA] ≤ E[π2] and E[πH ] ≤ E[π1]. Note that p is
continuous in d and the derivative exists everywhere except for d = β(a+c)/2
and d = βa. Thus, the probability to play strategy H increases in d.
The expected profits in the mixed equilibrium can be written as














(E[π1]− E[πH ])(E[πA]− E[π1]) +
∂E[πA]
∂d
(E[π1]− E[πH ])(E[π2]− E[πH ]) +
∂E[π1]
∂d
(E[π2]− E[πA])(E[π2]− E[πH ]).
By the analysis in the main text we have close to βH(d) that E[π1] ≈ E[πH ]
and E[π2] ≥ E[πA]. Thus, expected profits decrease in d. However, expected
profits may also increase. For example at parameters a = 1, c = 1/5, β = 2/3,
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and d = 1/3, the expected profits are 0.1417, yet at d = 0.334 expected profits
are 0.1418.
By contrast to the main text, expected profits are continuous. The non-
monotonicity follows from the same economic effect discussed in the main
text. Disposal costs decrease expected profits under strategy A, precisely
E[πA] and E[π1], thus firms play strategy A with a smaller probability if d
increases. However, in the mixed equilibrium an asymmetric outcome arises
with probability p(1 − p). In this asymmetric outcome, the second firm
has an information advantage; its valuation increases in d. The probability p
increases in d, and whenever it is close to 1, this positive effect is a rare event.
Therefore, only the negative effect remains, and expected profits decrease.
N Firms. In this section we extend the model from section 1.4 in the main
text to N symmetric firms. Lets repeat the set-up. Each firm produces
inventory q̄i at zero marginal costs. After demand’s realization, firms choose
their sales volume qi. On the one hand, if the sales volume exceeds the firm’s
inventory, the additional quantity induces marginal costs of c > 0. On the
other hand, if a firm’s sales volume deceeds its inventory, the disposed of
quantity induces marginal costs of d > 0. A firm’s profits can be written as
E[π(qi, q̄i)] = E[Ps(Q)qi − cmax{(qi − q̄i, 0} − dmax{(q̄i − qi, 0}],
where the inverse demand is Ps(Q) = a−bs(Q). The intercept a > max{c, d}
is common knowledge, while the slope bs takes on the value bl = 1 + β or
bh = 1− β, each with equal probability. Q is the total sales volume, i.e., the
sum of qi over all N .
As in the main text, we assume that firms do not observe their competi-
tors’ inventories. In the second stage, a firm takes its own inventory as given
and chooses qi ≥ 0 to maximize
π(qi|q̄i) = Ps(Q)qi − cmax{(qi − q̄i, 0} − dmax{(q̄i − qi, 0}.

























j 6=i qj is the other firms’ sales volume. Since firms compete
with a homogeneous product, it is of now matter for firm i how Q−i is com-
plied.









Q−i,l, if d > c and Q−i,h −Q−i,l < 2(βa−c)1−β2 ;
a−d







Q−i,l − 1−β4 Q−i,h, else.
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qi high demand low demand












Table 1.5: N-firms’ inventory and sales volume with multiple manufacturing sites.
Inventory equals the sales volume in the high (low) demand state if d < min{βa, c}
(c < min{βa, d}).
We immediately obtain the symmetric equilibrium inventories and sales
quantities summarized in Table 1.5.
Comparing Table 1.5 with Table 1.4 in the main text, shows that the
equilibrium is similar and thus the results in Proposition 1.3 remain valid
for any number of firms. However, an interesting trade off for policymakers
arises in the number of firms. Suppose d < min{βa, c}, thus, firms dispose of













Expected consumer surplus increases in the number of firms, N/(N + 1) <
(N + 1)/(N + 2) ⇔ N2 + 2N < N2 + 2N + 1, which generally results from
increased competition. The expected disposal, however, also increases in the
number of firms. It can be written as





and by the same formal argument as above, expected disposal increases in
the number of firms. Disposal costs decrease the disposed of quantity, as in
the main text, moreover even stronger the more firms are in the market.
In this set-up, increasing competition due to the number of firms benefits
consumers yet increases the disposal. Policymakers concerned about the
discarded quantities, therefore, face a trade-off.
Suppose firms face fixed costs, such that there exists an upper bound on
N where firms expect positive profits. Let’s denote the fix cost by F , firms’
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Increasing disposal costs decrease profits. Consequently, the upper bound on
N decreases, and some firms leave the market. A decrease in firms’ number
decreases competition and thus consumer surplus, while firms may benefit
from fewer competitors. Generally, consumers are worse off if disposal is
costly due to the lower inventory hold by firms and, additionally, to a decrease
in the number of firms.
Observable Inventories. This section contains the formal derivation of
the discussion in section 1.4. We use the same model as above for N = 2. By
contrast, we assume that firms observe their competitor’s inventories before
choosing their sales volume. Remind that we assume a ≥ 2c + d to ensure
that both firms are active.
In the second stage, firms take their inventory as given and maximize
their profits
π(qi|q̄i) = Ps(Q)qi − cmax{(qi − q̄i, 0} − dmax{(q̄i − qi, 0},























Since competitors observe inventories, we derive the sales game’s subgame
equilibrium following any firm’s inventory choice. Lets denote the firm with
the larger inventory as 1 and the other by 2, i.e., we assume without loss
of generality q̄1 ≥ q̄2. Combining the best response functions, we can derive
the unique subgame equilibrium for different ranges of parameters, which we
summarize in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.4. Let q̄1 ≥ q̄2. The unique subgame equilibrium sales volumes
following the inventories
(i) q̄1 ≤ a−c3bs are




(ii) q̄1 ∈ [a−c3bs ,
a+c+2d
3bs
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(iii) q̄1 ≤ a+d2bs −
1
2




q1 = q̄1 and q2 = q̄2;











(v) q̄1 ≥ a+d2bs −
1
2









q̄2 and q2 = q̄2;
(vi) q̄2 ≥ a+d3bs are




Only in subgames (ii) and (iii) does firm i sell its inventory. Otherwise,
it always produces additional quantities or disposes of.
To derive all equilibria, we first exclude inventory ranges that are never
optimal and, therefore no candidates for an equilibrium. Start with q̄1 <
(a− c)/(3(1 + β)), both firms produce additional quantity even if demand is
below expectation. By increasing their inventory, firms decrease their costs.
Similarly if q̄2 > (a+ d)/(3(1− β)), both firms dispose of even if demand is
above expectations. Firms decrease their costs by decreasing their inventory.
The maximal quantity that firm 1 could sell is (a + c + 2d)/(3(1 − β)),
thus any larger inventory is never optimal. Similarly, the minimal quantity
that firm 2 could sell is (a− 2c− d)/(3(1 + β)), thus any lower inventory is
never optimal.
If q̄1 > (a + d)/(2(1 − β)) − q̄2/2, firm 1 disposes of even if demand is
above expectations. By decreasing its inventory the firm decreases its costs.
Similarly, if q̄2 < (a − c)/(2(1 + β)) − q̄1/2, firm 2 decreases its costs if it
increases its inventory since it produces additional quantities even if demand
is below expectations.
There remain six different areas for the inventory’s equilibrium strategy.
We summarize them in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1.5. Let q̄1 ≥ q̄2. The following six areas may contain an equilib-
rium.
(i) If q̄1 ≤ a−c3(1−β) and q̄2 ≥ a−c2(1+β) − 12 q̄1, firms sell their inventory in the
low demand state and produce additional quantities if demand is above
expectations.
(ii) If q̄1 ≤ a+d2(1+β) − 12 q̄2 and q̄2 ≥ a−c2(1−β) − 12 q̄1, firms sell their inventories
regardless of the demand’s realization.
(iii) If q̄1 ≤ a+d2(1−β) − 12 q̄2 and q̄2 ≥ a+d3(1+β) , firms sell their inventories if
demand is above expectations and disposes of otherwise.
(iv) If q̄1 ∈ [ a−c3(1−β) , a+d2(1+β) − 12 q̄2] and q̄2 ∈ [ a−c2(1+β) − 12 q̄1, a−c2(1−β) − 12 q̄1], firm
1 sells its inventory regardless of the demand’s realization, while firm
2 sells its inventory if demand is below expectation and produces addi-
tional quantities otherwise.
(v) If q̄1 ∈ [ a+d2(1+β) − 12 q̄2, a+d2(1−β) − 12 q̄2] and q̄2 ∈ [ a−c2(1−β) − 12 q̄1, a+d3(1+β) ], firm 1
sells its inventory if demand is above expectation and disposes of other-
wise, while firm 2 sells its inventory regardless of demand’s realization.
(vi) If q̄1 ∈ [ a+d2(1+β) − 12 q̄2, a+c+2d3(1−β) ] and q̄2 ∈ [a−2c−d3(1+β) , a−c2(1−β) − 12 q̄1], firm 1 sells
its inventory if demand is above expectation and disposes of otherwise,
while firm 2 sells its inventory if demand is below expectations and
produces additional quantities otherwise.
Next, we analyze each area for an equilibrium. We use as in the proof
in the main text q̂1 if the sales volume is not equal to the inventory and
explicitly q̄1 if it equals the inventory. In (i) firm 1’s profits are E[π1] =
[(a− (1−β)(q̂1 +q2,h−c))q̂1 +(a− (1+β)(q̄1 +q2,l)−c)q̄1]/2+cq̄1, implying a
unique symmetric interior solution q̄i = (a+c)/(3(1+β)) if c < min{βa, d}, in
(ii), E[π1] = [(a−(1−β)(q̄1+q2,h−c))q̄1+(a−(1+β)(q̄1+q2,l))q̄1]/2 implying
the unique symmetric equilibrium q̄i = a/3 if βa ≤ min{c, d}, and in (iii),
E[π1] = [(a− (1− β)(q̄1 + q2,h + d))q̄1 + (a− (1 + β)(q̂1 + q2,l) + d)q̂1]/2− dq̄1
implying the unique symmetric equilibrium q̄i = (a + d)/(3(1 + β)) if d ≤
min{βa, c}. For the technical details see the proof of Proposition 1.3 in
the main text; the symmetric equilibrium is equivalent. Hence, the same
symmetric equilibrium exists regardless if inventory is observed or not.
Finally, we analyze asymmetric equilibria. Focus first on (iv), firm’s
best replies are technically already derived in the proof of Proposition 1.3.
The unique equilibrium candidate is q̄1 = q1,h = q1,l = 2a/(5 + 2β) and
q̄2 = q2,l = (3a + 5c + 2βc)/(2(1 + β)(5 + 2β)), which is indeed an interior
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equilibrium if βa ≥ c, c(5+2β)+a−8βa ≥ 0 and (c−2d)(5+2β)+a+4βa ≤ 0.
Note that this equilibrium is independent of d, only its existence depends on
the disposal costs. If disposal costs are low, this equilibrium does not exist.
We show next, that in (v) no equilibrium exists. The unique candidate is
given by q̄1 = q1,h = (3a− d(5− 2β))/(2(1− β)(5− 2β)), q1,l = (3a− 4βa+
d(5− 2β))/(2(1 + β)(5− 2β)), and q̄2 = q2,h = q2,l = 2a/(5− 2β). Necessary
condition for its existence are d ≤ βa and d ≥ (a+ 8βa)/(5− 2β), hence, the
range for d only exists if a+ 3βa+ 2β2a ≤ 0, which yields a contradiction.
Lastly we derive the equilibrium in (vi). The inventories’ first order
conditions are already derived in the proof of Proposition 1.3. This implies
the unique equilibrium candidate q̄1 = q1,h = (a + c− 2d)/(2(1− β)), q1,l =
(a−2c+3d)/(4(1+β)), q̄2 = q2,l = (a+2c−d)/(2(1+β)), and q2,h = (a−3c+
2d)/(4(1− β)). This indeed forms an interior equilibrium if d ≥ (a + c)/10,
(7 + β)d ≤ a + 3βa + 4c, and 4d ≥ a − 3βa + 7c − βc. We summarize the
equilibrium in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.4. If max{(a+c)/10, (a+7c−3βa−βc)/4} ≤ d ≤ min{(a+















4(1−β) ; q2,l = q̄2.
Firm 1 disposes of if demand is lower than expected; firm 2 produces
additional quantities if demand is higher than expected, otherwise firms sell
their inventories. Expected prices, disposal, profits, and consumer surplus






E[q̄1 − q1] =




















Expected disposal and consumer surplus decreases with disposal costs, while
expected prices and firm 2’s profits increase; firm 1’s expected profits are
ambiguous.
By contrast to the other cases, expected prices increase in disposal costs.
Firms decrease their inventories, and thus expected trade volume decreases,
implying higher prices. Firms’ hand an increase in disposal costs over to
consumers. Interestingly, expected prices decrease with c. The higher the
production cost in the second period, the more firms increase their inventory,
which is produced at zero costs. Parts of this reduced production costs are
handed over to consumers.
Expected disposal decreases in its costs, as in the other cases. The larger
firm is the one disposing of if demand is below expectations. Higher disposal
costs decrease the firm’s inventory and disposal. Therefore, its sales volume
in the high demand state is lower, yet higher if demand is below expectations.
By contrast, the smaller firm sells less if demand is below expectations and
increases its sales volume if demand is above expectations.
Profits and consumer surplus are convex in d. Firm 1’s profits are am-
biguously affected by d. On the one hand, firm 1’s cost increase if demand
is below expectations. On the other hand, firm 1’s sales volume also in-
creases, resulting in a larger market share. The total effect on profits is thus
ambiguous.
Firm 2 produces mainly in the second period, thus, with an informa-
tion advantage: the higher disposal costs, the more severe this information
advantage, increasing firm 2’s profits.
Consequently, there exist parameter ranges, where both profits increase.
Consumer surplus, however, decreases in d. Firms produce less inventory if
disposal is costly. If demand is higher than expected, firms indeed produce
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additional quantity yet at higher costs. Therefore, the trade volume decreases
and, thereby, consumer surplus.
For further discussion see the main text. Conclusively, we present next
the numerical simulation to show that firms may oppose to observe their
competitor’s inventory. Suppose a = 1, c = 1/4, and β = 3/4. With
d = 1/2 it follows E[π2] = 0.231 ≥ E[πi] = 0.1746 ≥ E[π1] = 0.087, thus the
smaller firm prefers if inventories are observable but the larger one is worse
off. With d = 1/3, E[πi] = 0.1746 ≥ E[π2] = 0.1536 ≥ E[π1] = 0.1252,
thus both firms prefers if inventories are private. Finally, with d = 1/5,
E[π1] = 0.2022 ≥ E[πi] = 0.1879 ≥ E[π2] = 0.1132, thus the larger firm
prefers if inventories are observed.

Chapter 2




To encourage private negotiations for damages in antitrust cases some ju-
risdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the
effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement
negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle
without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction increases the settlement
amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are
actually fined. Under a leniency program the rebate does not affect the le-
niency applicant: she doesn’t pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall
effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative.
2.1 Introduction
Antitrust rules are enforced publicly by competition agencies, typically by
way of fines. Moreover, they can be enforced privately by the victims of an
infringement through damage actions. In quite a few jurisdictions there is
concern about the underdevelopment of private antitrust enforcement. For
example, while in the US private cases already amount to at least 90% of
antitrust enforcement, in the EU no more than 10% of antitrust enforcement
was private.1 During the period 2006-2012 less than 25% of the Commission’s
1EU (2007), p. 28.
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infringement decisions were followed by private damages actions. Cases were
mostly brought in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, while
no follow-on actions were reported in 20 out of 28 member states.2
Several factors contribute to this underdevelopment: Typically, jurisdic-
tions in Europe do not allow for collective actions and do not award punitive
damages. Furthermore, the plaintiff in a civil suit does not have the means
of an antitrust authority like dawn raids etc. to prove the infringement.3
Finally, the plaintiff assumes substantial expense risk, in particular if the
English cost allocation rule applies and contingency fees are not allowed.
To encourage private antitrust enforcement the EU adopted Directive
2014/104/EU in 2014. The Directive establishes the right of victims to obtain
full compensation for the harm caused by an anti-competitive conduct. Full
compensation includes actual losses and loss of profit, plus interest from
the time the harm occurred until compensation is paid. In order to ensure
that the right to full compensation is effectively guaranteed, the Directive
introduces a number of measures which should facilitate antitrust damages
claims in EU Member States.4
One measure that has been put forward lately is to subtract part of a
voluntary redress paid to the victims from the fine. For example, in its de-
cisions Strassenbau and Engadin II (3.9.2019), the Swiss Competition Com-
mission subtracted half of the settlement payment paid by the bid rigging
construction companies to the victim (the Canton of Graubünden) from the
wrongdoers’ fines.5 Likewise, in June 2014 the Israeli Antitrust Tribunal
approved a consent decree reached between Israeli banks who allegedly ex-
changed information and the Israeli Antitrust Authority providing that the
entire settlement payment would be subtracted from the wrongdoers’ fine.6
The EU also allows for this possibility. For instance, the Directive (EU)
2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council states: (47)...“ NCAs
[national competition authorities] should be able to take into account any
compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement” [our emphasis]
and in Article 14(2) “Member States shall ensure that national competition
authorities may consider compensation paid as a result of a consensual settle-
ment [our emphasis] when determining the amount of the fine to be imposed
2OECD (2015), p. 5.
3The burden of proof is, however, lower in a civil than in an administrative suit.
4For details about the measures, see, e.g., OECD (2015).
5www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/58229.pdf (last accessed March
15, 2021).
6See H′′43129-03-10 Bank Hapoalim Ltd. v. Director General of the Israeli Antitrust
Authority (15.6.2014).
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for an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, in accordance with Article
18(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU.”7
In this chapter we analyze whether rebating fines indeed stimulates pri-
vate damage negotiations. Furthermore, we study the effects on deterrence,
in particular if a leniency program applies.
A firm has been fined by the antitrust authority for anti-competitive
behavior. The victim seeks damages. The victim and the firm may settle
the case out-of-court. The competition authority subtracts a fraction of
the settlement payment from the wrongdoer’s fine. If they do not reach a
settlement, the victim can take the case to court.
The players’ payoffs from going to court determine their threat points
in the bargaining stage. Bargaining is of the random offeror type.8 If the
plaintiff does not go to court in the last stage, his outside option whilst
bargaining is zero. The defendant will, therefore, not settle. This holds
independently of the amount that is subtracted from the defendant’s fine.
Rebating the fine thus does not stimulate settlements that would otherwise
not occur.
If the plaintiff goes to court, the parties settle without the rebate. Intro-
ducing the reduction increases the settlement amount: the rebate increases
the surplus and at the same time lowers the defendant’s marginal cost of
settling. Thus, if parties settle without the rebate, its introduction increases
the settlement amount.
Ex ante the prospect of paying the fine and the settlement potentially
deter the defendant. The rebate lowers the fine and at the same time increases
the settlement. In our set-up the first effect is stronger than the second one—
deterrence, therefore, goes down.
7https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2019:011:
FULL&from=EN (last accessed March 15, 2021). In two cases, Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel
[1999] OJ L24/1 and Nintendo [2003] OJ L255/33, the European Commission granted
reductions of fines in recognition of the fact that the wrongdoers had paid substantial
compensation. The European Commission refused to grant reductions in other cases. The
EC Court of First Instance confirmed in Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006]
ECR II-3627 that there is no obligation to grant such reductions. The UK offers to reduce
the fine by 5-10% should an undertaking make a voluntary redress in the processing on
imposing penalty. In Korea the competition agencies can apply a 20-30% reduction. In
Turkey the fine can be reduced at a rate of 25-60%. In Canada restitution is a factor that
can be taken into account by a court in imposing a sentence for a criminal offence. The
Dutch and Spanish competition authorities take into account voluntary compensation as
a mitigating circumstance in setting the fine. In the US the Department of Justice does
not grant rebates; there voluntary compensation is one of the conditions for obtaining
leniency. See Wils (2009), OECD (2015), and Cartel Working Group (2019).
8In the first appendix we extend our results to the Nash Bargaining Solution.
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Then we look at a leniency applicant under a leniency program. Since
the leniency applicant is exempted from the fine, she does not care about the
rebate. The rebate reduces deterrence for non whistle blowers. It does not
affect deterrence for the leniency applicant. The relative incentive to turn
the cartel members in, therefore, goes down. Consequently, the overall effect
of a rebate on deterrence is negative.
Finally, we show that our results remain true if the agents have asym-
metric rather than symmetric information.
Rebating fines is thus not a clever idea in our framework. It does not
stimulate settlements that would not occur absent the rebate. If parties
settle without the reduction, the rebate increases the settlement amount—
however, at the price of reduced deterrence. Moreover, the rebate makes
it less attractive for a cartel member to blow the whistle under a leniency
program.
Related Literature. We are not aware of any formal papers focusing on
fine rebates. There is a literature concerning private and public enforcement
of antitrust laws.9 Shavell (1997) analyzes the divergence between the private
and social motives to sue. When a plaintiff contemplates litigating, he does
neither consider the legal costs incurred by others, nor does he recognize the
positive effects on deterrence. Shavell discusses several corrective policies,
one of which is to foster settlement over trial. McAfee et al. (2008) show
that if courts are accurate, adding private to public enforcement increases
welfare; if courts are not accurate, private enforcement increases welfare only
if the government is inefficient in litigation. Bourjade et al. (2009) study
antitrust litigation and settlement under asymmetric information. They find
that increasing damages induce more private litigation of well-founded cases
than reducing filing costs.
Buccirossi et al. (2019) analyze whether private actions for damages may
jeopardize leniency programs. The evidence provided by the leniency ap-
plicant may be used in the damage action. Moreover, since the leniency
applicant typically does not challenge the decision of the antitrust author-
ity, under joint liability she may be the first one to be targeted in a private
action.10 Buccirossi et al. show that damage actions improve a leniency pro-
9See, e.g., Segal and Whinston (2007) for a survey.
10There are, however, exceptions. In the air cargo cartel Lufthansa received full immu-
nity from fines under the European Commission’s leniency program because it was the first
to provide information about the cartel (europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-10-1487 en.
htm?locale=en, last accessed March 15, 2021). Nevertheless, Lufthansa filed an ap-
peal “based on legal considerations” (www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-01-27/
japan-airlines-appeals-48-8-million-antitrust-fine-at-eu-court, last accessed March 15,
2021).
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gram if civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to
all evidence gathered by the competition authority is given to the claimants.
There is a fairly large literature on settlement bargaining. It typically
finds that with symmetric information parties settle rather than file a costly
suit. To generate litigation the literature resorts to asymmetric informa-
tion. The workhorses are either screening models where the uninformed
party screens for private information using the settlement proposals (Be-
bchuk (1984) and Nalebuff (1987)), or signalling models where the informed
party signals private information with the settlement offers (Reinganum and
Wilde (1986)).11 We follow Nalebuff (1987).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes
the model. In section 3 we derive our results on settlement and deterrence
under symmetric information. In section 4 we discuss the asymmetric infor-
mation set-up. The last section concludes. In the appendix we derive the
Nash Bargaining Solution which corresponds to the solution of the random
offeror game. Finally, the appendix contains the derivation of the asymmetric
information scenario.
2.2 Model
A firm has engaged in anti-competitive behavior by, e.g., participating in a
cartel. The competition authority has, therefore, levied the firm a fine f > 0.
After the fine is determined, the victim of the infringement contemplates
obtaining damages from the wrongdoer.12
The parties first try to negotiate an out-of-court settlement; if successful,
the victim gets S ≥ 0 from the wrongdoer and drops the case. If settlement
negotiations break down, the victim/plaintiff can take the firm/defendant to
trial. Going to court costs each party to the conflict c > 0. The court awards
(expected) damages D > 0 to the plaintiff. Going to court thus generates
payoffs D−c for the plaintiff and −f−D−c for the defendant. Alternatively,
the victim can drop the case and gets 0.13
The payoffs from the court’s decision determine the players’ outside op-
tions/threat points in the settlement negotiations. The settlement amount
11See, e.g., Kennan and Wilson (1993) or Spier (2007) for surveys.
12We model private enforcement as an action that follows on a public enforcement deci-
sion. Private enforcement can also be a stand-alone action—a civil action brought without
any prior finding of competition law violation by an antitrust authority. In most jurisdic-
tions private enforcement is, however, mostly represented by follow-on private actions; see
OECD (2015).
13The firm made a profit and the victim suffered a loss from the anti-competitive be-
havior. Yet, these payoffs are sunk for the problem under consideration.
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S is determined by random offeror bargaining: with equal probability either
the plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand or the defendant makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer.14
The antitrust authority wants to stimulate settlement negotiations. It
will subtract the fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the settlement payment from the fine.
The wrongdoer will, therefore, end up with a net fine of f − λS. To avoid
tedious sub cases let f be sufficiently large so that the net fine is non-negative.
The formal condition on f and the analysis of small fines are relegated to
the appendix.
2.3 Results
We solve the game by backward induction. After negotiations have failed,
the plaintiff takes the case to court if it has positive expected value, i.e., if
D − c > 0; otherwise, he drops the case, leading to a payoff of 0 for the
plaintiff and −f for the defendant.
Let us now turn to the settlement stage. Consider first the case where the
plaintiff goes to court. By settling the parties save the cost 2c and generate
the subsidy λS. The least the plaintiff is willing to accept is his outside
option D − c; the most the defendant is willing to pay is S that satisfies
S + f − λS = D + c+ f or S = (D + c)/(1− λ). The plaintiff when it is his
turn, therefore, demands (D + c)/(1 − λ) and the defendant when it is her










If the plaintiff drops the case, by settling the parties do not save the cost
of going to court; the surplus consists only of the subsidy λS. The plaintiff’s
outside option in the bargaining process is 0, meaning he accepts 0. The
defendant’s threat point is f . She is willing to pay S up to S + f − λS = f
or S = 0. The expected settlement is, therefore, s = 0.
In the first stage, the plaintiff will go for damages if s > 0 or, equivalently,
D − c > 0; otherwise, he will not try to collect damages.
14The probability of the plaintiff making his demand in the random offeror game corre-
sponds to his bargaining power in the Nash Bargaining Solution. In the appendix we fully
characterize the Nash Bargaining Solution for any bargaining power. The Nash Bargain-
ing Solution is thus also a solution of the random offeror game with varying probabilities
of making the offer.
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To sum up: If D − c > 0, the plaintiff goes for damages. The parties
agree on the settlement payment s = .5[D − c + (D + c)/(1− λ)]. Without
settlement the plaintiff would take the case to court. The plaintiff ends up
with payoff s while the defendant gets −f − (1 − λ)s. If D − c ≤ 0, the
plaintiff will not go for damages. He has payoff 0 and the defendant ends up
with −f .15
Settlement Stimulation. This result has several interesting implications.
If D−c < 0, the plaintiff will not litigate if asked to do so. In the negotiation
stage, the threat to go to court is not credible. The solution concept of
subgame perfection/backward induction implies that the defendant ignores
empty threats and, therefore, does not settle. This result holds for any value
of the rebate λ: Even if the full amount of the settlement can be subtracted
from the fine (like in the Israeli case mentioned in the Introduction), there
will be no settlement unless the plaintiff indeed takes the case to court.16
To stimulate settlement negotiations that would otherwise not take place,
subtracting the settlement payment from the fine is ineffective. To trigger
settlement bargaining, the plaintiff has to be induced to actually take the
case to court. This can, e.g., be achieved by increasing D or lowering c.17
Consider now the case D > c. Here the plaintiff would take the case
to court and the parties, therefore, agree on the settlement s = .5(D − c +
(D + c)/(1 − λ)). The settlement amount increases in λ at an increasing
rate.18 Thus, if the competition authority wants larger settlement amounts,
increasing the fraction λ that can be subtracted from the fine is effective—
given the parties engage in settlement negotiations in the first place.
The fraction λ affects the settlement via two channels. First, reducing the
fine increases the surplus of not going to court, thus making the pie larger.
Second, the higher λ the lower the defendant’s marginal cost of settling: for
each unit the plaintiff obtains, the defendant effectively only pays (1 − λ).
For example, in the aforementioned Israeli case where λ = 1, each Shekel the
15In an earlier version of this chapter we show that qualitatively the same results obtain
if the parties exogenously split the surplus from settlement. See https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3527422 (last accessed March 15, 2021).
16For λ = 1 the defendant is actually indifferent as to s. Yet, with a small bargaining
cost s = 0 is the unique outcome. If D > c, λ = 1 yields corner solutions such as, e.g.,
s = f for net payments to be non-negative. See the appendix.
17It seems difficult for the competition authority to influence D and c which are after all
in the realm of the civil court. The antitrust agency could, e.g., grant access to documents
from the antitrust case to the plaintiff, thus lowering c and increasing D.
18Formally, ∂s/∂λ = (D + c)/2(1− λ)2 > 0 and ∂2s/∂λ2 = (D + c)/(1− λ)3 > 0.
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plaintiff got was entirely subtracted from the fine so that banks’ marginal
cost was zero.19
Deterrence. Let us now turn to deterrence. The defendant is deterred by
the sum of the fine and damages. We denote this total expected payment
which eventually deters by z.
If D ≤ c, s = 0 and z = f . Consider now the interesting case D > c.
Increasing λ increases the reduction in the fine, making the surplus from
settlement larger. The surplus is shared, implying that not only the plaintiff
but also the defendant benefits from a reduction in fine. Specifically, z =
f + (1−λ)s = f +D− .5λ(D− c); the first term measures public deterrence,
the second term private deterrence, and the third term captures the effect of
rebate. The total payment is decreasing in λ.20 Increasing λ increases s—
the marginal effect on the settlement. However, the fraction the wrongdoer
deducts goes up as well and also applies to the inframarginal settlement
amount. The effect from reducing the inframarginal units is stronger than the
marginal effect: the total payment of a cartel member is lower, the higher the
reduction in fine λ. Consequently, deterrence is weakened if firms anticipate
the reduction in fine.
Given that the fine reduction weakens deterrence for an “ordinary” cartel
member, it is interesting to analyze the effects on a leniency applicant under
a leniency program; we use the subscript a for the applicant and no subscript
for the other cartelists.21 Suppose the leniency program grants full leniency
to the first applicant. Since the applicant’s fine is zero, it cannot be reduced
in case of a settlement.
Consider now the two cases: If D ≤ c, the plaintiff does not go to court
so that s = 0; the applicant’s total payment za = 0. If D > c, the plaintiff’s
threat to sue the applicant is credible. The total surplus from an out-of-court
settlement is 2c, there is no fine that can be reduced. The plaintiff has the
outside option D − c and the defendant D + c. Random offeror bargaining
yields s = D which implies za = D.
The leniency applicant’s total payment za is thus either 0 or D. It is
independent of λ. It is lower than her colleague’s total payment z which is
either f or f + (1 − λ)s. Yet, for D > c the colleague’s total payment z is
decreasing in λ, so that the difference z − za also shrinks. Consequently, the
relative attractiveness of blowing the whistle (alternatively, the loss of being
the sucker) goes down with λ. This argument actually holds for any level of
19The two effects are reminiscent of the income and substitution effects in consumption
resulting from a price decrease.
20Formally, ∂z/∂λ = −(D − c)/2 < 0.
21There is a fairly large literature on leniency programs; see, e.g., Motta and Polo (2003),
Spagnolo (2004), or Chen and Rey (2013). For a survey see Harrington (2006b).
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liability of the leniency applicant.22 The fact that she pays no fine that can
be reduced drives the result.23
Whether the reduced deterrence is detrimental or not depends on the
status quo. If we start out with underdeterrence, rebating the fine may
increase underdeterrence. Suppose, by contrast, that the damage awarded
by the court reflects the harm to the public. The total payment of damage
plus fine exceeds the harm and potentially leads to overdeterrence. In this
case, rebating the fine may reduce overdeterrence.24
2.4 Asymmetric Information
To illustrate the effects of a fine reduction under asymmetric information, we
have to further specify the set-up, in particular the bargaining process. We
choose the framework developed by Nalebuff (1987).25 The defendant has
superior information about the damage than the plaintiff.26 Specifically, the
defendant knows the realization D of the damages. The plaintiff only knows
that damages are drawn from a probability distribution. In the appendix we
consider the general case of log-concave distributions; here we confine our
attention to damages being uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Bargaining proceeds as follows: In the first stage, the uninformed plain-
tiff makes take-it-or-leave-it demand S. In the second stage, the informed
defendant either accepts or rejects the settlement demand. If she accepts,
bargaining is over. Otherwise, there is a third stage where the plaintiff either
drops the case or proceeds to court.
22For example, in the EU Art. 11(4) of Directive 2014/104/EU provides “that an im-
munity recipient is jointly and severally liable as follows: (a) to its direct or indirect
purchasers or providers; and (b) to other injured parties only where full compensation
cannot be obtained from the other undertakings that were involved in the same infringe-
ment of competition law.” In the US the 2004 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement
and Reform Act eliminates treble damages and joint liability for the amnesty recipient.
23Note that we do not answer the general question of whether or not damage actions
reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs. This issue is, e.g., addressed in Buccirossi
et al. (2019).
24For these argument to be valid the firms must have several different possibilities to
collude. With only one possibility, charging the monopoly price say, any sanction greater or
equal to the harm deters monopoly pricing and there is no overdeterrence. To meaningfully
talk about over- or underdeterrence, there must be more than one option to collude; see
Emons (2020). For a discussion of sub-optimal cartel fines see, e.g., Bageri et al. (2013).
25Nalebuff (1987) extends Bebchuk (1984) to possible negative value claims.
26Osborne (1999) presents some empirical evidence that defendants actually do better
in predicting court rulings than plaintiffs.
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If the case has ex ante negative expected value, the defendant will reject
any demand S. The plaintiff gets no new information through bargaining.
He does not update his expectation and, therefore, does not litigate. This
result corresponds to our symmetric information one and holds for any value
of λ. Rebating the fine has thus no effect on deterrence.
Let us now turn to the other possibility where the case has ex ante positive
expected value. Specifically, for our uniformly distributed damage example,
assume the cost to go to court c ≤ 1/4.
The equilibrium depends on the size of the fine. Let us sketch the outcome
for a large fine f ≥ λ(1 − c + 2λc)/(1 − λ2). The plaintiff demands S =
(1− c+ 2λc)/(1− λ2) which is increasing in λ. If the defendant accepts this
demand, she incurs the cost f + (1 − λ)S. If she rejects and the plaintiff
takes the case to court, her cost is f + D + c. Defendants with D ≤ D̂ :=
(1− 2c+ λc)/(1 + λ), therefore, reject the demand; defendants with D > D̂
accept. If the plaintiff takes the rejections to court, he expects to get D̂/2
which exceeds the litigation cost for c ≤ 1/4. The plaintiff, therefore, indeed
takes the rejected demands to court.27 Note that the parties go to court for
low D even though this is inefficient—the typical outcome under asymmetric
information; see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Let us now turn to deterrence. If D ≤ D̂, the defendant rejects, is taken to
court, and ends up paying f+D+c. This total payment is independent of λ.
If D > D̂, the defendant accepts and her total payment is Z = f+(1−λ)S =
f+(1−c+2λc)/(1+λ). This total payment is decreasing in λ.28 Increasing λ
increases S. Yet, the deductible fraction also goes up, with the second effect
stronger than the first one. Thus, reducing the fine decreases deterrence.29
Note that D̂ decreases with λ: the higher the rebate, the fewer cases are
prosecuted. This has, however, no effect on deterrence because type D̂ is
indifferent between accepting S and going to court.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the effects of rebating fines by the redress
paid to the victims. This policy turns out to be fairly ineffective, if not coun-
terproductive, in our set-up. It does not stimulate settlements that would
27The results for medium and small fines are as follows: For all values of f the plaintiff
goes to court. If f ∈ (λ(1 − c), λ(1 − c + 2λc)/(1 − λ2)), the plaintiff demands S = f/λ
and D̂ = f(1− λ)/λ− c. For f ≤ λ(1− c), s = 1− c and D̂ = 1− 2c− f .
28Formally, ∂Z/∂λ = (3c− 1)/(1 + λ)2 < 0 for c ≤ 1/4.
29The same result holds for medium values of f . For small values of f increasing λ has
no effect on deterrence.
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otherwise not take place. If parties settle without the reduction, the rebate
indeed increases the settlement amount—however, at the cost of reduced de-
terrence. Moreover, the rebate makes it less attractive for a cartel member
to blow the whistle under a leniency program.
A few remarks are in order. Our results rely heavily on backward in-
duction arguments. If the plaintiff does not take the case to court, he has
no credible threat in the settlement negotiations. The defendant, therefore,
rejects any settlement demand in the first place, independently of the re-
bate. Backward induction/subgame perfection is probably the most widely
accepted refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. Any results which are
based on empty threats would not seem convincing to us.
For our findings on deterrence the defendant needs to rationally foresee
the fine reduction. This applies, e.g., if the rebate is a well established
policy of the antitrust authority. This was probably not the case in the
Swiss decisions. The Swiss Competition Commission granted the rebate for
the first time in 2019. It seems unlikely that the construction companies
anticipated the fine reduction when they engaged in bid rigging during the
years 2004-2012. If the rebate is an unexpected or a random event like in the
EU, it has no or little effect on deterrence.
We have focused on follow-on private actions which is the prevailing form
of private enforcement. The analysis of stand-alone private actions raises
some additional issues: Are there at all follow-on public actions with a fine
that can be reduced? Does the antitrust authority subtract only uncontested
redress as in our set-up, or is contested redress also eligible? These questions
are left for future research.
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2.A Nash Bargainig Solution
In this appendix we completely characterize Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
which is also the solution of the alternating offeror game.30 Moreover, we deal
properly with small fines, i.e., f < Dλ/(1− λ).
The NBS yields a reasonable outcome without explicitly modeling the
bargaining game. Since the NBS corresponds to the expected settlement of
the alternating offeror game, we denote it by s∗. Note that in our set-up
the settlement is not only a transfer of surplus from the defendant to the
plaintiff; it is also a means to increase the size of the surplus.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of the plaintiff and (1 −
α) the bargaining power of the defendant. The plaintiff settles if s ≥
max {0, D − c}. The defendant can at most reduce her fine to zero, i.e.,
she settles if s+ max{f − λs, 0} ≤ D + c+ f .
First, consider the case D ≤ c. The NBS s∗ maximizes
sα (−s−max{f − λs, 0}+ f)1−α .
We have s∗ = 0 which is the same outcome as in the main text. Whenever
the plaintiff has a non-credible threat, there is no settlement payment.
Next suppose D > c; the plaintiff’s threat to sue is thus credible. If the
parties settle, the plaintiff gets s and the defendant pays s+ max{f −λs, 0}.
The outside option if bargaining fails are D−c for the plaintiff and −D−c−f
for the defendant. The NBS s∗ maximizes
(s−D + c)α (−s−max{f − λs, 0}+ f +D + c)1−α





s̄, if f ≥ λs̄;
f/λ, if λŝ ≤ f < λs̄;
š, if f < λŝ,
where s̄ := (1−α)(D−c)+α(D + c)/(1− λ), ŝ := (D−c(1−2α))/(1−λα),
and š := D + c(2α− 1) + αf .
First note that s∗ is also the solution of the alternating offeror game where
α denotes the probability that the plaintiff makes the offer.
If s∗ = s̄, we have qualitatively the same results as in the main text.31
The settlement increases at an increasing rate in λ. The plaintiff’s bargaining
30For more on the NBS see, e.g., Roth (1979). Binmore et al. (1986) analyze the relation
between the static NBS and a sequential bargaining model à la Rubinstein (1982).
31In the other two cases the net fine is zero.
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power as measured by α determines the distribution of the surplus. The gains
of the plaintiff are s̄− (D − c) = α(2c+ λ(D − c))/(1− λ) and gains of the
defendant amount to (1−α)(2c+λ(D−c)). The plaintiff benefits more from
the fine reduction than the defendant if λ ≥ (1− 2α)/(1− α). For α small,
a large λ is necessary for the plaintiff to gain more than the defendant; for
α ≥ 1/2 the plaintiff does better for any λ.32
In our set-up the plaintiff does not get the share α of the surplus 2c+λs.
λ increases the surplus by decreasing the defendant’s marginal cost: for each
unit the plaintiff obtains, the defendant only pays 1 − λ. The plaintiff’s
marginal utility is one while the defendant’s marginal disutility is only 1 −
λ. Whenever parties’ marginal utilities differ, the NBS does not yield the
distribution α/(1 − α) of the surplus: the party with the higher marginal
utility gets more than his/her bargaining power.33
Finally, consider deterrence. Here we have z = f +( D − (1 − 2α)c) −
(λ(1−α)(D−c)); the first term measures public deterrence, the second term
private deterrence, and the third term captures the effect of rebate. Private
deterrence goes up with the plaintiff’s bargaining power. The effect of λ
on deterrence is negative, yet less so the stronger the plaintiff. A powerful
plaintiff gets most of the surplus created by the rebate, resulting in a small
effect on deterrence.
32s̄ is a supermodular function in α and λ, thus the effect on s̄ from increasing λ is
stronger the higher α.
33See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 842-843 or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), p.
18-19.
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2.B Asymmetric Information
In this appendix, we derive the equilibrium under asymmetric information
sketched in the main text for log-concave distributions. The defendant knows
the realization of D while the plaintiff only knows its distribution. D is dis-
tributed on [D,D] with density g and CDF G. The density has full support,
is differentiable, and log-concave. Moreover, D < c, i.e., negative value cases
are possible. Let D define the defendant’s type.
In the first stage of bargaining, the uninformed plaintiff makes a take-
it-or-leave-it demand S. In the second stage, the informed defendant either
rejects or accepts the settlement demand. If she accepts, bargaining is over.
If she rejects, there is a third stage where the plaintiff either drops the case
or proceeds to court. Denote the probability that the plaintiff litigates by η.
If the parties settle out of court, the plaintiff gets S and the defendant
pays Z := S + max{f − λS, 0}. If the plaintiff litigates, he gets D − c and
the defendant pays D + c + f . When the case is dropped, the plaintiff gets
zero and the defendant pays f .
For all possible values of S we will first derive Nash equilibria for the
subgames starting in stage 2. Then we will determine the plaintiff’s optimal
demand S.
Consider first the defendant in stage 2. A defendant of type D ≥ D(S, η)





Next consider the plaintiff in stage 3. Since negative expected value
claims are possible, there exists a unique cut-off value D̂ where the plaintiff





xg(x) dx = E[D|D ≤ D̂] = c.
If D < D̂, the plaintiff drops the case, thus η = 0. If D > D̂, the plaintiff
litigates, i.e., η = 1. If D = D̂, the plaintiff is indifferent, accordingly,
η ∈ [0, 1]. The cut-off D̂ is independent of S and λ.
We distinguish between two possibilities: the case has a priori negative
or positive expected value. Let us start with the easy one where E[D] ≤ c,
i.e., the case has negative expected value. For all possible S, the defendant
rejects the demand. The plaintiff learns nothing from the defendant’s deci-
sion, sticks to his prior, and chooses η = 0 since E[D] ≤ c. This result holds
for any value of the rebate λ. For negative expected value cases subtracting
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the settlement payment from the fine is, therefore, ineffective in stimulating
settlement negotiations.
Let us now turn to the interesting possibility where E[D] > c, i.e., the
case has a priori positive expected value. Suppose η = 1. Then defen-
dants with D ≤ D(S, 1) reject the demand. If D̂ ≤ D(S, 1), or equivalently
E[D|D ≤ D(S, 1)] > c, the plaintiff will indeed go to court. If D̂ > D(S, 1),
or equivalently E[D|D ≤ D(S, 1)] < c, the plaintiff will not go to court:
a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. Therefore, we construct a mixed
strategy equilibrium. The plaintiff is willing to mix in stage 3 if D(S, η) = D̂
which immediately yields η = (Z − f)/(D̂ + c). Defendants with D < D̂
reject S. Plaintiffs are indifferent whether to drop the case or not.
We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let E[D] > c.
(i) If D̂ ≤ D(S, 1), the plaintiff litigates with η = 1 and defendants of type
D > D(S, 1) accept while the others reject;
(ii) if D̂ > D(S, 1), the plaintiff litigates with η = (Z − f)/(D̂ + c) and
defendants of type D > D̂ accept while the others reject.
Lemma 2.1 establishes for any settlement demand S an equilibrium for
the ensuing subgame. The plaintiff thus chooses S so as to maximize
(1−G(D(S)))S +G(D(S))η(S)(E[D|D ≤ D(S)]− c),
where write D(S) instead of D(S, η(S)).
With probability (1−G(D(S))) the defendant accepts and pays S. With
probability G(D(S))) the defendant rejects the demand. The plaintiff liti-
gates with probability η(S) which yields in expectation E[D|D ≤ D(S)] at a
cost c. With probability (1− η(S)) he drops the case and gets nothing.
Rather than solving the plaintiff’s problem directly for S, we determine
the defendant’s total payment Z where S = min{(Z − f)/(1 − λ), Z}. The
plaintiff thus picks Z so as to maximize
V (Z) = (1−G(q(Z))) min{Z − f
1− λ , Z}+G(q(Z))β(Z)(E[D|D ≤ q(Z)]− c),
where β(Z) := min{(Z − f)/(D̂+ c), 1} and q(Z) := (Z − β(Z)c− f)/β(Z).
V (Z) is continuous; furthermore, it is differentiable except at Z = f/λ and
Z = D̂ + c+ f .
V (Z) strictly increases if Z ≤ D̂ + c + f : The condition implies the
case (ii) of Lemma 1, i.e., defendants of type D ≥ D̂ accept the plaintiff’s
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demand. The threshold type is independent of Z. Therefore, G(q(Z)) is
constant in Z while all remaining terms increase in Z. Thus, the defendant’s
minimal payment to the plaintiff is D̂ + c+ f , which is independent of λ.
The equilibrium payment Z is given by the following Proposition:





D̂ + c+ f, if V ′1(D̂ + c+ f) < 0;
Z1, if V
′
1(D̂ + c+ f) ≥ 0 > V ′1(f/λ);




where V ′1(·), V ′2(·), Z1, and Z2 are defined in the proof. Z weakly decreases
in λ.
If λ > f/(D̂ + c+ f), the defendant pays:
Z =
{
D̂ + c+ f, if V ′2(D̂ + c+ f) < 0;
Z2, if V
′
2(D̂ + c+ f) ≥ 0,
where V ′2(·) and Z2 are defined in the proof. Z is independent of λ.
Proof. Consider first the case λ ≤ f/(D̂ + c + f). We split the plaintiff’s





1− λ +G(q(Z))(E[D|D ≤ q(Z)]− c)





V2(Z) = (1−G(q(Z)))Z +G(q(Z))(E[D|D ≤ q(Z)]− c)
s.t. Z ≥ f/λ,
(2.2)
with q(Z) = Z − c− f .
We first analyze problem (2.1) without constraints. The first order con-
dition can be written as
(1− λ)V ′1(Z) = 1−G(q(Z))− g(q(Z))(2c(1− λ) + (Z − f)λ) = 0.
Plugging the first order condition into the second order condition
(1− λ)V ′′1 (Z) = −g(q(Z))(1 + λ)− g′(q(Z))(2c(1− λ) + (Z − f)λ) < 0
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and rearranging shows that the second order condition holds if
g2(·)(1 + λ) + g′(·)(1−G(·)) > 0,
which is true for log-concave g(·). Consequently, if it is interior, there exists
a unique maximum Z1.
With the implicit function theorem we derive the sign of dZ1/dλ. Since
V ′′1 (Z) < 0, the sign is determined by the sign of
∂2V1(Z;λ)
∂Z∂λ
(1− λ)2 = 1−G(q(Z))− g(q(Z))(Z − f).
Plugging in the first order condition shows that this expression is negative if
and only if g(q(Z))(1−λ)(−Z+f+2c) ≤ 0; this holds since Z ≥ D̂+c+f ≥
2c + f . We have thus shown that if the solution is interior, Z1 decreases in
λ, which implies that deterrence goes down with the fine’s reduction. The
solution is indeed interior if the following two conditions hold: V ′1(D̂+c+f) >
0 and V ′1(f/λ) < 0.
34
Next consider problem (2.2). Ignoring the constraints, the first order
condition can be written as
V ′2(Z) = 1−G(q(Z))− g(q(Z))(2c+ f) = 0.
The second order condition is
V ′′2 (Z) = −g(q(Z))− g′(q(Z))(2c+ f) < 0
and plugging in the first order condition and manipulating shows that the
condition is equivalent to
g2(·) + g′(·)(1−G(·)) > 0,
which holds for log-concave g(·). Thus, there exists a unique maximum Z2
which is independent of λ. To have an interior solution, V ′2(f/λ) > 0.




V2(Z) = (1−G(q(Z)))Z +G(q(Z))(E[D|D ≤ q(Z)]− c)
s.t. Z ≥ D̂ + c+ f.
(2.3)
Problem (2.3) has the same first order condition for an interior solution as
problem (2.2). The solution does not depend on λ. The maximum is either
Z = D̂ + c + f or, if V ′2(D̂ + c + f) > 0, the interior solution Z2. Thus,
whenever λ > f/(D̂ + c+ f), there is no effect on the deterrence.
34Note that q(Z1) also decreases, which implies that more defendants will accept the
settlement demand: fewer cases will be taken to court.
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When Z equals Z1 or f/λ, deterrence goes down with the rebate. All other
payments of the defendant do not depend on λ. Consequently, deterrence
weakly decreases in the fine reduction.
Finally, we analyze how the reduction affects trials. Due to asymmetric
information some cases go to court. Only defendants of type D ≥ D(S, η)
accept the settlement offer. The plaintiff’s offer S results in a subgame of
case (i) in Lemma 1. The plaintiff always litigates when a defendant rejects
his offer, i.e., η = 1. Thus, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, defendants
of type D ≥ D(S, 1) = Z(S) − c − f accept the plaintiff’s offer. It follows
from Proposition 1 that the defendant’s payment Z weakly decreases in λ. A
reduction in fine encourages out of court settlement, yet only if the plaintiff
credibly litigates.
The reduction in fine lowers the defendant’s payment Z and thereby incen-









Using Leibniz rule we get
∂z
∂λ






Similar to symmetric information, the defendant’s expected payment de-
creases in λ—resulting in lower deterrence.
Chapter 3
Cartel Stability in Times of
Low Interest Rates
Abstract
We study the interest rate’s effect on the stability of cartels. A low interest
rate implies a high discount factor and thus increases cartel stability. If firms
access the capital market, an additional effect comes into play: a low interest
rate lowers investment costs, resulting in more profitable deviations from
the collusive agreement. We propose a new measure for a cartel’s stability
regarding the two opposing effects. Stability is U-shaped in the interest rate.
We test our theory using a dataset of 615 firms and find supporting evidence.
We conclude that the current unusually low interest rate facilitates collusion.
3.1 Introduction
Low interest rates mark the last decade. The financial crisis heralded the
start of a new era: worldwide, central banks keep interest rates down to
stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, the recovery is sluggish, and interest
rates remain low to boost the economy and inflation. In this chapter, we an-
alyze possible adverse effects of the current monetary policy. More precisely,
we study how the interest rate affects the formation and stability of cartels.
When interest rates are low, a dollar tomorrow has just about the same
value as a dollar today. Accordingly, future values are only little discounted.
The discount factor is inversely related to the interest rate. The higher the
discount factor, the more patient are the market participants. Firms value
long-term additional profits from collusion more than a large one-time gain by
deviating from the collusive agreement. Technically, collusion’s net present
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value increases when interest rates are low. Following this argument, the
current monetary policy encourages formation of cartels and stabilizes them.
Although the argument is correct, it ignores another interesting channel.
Typically, firms operate with borrowed capital under financial constraints.
The interest rate determines a firm’s capital cost. When interest rates are
low, firms can borrow outside capital inexpensively and invest in production.
Whereas if interest rates are high, firms’ investments may be impossible if
they do not have enough own means. Therefore, in times of high interest
rates, competition may be weak because firms have not enough resources to
compete for the entire market.
Moreover, cartelists have fewer incentives to deviate from their collu-
sive agreement when they face binding financial constraints. Suppose the
cartelists have colluded on how to split the market. Even if a cartel member
deviates and tries to extend its production, it may lack the necessary means
to serve large parts of the market. Low interests facilitate new investment
opportunities; thus, numerous deviation strategies may arise.
We present a model to incorporate the interest rate’s different effects and
propose a new measure for a cartel’s stability. In our set-up, firms are locally
differentiated, i.e., our model incorporates heterogeneous consumers. Each
period, firms choose their production quantity and price. Firms are capital
constrained. They receive the consumers’ payment when the goods go over
the counter. Consequently, firms face a liquidity problem when investing in
their production, which is overcome by a firm’s access to the financial market.
The interest rate determined on the financial market affects thereby the firm’s
investment (opportunity) costs. When interest rates are high, firms cannot
afford to serve consumers near their competitor, resulting in relatively weak
competition.
Instead of competing, firms may collude on prices or on segmenting the
market. Firms observe their competitor’s last period price; respectively, firms
can infer the competitor’s price from their sales and the market conditions.1
Our framework yields interesting price patterns: When there is an exogenous
shock in the consumers’ willingness to pay, e.g., due to an increased income,
collusive prices increase more than competitive ones. By contrast, if there is
a shock in the firms’ opportunity costs, competitive prices react more. When
consumers perceive the firms less differentiated, e.g., due to new regulations,2
prices become more important than the goods’ origin. Competing firms lower
their prices due to increased competition; cartelists increase their prices.
1By contrast, Green and Porter (1984) analyze situations where firms do not know if
their low sales are due to a recession or the competitor’s deviation.
2For example, the European Parliament discusses harmonizing charger leads.
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Our model can also be applied to tacit collusion, where there exists no
hard evidence of the collusive agreement. A high price, therefore, serves as
a message to start or sustain collusion. We derive the necessary discount
factor to sustain collusion, which we denoted as the critical discount factor.
The critical discount factor depends on the colluding profits and a firm’s
profit if it deviates from the collusive agreement. The interest rate increases
costs, thereby decreasing profits and affecting the critical discount factor.
Our proposed measure for a cartel’s stability depends on the one hand on
the critical discount factor. On the other hand, risk neutral firms’ ratio-
nal discount factor is directly implied by the financial market as 1/(1 + r),
whereby r is the interest rate. The larger the difference between the rational
and the critical discount factor, the more profitable a cartel is. We assume
that more profitable cartels are more stable, respectively, are more likely to
be formed.3
Our model implies a U-shaped relation between the interest rate and a
cartel’s stability. The result arises from the interest rate’s opposing effects
on the discount factors. The rational discount factor reacts most to a change
in interests when their rate is low. The money’s time value is doubled when
the interest rate increase from 1% to 2%, yet less than doubled if the interest
increases from 2% to 3%.
By contrast, the critical discount factor is only little affected by a change
in the interest rate when they are low. With low interest rates, a firm can
afford to invest such that if it deviates from the collusive agreement, it can
conquer large parts of the market. It can even serve consumers located close
to its competitor, i.e., consumers with a relatively strong preference for its
competitor. Yet, those consumers have a relatively small willingness to pay
and are therefore the least valuable customers. For a higher interest rate, the
marginal consumers have less extreme preferences resulting in more valuable
customers for the firm, i.e., the interest rate’s effect on profits intensifies.4
Nevertheless, for very high interest rates, firms cannot afford the invest-
ments to serve the whole market and become local monopolists resulting in
a critical discount factor of zero. For low interest rates, the rational discount
factor’s effect dominates the effect on the critical discount factor; for larger
interest rates, the latter effect dominates the first, resulting in a U-shape.
For very high interest rates, the critical discount factor’s effect vanishes, and
3Instead of the discount factor’s difference, we also study the ratio of the two and find
similar results.
4Moreover, when the distribution is symmetrically single-peaked, only a few customers
have strong preferences; thus, the mass of marginal consumer increases, amplifying the
effect.
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stability decreases monotonically in the interest rate, resulting overall in a
negative cubic shape.
We doubt that very high interest rates yielding local monopolists have
been observed and therefore focus on the U-shape. We test our theoretical
prediction using a dataset collected by Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) and
find empirical support for our theory. The dataset contains 615 firms active
in 114 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 1999 and
2016. We first test the interest rate’s U-shape with a logit model, estimating
the probability that a cartel breaks up. We find significant evidence in line
with our theoretical prediction. Moreover, we follow Hellwig and Hüschelrath
(2018) and use survival analysis to estimate a cartel’s duration. Precisely,
we estimate how a firm’s duration of participation depends on the interest
rate using a Weibull model. Again, we find significant estimates in line with
our theory.5
We conclude that a cartel’s stability and the likelihood of its formation
depend on the financial market. The interest rate affects collusion non-
monotonically. In current times of unusually low interest rates, we expect the
cartels’ stability to be weakened when interests increase. Thus, the current
monetary policy may stabilize cartels and facilitates new ones.
Related Literature. Our set-up builds on the literature on cartel stability
and product differentiation. This literature usually assumes a stage game in
the form of a Prisoners’ Dilemma that is infinitely repeated. It is well known
that for homogeneous price competition, the cartel stability only depends
on the number of firms. Deneckere (1983) studies differentiated products
with Cournot and Bertrand competition and finds a non-monotonic relation
between cartel stability and product differentiation.6 Collie (2006) introduces
quadratic production costs. Cartel stability increases with costs, similar to
our set-up. However, in their models, cartels are always less stable than
cartels in a market with a homogeneous product, even in the limiting case
when firms become monopolists. In our set-up, monopolists are indifferent
between colluding or not; their profits stay the same.
Similar to us, Chang (1991) studies a stage game à la Hotelling. He
assumes a uniform distribution of consumers and allows for different sym-
metric locations. In line with the literature, he finds that cartels become
more stable the more differentiated products are, as long as both firms are
active. He abstains from the possibility that one firm can capture the entire
market and wrongly concludes a monotonic relation between cartel stability
5There exist, however, several problems regarding the data’s quality. There is a selec-
tion bias since only convicted cartels are collected in the dataset. Furthermore, a cartel’s
duration may be underestimated because of lacking evidence.
6Deneckere (1984) corrects some mistakes in the analysis.
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and product differentiation. Allowing one firm to capture the entire market
also leads to a non-monotonic relation similar to the ones above. The main
difference is, however, that cartels are more stable than cartels in a market
with a homogeneous product, by contrast to the former.
There exists a large theoretical and empirical literature studying collu-
sion’s counter- or pro-cyclicality. In the theoretical literature, business cycles
are usually modeled as exogenous changes in demand. Results are, neverthe-
less, ambiguous.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) argue that collusion is counter-cyclical:
Firms deviate from cartel agreements during booms. When demand is high,
a one-time deviation is more profitable, and punishment follows in periods
characterized by lower demand, making the punishment less severe. Halti-
wanger and Harrington (1991) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997) argue to the
contrary: Cartels tend to break-up during recessions. The one-time deviation
profit is largest when demand is high, yet the discounted future profits’ loss
is lowest in a recession. Fabra (2006) introduces capacity constraints and
shows that collusion tends to be counter-cyclical when capacity constraints
bind while it is pro-cyclical for sufficiently large capacities.7
None of those papers discuss the interest rate’s effect explicitly. All con-
sider demand shocks and study a cartel’s stability employing a critical dis-
count factor. The lower the interest rate, the higher the discount factor,
i.e., cartels become more stable. The literature neglects firms’ financing
decisions and commonly assumes no financial restrictions. We show that in-
corporating the financial decision by investing with outside capital leads to
a non-monotonic effect of the interest rate on collusion.
The only paper we are aware of discussing the interest rate’s effect on
collusion is Paha (2017). He extends Besanko et al. (2010)’s model and
incorporates capacity investments. Due to the models’ complexity, they rely
on numerical simulations. The interest rate’s effect on costs is neglected;
interest rates only determine the rational discount factor. Cartelists collude
on prices yet not on investment strategies. Firms’ capacities independently
and randomly depreciate. Low interest rates lead to asymmetric capacities
as the result of preemption races for a dominant position. Asymmetric firms
are less likely to agree on a collusive price, resulting in fewer cartels when
interest rates are low.
Related to the mechanism Liu et al. (2020) present an analytically tractable
model focusing on innovation. When interest rates are low, competition is
7The theoretical literature lacks an explanation for the formation of new cartels. An
exception is Bos and Harrington (2010), who present a theoretical model with endogenous
cartel formation in a market with many firms. In our set-up, changes in the interest rate
may lead to the formation of new cartels.
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intensified if firms are on the same innovation ladder’s stage. Accordingly,
a leader is encouraged to innovate to prevent the competitive stage, while a
follower is discouraged, resulting in more asymmetric firms.8 They do not
discuss collusive agreements.
Some empirical work includes the interest rate in collusion’s study. Lev-
enstein and Suslow (2016) analyze 247 cartels accused of price-fixing and
brought to the US Department of Justice between 1961 and 2013. They ar-
gue in line with the literature mentioned above: interest rates are inversely
related to a firm’s discount factor and incorporate it as a control in their
estimations. In their dataset, lower interest rates indeed stabilize cartels and
facilitate the formation of new cartels.
By contrast to the latter, Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) find the oppo-
site. They study 615 firms active in 114 cartels convicted by the European
Commission between 1999 and 2016. In their dataset, firms’ participation
duration is significantly shorter when interest rates are low, resulting in desta-
bilized cartels and fewer formations. The authors discuss their finding only
shortly in lack of theoretical arguments.
Our theory explains the opposing empirical evidence. We use the data
collected by Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) and incorporate the interest
rate’s U-shape: we find supporting evidence for our theoretical prediction.
By contrast to Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018), we use the real interest rate
and other macroeconomic indicators measured in real terms. Rational agents
base their decision on real terms. However, results do qualitatively not change
if we use nominal units.
We distinguish between two channels of the interest rate. On the one
hand, it affects costs and thereby directly a firms’ balance sheet. On the
other hand, it determines the time value of money. The second effect has
been intensively studied by the experimental literature. Collusion in infinitely
repeated games is commonly studied by a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. The
player’s (rational) discount factor is thereby controlled by the probability of
the game’s repetition. Dal Bó (2005) and Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) show
that cooperation is more likely, the higher the discount factor.
Bruttel (2009) conducts an experiment and silences the first channel by
a finite repeated game. By contrast to the former, she argues along Rosen-
thal (1981) and Normann and Wallace (2012) that an infinite game can be
approximated with a finite game. She studies stage games with different crit-
ical discount factors and finds supporting evidence for a continuous stability
measure similar to the one proposed by us.
8This phenomenon is known as the discouragement effect in the contest literature.
3.2. Theoretical Model 67
In the next section, we present our theoretical model to study cartels’
stability. Following this, we test our theory in an empirical analysis. Finally,
we conclude.
3.2 Theoretical Model
Two firms compete for consumers of mass one, each offering a single com-
modity. The market is differentiated; consumers prefer one firm in the form
of lower transportation costs. To serve consumers, firms first have to pro-
duce their commodities. Production requires capital, which is obtained by
retained profits or the financial market. Each period, firms first decide to
issue bonds at the market interest rate and then set prices. Firms either
compete or collude. By collusion, we mean that firms set prices to maximize
their joint profits.9
Firms only collude on prices. As long as the competitor sets the collusive
price, firms continue with the cartel. We analyze relatively weak forms of
collusion, where there is no hard evidence. Outsiders with less information
about the market than the firms can hardly detect anti-competitive behavior.
Furthermore, we assume the set of consumers to be the same in each period.
Next, we describe the stage game.
Stage Game. There is a unit mass of consumers symmetrically distributed
between two firms. The cumulative distribution function F (x) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable and strictly log-concave on its compact support. With-
out loss of generality, let F ’s support be [−1, 1]. We denote the density as
f(x) = F ′(x), which we assume to be strictly positive on its support.10 The
distribution reflects heterogeneous consumers’ preferences. Whenever rela-
tively many consumers are indifferent between the two firms, f(0) is high. A
consumer located near the support’s boundary has a strong preference for a
firm; price differences are less relevant for those consumers.
Consumer x ∈ [−1, 1] has utility U − pi − t|xi − x| if she buys the good
at firm i at price pi, where xi ∈ {−1, 1} is the firm’s location.11 U is the
utility of having the good in monetary units, and t > 0 is the transportation
cost, representing competition’s intensity. If consumer x does not buy the
9We denote the collusive price as the monopoly price. In an infinitely repeated game,
firms could collude on any price between the competitive and the monopoly price, whereby
the monopoly price is the payoff dominating allocation. Results are qualitatively similar
if firms collude at a lower price. However, a cartel is more stable if firms collude on lower
prices. We discuss this in the appendix.
10Technically, log-concavity means f2(x)−F (x)f ′(x) > 0 and symmetry f(x) = f(−x).
11Results are qualitatively similar with quadratic transportation costs. We discuss this
in the appendix followed by a discussion of endogenous product differentiation.
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good, we normalize her utility to 0. We denote the firm at the support’s
lower bound as firm i, i.e., xi = −1, and its competitor as firm j with xj = 1.
Accordingly, the participation constraint for a consumer to buy at firm i is
U − pi − t(x + 1) ≥ 0⇔ x ≤ (U − pi − t)/t, and for firm j the inequality is
reversed.
Consumer x prefers buying at firm i instead of firm j if U−pi−t(x+1) ≥
U − pj − t(1 − x) ⇔ x ≤ (pj − pi)/(2t). Firm i’s demand consists of the
consumers participating in the market and preferring to buy its product,
instead of buying at firm j. Formally,













We assume a constant marginal production cost c > 0. Costs cDi(pi, pj)
accrue before firms sell their goods. Production has, therefore, to be financed
in advance, either by firm i’s own means Wi ≥ 0 or by issuing bonds bi ∈ R.
If bi < 0, a firm invests in the capital market, else it borrows capital. The
capital market pays an interest rate r ≥ 0. Firm i’s profit from the production
and the capital market are thus πi(pi, bi) = (pi − c)Di(pi, pj) − rbi − rWi,
where the last term reflects the equity’s opportunity cost. Firms can always
ensure a return of rWi resulting in zero economic profit. Using the constraint
of costs incurring pre production implies cDi(pi, pj) = Wi+bi and profits can
be written as πi(pi) = (pi − (1 + r)c)Di(pi, pj). The marginal opportunity
costs C := (1 + r)c depend on the capital market’s interest rate.12
If F ((U − pi − t)/t) ≤ F ((pj − pi)/(2t)), the firm is a local monopolist.
In this case, Firm i’s optimal price is implicitly
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By F ’s log-concavity, the right-hand side decreases in pm, while the left-hand
side of the equation strictly increases, therefore, pm is uniquely defined. Local
monopoly pricing pi = pj = pm is an equilibrium if F ((U − pm − t)/t) ≤
F (0) ⇔ pm ≥ U − t, which implies that firms serve less than the total
market.13
12The assumption of perfect capital markets simplifies the analysis: There is only one
price for capital, i.e., it is not necessary to distinguish between Wi and bi. Therefore, a
firm’s dividend policy becomes irrelevant for the analysis.
13Firm j’s condition is 1 − F ((U − pm − t)/t) ≤ F (0) which simplifies to the same
condition by the distributions symmetry F (0) = 1/2.
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Otherwise, firms may compete. Firm i’s best response function for any
pj is implicitly given by


















Again, by F ’s log-concavity, p∗i (pj) is uniquely determined. There exits a
unique and symmetric equilibrium with pi = pj = pc := C + t/f(0) resulting
in firms’ profits πc := t/(2f(0)) if pc ≤ U − t.14
However, if pm ≤ U − t ≤ pc, firms serve the whole market and multiple
equilibria exist with pi + pj = 2U − 2t. The only stable equilibrium to
parameters’ perturbations is the symmetric one with prices equal to U − t.
We thus focus on the symmetric equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist
in this corner solution.




(pi − C)Di(pi, pj) + (pj − C)Dj(pj, pi),
which are maximal for the maximal prices such that consumers still partic-
ipate pi = pj = pt := U − t. If firms trust each other and set prices pt, a
firm’s profit is πt := (U − t−C)/2. Again, this is only optimal as long firms
are not local monopolists, i.e., pm ≤ U − t. Thus, cartelists set their price to
pt instead of competing, as long as they are not local monopolists anyways.
Formally, cartel prices are pt if pt ≥ pm ⇔ C ≤ U− t− t/(2f(0)) and pm else;
competitive prices are pc if pc ≤ pt ⇔ C ≤ U − t − t/f(0) and equal to the
cartelists prices otherwise. The necessity of an agreement thus only arises if
opportunity costs C are low, respectively, if firms are not local monopolists
anyway. If C ≥ U − t − t/f(0), the competitive and collusive outcome are
equivalent; thus, deviation only occurs for relatively low C.
Our framework predicts an interesting price pattern, which can be empir-
ically evaluated.16 Furthermore, antitrust authorities observing prices may
use the pattern to uncover cartels. Table 3.1 gives an overview of how prices
respond to different shocks. For example, if consumers perceive an increase
14Suppose there exists another equilibrium with p∗j > p
∗
i , thus F ((p
∗
j − p∗i )/(2t)) > 1/2.
Using the best reply functions we can write the difference p∗j − p∗i = 2t(1 − 2F ((p∗j −
p∗i )/(2t)))/f((p
∗
j − p∗i )/(2t)) < 0 resulting in a contradiction.
15In our framework, joint profit maximization is equivalent to the Nash Bargaining
Solution.
16The price pattern is the same for any convexly increasing cost function as well as for
quadratic transportation costs.
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U C t f(0)
pm + + ? ?
pt + 0 - 0
pc 0 + + -
Table 3.1: Price Pattern. The table shows how prices react to exogenous shocks
in the model’s parameters.
in their income, their maximal willingness to pay for the product U increases,
resulting in a price increase if firms are local monopolists or colluding, yet
not affecting competitive prices. A cartel, like a local monopolist, competes
against the consumers’ outside option; the better the consumers’ outside op-
tion, the lower the prices. By contrast, competing firms have to fight against
their competitor’s offer.
Likewise, opportunity costs only increase competitive or local monopoly
prices yet do not affect collusive ones. A cartel sets prices to extract most
consumer surplus while still serving the whole market. A large increase in
C can, nonetheless, lead to a change in the market structure such that firms
become local monopolists.
An increase in transportation costs t increases competitive prices. The
distance to a firm becomes crucial for a consumer’s decision; prices are negli-
gible. Thus, firms gain market power, and prices go up. By contrast, a cartel
decreases its price. If the transportation cost increases, consumers have less
money to spend, and therefore, the cartel lowers its price to extract the con-
sumer surplus’ rest. A local monopolist faces both effects, resulting in an
ambiguous effect.17
Finally, we also look at a decrease of indifferent consumers f(0). This
may arise from a mean preserving spread of the distribution, e.g., form an
increase in consumers heterogeneity. Relatively fewer consumers are indif-
ferent between the two firms. The fewer consumers are indifferent, the lower
are firms’ incentives to compete for the mass of indifferent consumers. An
increase in the consumer distribution’s variance may thus lead to more mar-
ket power of firms, resulting in higher prices. A cartel is only interested
in covering the entire market, thereby only cares about the consumer with
the largest transportation cost and not the consumers’ distribution. Thus,
there is no effect on collusive prices. Local monopolists’ prices are affected
ambiguously by a change in the distribution.
17For uniformly distributed customers, the local monopoly price is independent of t: the
two effects cancel out.
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Instead of colluding, firm i could undercut its competitor’s price to in-
crease its market share. The price deviation is implicitly given by the best
response (3.1) to pt,
pd := p
∗























Whenever C ≥ U − t − t/f(0), there is no gain from deviation. Firms
are local monopolists, competing yields the same outcome as colluding. We
therefore focus on C = (1 + r)c ≤ U − t − t/f(0) ⇔ r ≤ r̄ := (U − t −
t/f(0))/c − 1.18 Moreover, if U − t − pd ≥ 2t ⇔ C ≤ U − 3t − 2t/f(1) ⇔
r ≤ r := (U − 3t− 2t/f(1))/c− 1, the deviating firm can capture the entire
market. Note that r may be negative.19
Lemma 3.1. If consumers are symmetrically log-concave distributed and r ∈
[r, r̄],
(i) πc is constant in r;
(ii) πt is linear and decreasing in r;
(iii) πd is convex and decreasing in r;
(iv) πc = πt = πd at r = r̄.
By definition profits are ordered by πd ≥ πt ≥ πc for an interior solution,
and by Lemma 3.1, the difference between the profits decreases with r. For
r ≥ r̄, firms are local monopolists. This concludes the analysis of the stage
game.
Stability. We assume that firms set their prices each period simultaneously.
Following the literature, we assume a Grim Trigger strategy. Firms set high
prices pt as long as both have set high prices last period. If one of the two
18Alternatively, (1+r̄) ≥ (pt−pc)/c+(1+r) = (πt−πc)/c+(1+r), where the right-hand
side are the relative gains from colluding.
19r ≤ 0 is ensured whenever there is only a low mass of consumers at the boundaries,
i.e., = f(1) ≤ 2t/(U − 3t).
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where δ is the firms’ discount factor. Accordingly, the critical discount factor




= 1− πt − πc
πd − πc
∈ [0, 1]. (3.4)
Note that equation (3.3) is satisfied for any δ if C ≥ U − t− t/f(0)⇔ r ≥ r̄,
and thus the minimal critical discount factor δ∗ = 0. Firms only have an
incentive to deviate from the colluding agreement if costs are low enough.
Before we study the effect of the interest rate on cartel stability, consider
how δ∗ depends on the parameters. We focus on interior solutions, thus a
deviating firm cannot capture the total demand, r ≥ r, and firms are no local
monopolists, r ≤ r̄.20
Proposition 3.1. If consumers are symmetrically log-concave distributed
and r ∈ [r, r̄], the critical discount factor δ∗
(i) increases in U ;
(ii) decreases in C;21
(iii) decreases in t.22
The consumers’ monetary utility U does not affect competitive profits if
the total market is served. Firms compete against each other, and the outside
option of having the good or not becomes redundant. The profits of colluding
firms increase in the consumers’ appreciation; they can extract more from
their customers. If U is low, undercutting the competitors’ price increases a
firm’s demand. However, the new customers have only a low willingness to
pay, thus profits from deviating are small. If U is large, collusive prices are
20Formally, a range exists whenever f(0) ≥ f(1)/(1 + f(1)), which is true, e.g., for any
symmetric single-peaked distribution.
21In the corner solution, where a firm can capture the entire market by deviating (r ≤ r),
the critical discount factor linearly increase: πd = 2t/f(1), thus is constant in C, while πt
linearly decreases.
22In the corner solution, where a firm can capture the entire market by deviating (r ≤
r), the critical discount factor increases for symmetrically single-peaked distributions:
∂δ∗/∂t = f(0)(4− f(1))/(4f(0)− 2f(1)) ≥ 0 if f(1) < min{2f(0), 4}.
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high: by undercutting, the deviating firm can capture a large share of the
market with a relatively high price. A deviation becomes more profitable;
firms have to be more patient to form a cartel, i.e., δ∗ increases.
The critical discount factor decreases in the interest rate r, or more gen-
erally in the opportunity costs C = (1 + r)c. With low opportunity costs,
firms are able to conquer large parts of the market. By deviating from the
agreement, firms may reach consumers located near its competitor. A large
price cut is necessary to attract those customers with a strong preference.
Nevertheless, this may be too costly, and the necessary price may even be
below the production costs. The larger the production costs, the less of the
market is served by the deviating firm. Accordingly, even if a firm deviates
from the tacit price agreement, some customers remain for the competitor.
The higher the costs, the lower is the firms’ necessary discount factor to
collude.
Finally, if t is low, firms find it harder to collude. When consumers have
low transportation costs, a firm can capture large parts of the market by
undercutting the competitor’s price. Accordingly, deviating from the tacit
agreement can almost double demand, while it has only little effect if t is
low. More precisely, competitive profits increase in t since competitors gain
market power; collusive profits decrease in t because consumers incur higher
costs resulting in a lower net willingness to pay. Profits from deviating also
go down in t, since fewer consumers are reached with a price cut. The first
two effects lower the relative value of collusion yet are outweighed by the
third effect, resulting in a lower δ∗ when t increases.
In general, a deviating firm’s profits are more affected than the compet-
itive or collusive ones. By symmetry, competitive firms end up with equal
market shares. Similarly, a cartel divides the market into equal shares. A
firm deviating from the tacit agreement ends up with a larger share of the
market; thus, its inframarginal effect is stronger.
Figure 3.1 sketches the critical discount factor δ∗ as a function of the
interest rate r for two different levels of t. The solid black line refers to
relatively low transportation costs, while the gray line refers to higher trans-
portation costs. In Lemma 3.1 we have shown that the critical discount factor
decreases in C, which implies that it also decreases in r, since C = (1 + r)c.
Note that the critical discount factor becomes zero at r̄. As we show in the
next Lemma, δ∗ is concave for sufficiently high r, i.e., r close to r̄. Whenever
the distribution is sufficiently log-concave, the critical discount factor is also
concave for relatively low r.
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r
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Figure 3.1: Discount factor. The solid black line refers to δ∗ for parameter values
U = 10, c = 1, t = 1, while the gray line refers to δ∗ with t = 1, 5. The distribu-
tion is single-peaked quadratic f(x) = 2/3 − x2/2. The dashed line refers to the
rational discount factor δ̂ = 1/(1 + r). The gray area represents when cartels are
unprofitable, i.e., δ∗ ≥ δ̂.
Lemma 3.2. For r lower yet close to r̄, the critical discount factor δ∗ is
concave. If the consumer distribution F (.) is sufficiently log-concave, δ∗ is
concave for all r ≤ r̄.
For example, for the uniform distribution, δ∗ is concave. Unfortunately,
we have to rely on numerical evaluations for other distributions. Simulations
show that δ∗ is also concave for the truncated normal distribution. For the
quadratic distribution f(x) = 1/2 + s/3 − sx2, where s ∈ (−1/5, 1/2] is a
shape parameter, δ∗ may be weakly convex for small r when the distribution
is convex, i.e., has a relatively low mass in the middle. In all simulations,
large interest rates affect the critical discount factor more than low interest
rates.
An increase in the interest rate increases opportunity costs. Consequently,
the deviating firm’s price cut is less severe, and it reaches fewer customers.
For low interest rates, the indifferent consumer lives relatively close to the
competitor. An increase in r implies that the firm can no longer capture this
customer by deviating. However, the customers the firm cannot reach are
near the competitor, thus, have a lower willingness to pay due to their high
transportation costs. Accordingly, the firm loses its least valued customers.
The closer a customer is located to a firm, i.e., the stronger her preference,
the more a firm can extract from this customer. When interest rates are
high, the indifferent consumer is located near the firm’s middle; thus, the
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deviating firm values them more, resulting in a stronger effect of the interest
rate.
Moreover, if there are lots of indifferent consumers, i.e., the distribution
has a large mass around its middle, the number of customers a firm cannot
reach when interest rates are down is rather low, amplifying the interest
rate’s effect.
The interest rate does not only affect opportunity costs. It also deter-
mines a rational firm’s discount factor. In our set-up, the discount factor
is determined by the capital market by δ̂ := 1/(1 + r), which we denote as
the rational discount factor. Note that it only depends on the interest rate.
Figure 3.1 shows the rational discount factor δ̂ as a dashed line.
Whenever the rational discount factor is larger than the critical discount
factor, δ̂ ≥ δ∗, a cartel is stable. Figure 3.1 shows that this is always true
when δ∗ is relatively low, for example, if the willingness to pay is low or
transportation costs are high. Yet, there also exist parameters such that
a cartel is unstable. Since δ̂ is convex and δ∗ is concave for sufficiently
log-concave distributions, the range of unstable cartels, whenever it exists,
has to be intermediary. Consequently, for sufficiently low interest rates and
sufficiently high interest rates, cartels are always feasible.
The profitability of a cartel can be measured by its internal rate of return
IRR, formally, δ∗ = 1/(1 + IRR).23 Whenever the internal rate of return
is below the market’s interest rate, it is unprofitable to continue or form a
cartel, IRR < r ⇔ δ∗ > δ̂. The more profitable a cartel is, i.e., the larger
IRR compared to r, the larger is the difference between the discount factors
δ̂ − δ∗.
The literature typically assumes that a firm’s decision to collude is di-
chotomous: if a cartel is profitable, collude; otherwise, don’t.24 Accordingly,
even if a cartel is only marginally profitable, firms fully collude. We assume,
by contrast, that the probability of colluding increases continuously in the
profitability of a cartel. The more money is to be made by colluding, the







s(δ̂ − δ∗), if δ∗ ≤ δ̂;
0, if δ∗ > δ̂,
23We show in the appendix that in our set-up, the IRR evaluation criterion is equivalent
to the net present value (NPV) evaluation criterion.
24An exception is Emons (2020) analyzing a leniency program’s efficiency when firms
choose their degree of collusion.
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where s : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function, with s(0) = 0 and
s(1) = 1.25 Accordingly, s is a cumulative distribution function and S can
be interpreted as the probability to form or continue a cartel. Whenever the
cartel is unprofitable, there is a zero probability; when the cartel becomes
more profitable, the probability goes up. We present different microfoun-
dations for our stability measure in the appendix. For example, industries
differ in their risk premia or decision-makers have heterogenous priors to be
prosecuted.
Proposition 3.2. If consumers are symmetrically log-concave distributed
and r ∈ [0, r̄], a cartel’s stability S
(i) decreases in r for low interest rates.








(iii) is quasiconvex for r ∈ (0, r̄) if the consumer distribution F (.) is suffi-
ciently log-concave.
The main insight of Proposition 3.2 is the interest rate’s non-monotone
effect on stability.26 If marginal production costs are low, or the market is
competitive by either having low transportation costs t or many indifferent
consumers, i.e., f(0) large, stability increases for relatively large interest
rates.
Proposition 3.2 is best understood by plotting the stability’s properties.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the cartel’s stability depending on the interest rate,
assuming the same distribution and parameters as in figure 3.1. Generally,
Proposition 3.2 implies a local maximum at r = 0 and at r = r̄, with none
in between. Thus for relatively low interest rates, stability decreases; then it
increases up to r̄ and decreases afterward.
25Alternatively, we can measure the cartels profitability by IRR − r = (δ̂ − δ∗)/δ̂δ∗ =
1/δ∗−1− r. For r ≥ r̄, the critical discount factor is zero, accordingly, the interests rates’
difference is not defined. However, focusing on r < r̄ and adjusting the strictly increasing
s : [0,∞)→ [0, 1], we can replace δ̂ − δ∗ by IRR− r and get the same results for interior
solutions: stability is U-shaped in the interest rate.
26Results are qualitatively similar when we use the ratio δ̂/δ∗ = (1 + IRR)/(1 + r)
instead of the difference δ̂ − δ∗ in our stability measure. However, for r ≥ r̄ the ratio is
not defined since δ∗ = 0. Formally, the ratio decreases in r if and only if δ̂′δ∗ ≤ δ̂δ∗′, while
the difference decreases if δ̂′ ≤ δ∗′. At r = 0 we know from the proof or Proposition 3.1
δ∗ ≤ 1/2 < 1 = δ̂, thus the ratio decreases when the difference decreases. At r = r̄, we
know δ∗ → 0, thus the ratio increases.







Figure 3.2: Cartel stability for parameter values as in figure 3.1, U = 10, c = 1,
t = 1, while the gray line refers to t = 1.5. The distribution is single-peaked
quadratic f(x) = 2/3− x2/2. The stability function is linear s(z) = z.
Stability is determined by the rational and the critical discount factor’s
difference. Both discount factors decrease in r. The rational discount factor
δ̂ decreases in r since a larger r implies a larger time value of money. An
increase from 1% to 2% doubles the capital’s costs, yet an increase from 2%
to 3% increases its cost by less than factor two. Consequently, the interest
rate’s effect on the rational discount factor is strongest for small interest
rates.
The critical discount factor also decreases in the interest rate. If the in-
terest rate is low, opportunity costs are low. Firms are thus able to conquer
the total market. By deviating from the agreement, firms may reach the con-
sumer with the strongest preference for their competitor. For larger interest
rates, this is too costly. Thus, even if the competitor deviates from the tacit
price agreement, some customers remain for the firm.
By contrast to the rational discount factor, the interest rate’s effect on the
critical discount factor is stronger for high interest rates. When interest rates
are low, the deviating firm loses less valuable customers by an increase in the
interest rate than when interest rates are high. The lower the interest rate,
the nearer is the indifferent consumer located at the competitor. In order
to convince a customer with strong preferences for the competitor to buy at
the deviating firm, large price cuts are necessary, making the customer less
valuable. If consumers are symmetrically single-peaked, only a small mass of
consumers are near the competitor, amplifying the effect.
For low r, the effect on the rational discount factor δ̂ outweighs; for r
close to r̄ the effect on the critical discount factor δ∗ dominates. For r ≥ r̄,
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firms are local monopolists and the critical discount factor is zero anyways,
the rational discount factors effect dominates again, resulting in the two local
maxima at 0 and r̄.
Whenever (3.5) is satisfied, our theory yields a clear theoretical prediction
of how the interest rate affects a cartel’s stability. Production costs have to
be low relative to the consumers’ monetary utility, or competition has to
be relatively strong. More precisely, competition is intense if transportation
costs are low or a large mass of consumers is indifferent between the two
firms. We believe that this condition is satisfied for a broad range of products.
Moreover, we believe that the observed interest rates are below r̄; thus, our
theory predicts that stability is U-shape in the interest rate. In the following
section, we present some empirical evidence in line with our theory.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This section tests if the interest rate indeed affects cartel stability in a non-
monotonic way, as predicted by our theory. A cartel’s stability can be mea-
sured in different ways; we use two different approaches. First, we determine
how the interest rate affects the probability that a cartel ends using a logit
model. Second, we quantify the interest rate’s effect on a firm’s participation
duration in a cartel using survival analysis. Next, we present the data.
Data. We use the dataset constructed by Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018).
It contains 615 firms participating in 114 cartels convicted by the European
Commission between 1999 and 2016. The earliest cartel started its infringe-
ment in the second quarter in 1969, and the latest cartel in the dataset ended
in 2012’s second quarter. This gives us an unbalanced panel with 16’431 firm-
quarter observations, respectively 3’232 cartel-quarter observations.
The dataset contains information about the infringement, firms’ indus-
tries, and the cartels’ spatial scope. Some cartel members entered after its
start or left before the cartel ended. Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) ana-
lyzed the effect on cartel stability of late entries and early exits. Furthermore,
the dataset contains information on the reason why an investigation started.
Using this information, Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) classified a cartel’s
natural break-up if the European Commission started its investigation after
the cartel ended, or in the case of a leniency applicant, if the cartel ended at
least a year earlier.27
During the relevant period, the European Commission introduced three
leniency programs to uncover illegal cartels. The first version was released
27For the dataset’s detailed description we refer the reader to Hellwig and Hüschelrath
(2018).
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in the third quarter in 1996 and was inspired by the 1993 US Department of
Justice’s Corporate Leniency Policy. It was amplified in 2002’ first quarter,
whereby the main improvement was that reduction in fines became stricter
aligned to the cooperation, and first applicants received automatic immunity
resulting in less uncertainty in the law’s interpretation. This was also the
goal of the revision in 2006’s fourth quarter, where a leniency applicant’s
duty was clarified. We construct for each revision a dummy variable equal
to zero before its introduction and one afterward.
We use the long-term interest rate in the Euro area from OECD.28 The
time series refers to government bonds maturing in ten years. The interest
rate is implied by the bond’s trade price on the financial market and not the
interest rate at which loans were issued. It starts in the first quarter of 1970,
and to the best of our knowledge, it is the longest available time series for
the Euro area. Firms borrowing may pay an individual risk premium, which
is unfortunately unknown for the firms in our dataset.29
Firms decision is based on the real interest rate and not on the nominal
rates. We use the Euro area’s inflation rate from the World Bank,30 which
starts in 1970 and is yearly available. Under the assumption that market
participants expected the actual inflation rate, we can calculate the real
interest rate by subtracting the inflation rate from the nominal interest rate.31
Alternatively, we have used nominal values instead of real ones and got similar
results, yet less significant.
Figure 3.3 shows the real interest rate and the number of active cartels.
The vertical lines indicate the leniency program’s introduction and revisions.
The figure suggests that the leniency program and its revisions were success-
ful in decreasing the number of cartels. Marvao and Spagnolo (2014) present
a detailed analysis of the leniency program’s effectiveness. For the increasing
cartel activity until 1995, we could only speculate. However, we tested our
results additionally on a subset starting in 1995’s first quarter, and results
were similar, although less significant.
Figure 3.4 shows the interest rate and the active cartels’ average duration
in quarters. Before 1985 the sample includes only a few cartels, which lasted
for two decades. The duration declines over time. Nonetheless, there may
28The time series is also available at FRED (IRLTLT01EZM156N).
29Alternatively, we use the Bank of England Official Bank Rate starting in 1975 to
measure the interest rate; results are similar.
30https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=XC (last ac-
cessed March 15, 2021).
31Levenstein and Suslow (2016) use last year’s inflation, which reflects a naive forecast.
Following this approach, our results become less significant.
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Figure 3.3: Real interest rate and number of active cartels. The solid black line
refers to the total number of active cartels, dashed are the ones with a natural
break-up. The vertical lines indicate leniency programs.
exist uncovered long-lasting cartels, which are not in our dataset. We discuss
the biased sample problem at the end of the section.
Real GDP per capita in the Euro Area measured by the World Bank
is unfortunately only yearly available. We use it to control for changes in
demand resulting from a change in income.32 Additionally, to control for
Europe’s general economic situation, we use the economic sentiment indi-
cator available at Eurostat. The indicator is a weighted average of replies’
balances to selected questions addressed to firms in different industries in the
Eurozone.33 It starts in the first quarter in 1985 and is measured monthly;
we use a quarter’s average.
Empirical Results. In our first approach, we quantify the interest rate’s
effect on a cartel’s break-up probability. We, therefore, focus on the cartel
level data. We create a variable equal to 1 if the cartel ends and zero other-
wise. Thus, the variable is zero if the cartel existed and one at the time when
it breaks up. Since all 114 cartels in the dataset ended and our cartel-quarter
observations are 3’232, we have a treatment effect of less than 5%.34 The
binary variable of interest, cartel break-up, is denoted by Y . We use a logit
32Alternatively, we use the Production and Sales (MEI) from OECD statistics, which is
quarterly available. Results are similar.
33The time series is seasonally adjusted and scaled to a long-term mean of 100.
34We did the same analysis with yearly instead of quarterly data; results were similar.
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Figure 3.4: Real interest rate and participation duration. The solid black line
refers to the active firms’ average participation duration in month. The vertical
lines indicate leniency programs.
model to quantify the interest rate’s effect, i.e.,
P (Yi,t = 1|xi,t) =
exp(βᵀxi,t + εi)
1 + exp(βᵀxi,t + εi)
,
where β is the parameters of interest’s vector including a constant, xi the
covariates’ vector and εi is a random effect.
35 To model the interest rate’s
non-monotonic effect, we use a second order polynomial. This is flexible
enough, to allow for the structures imposed by Proposition 3.2, precisely, the
U-shape relation between stability and the interest rate.
Generally, our theory predicts a shape resembling a negative cubic poly-
nomial, whereby the decreasing effect for large interest rates follows from the
fact that firms become local monopolists. Such high levels of interest rate
are likely not observed in our data. Therefore, we focus on the U-shape in
our empirical analysis.
We control the cartels’ infringement, i.e., xi contains information if a
cartel fixed prices, market shares, or both. Furthermore, we control for the
industry in which the cartel was active and whether it was active in the entire
EU, only some countries or worldwide. We also include the number of cartel
members, which may change over time, and control for cartels that did break-
35The error term is assumed to be independent and identically normal distributed.
82 Cartel Stability in Times of Low Interest Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Rate 0.61 0.70∗ 0.62 0.69∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Interest Rate2 -0.13∗ -0.12∗ -0.14∗ -0.12∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 3’232 3’232 3’078 3’078
Table 3.2: Logit Models. Robust standard errors in parentheses and significance
levels indicated by ∗ for p < 0.05, ∗∗ for p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗ for p < 0.001. All
models include a constant and controls for infringement, industries, spacial scope,
members, natural death and leniency programs. All coefficients are reported in
Table 3.4.
up naturally. Finally, we control for the leniency program’s introduction and
its revisions.
Parameters are quantified using Maximum likelihood estimation control-
ling for random effects. Estimates are presented in Table 3.12, whereby we
only give a subset of the coefficients; all estimates are presented in the ap-
pendix Table 3.4. The probability that a cartel ends increases in the interest
rate close to zero. At some point, the quadratic term decreases the break-up’s
probability. The estimates are in line with our theory; however, not always
significantly different from zero. If we control for GDP per capita in columns
(2) and (4), the estimates have the predicted sign and are significant.
For the second approach, we focus on a firm’s participation duration in
a cartel. Similar to Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018), we focus on a firm’s
natural leave. We are interested in how long it takes a firm to leave a cartel
after it entered. The firm’s exit is called the event in survival analysis. The
occurrence of the event is a random variable T and the probability that an
event has not happened before period t is P (T ≥ t) = S(t), where S is the
survival function.
More precisely, we assume a Weibull model,
S(t|xi,t) = exp(− exp(βᵀxi,t)tκ),
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implying a hazard function
dS(t|xi,t)/dt
S(t|xi,t)
= h(t|xi,t) = κ exp(βᵀxi,t)tκ−1.
The hazard function can be interpreted as the probability that the event
happens at t if it has not happened before. κ is the distribution’s shape pa-
rameter. If κ > 1, the baseline hazard h(t|0) = κtκ−1 increases monotonically
over time; it becomes more likely that the event happens over time.
Depending on the covariates, the hazard function increases or decreases.
Precisely, if βᵀxi,t > 0, the hazard function is larger than the baseline hazard,
and thus it is more likely for the firm i to experience the event, i.e., to leave
the cartel. We use the same set of controls as above, except for natural
break-up, since this is the event we study. Additionally, we include controls
for the exit or entry of other cartel members within six months.36
The event we are studying is a firm’s natural leave. Some firms in our
dataset may be forced to leave a cartel due to an investigation resulting in
a cartel break-up. Those firms did not experience the event, yet the cartel
ended. The data is, thus, right censored. Let ζi = 0 if the observation
is censored and 1 otherwise. An uncensored observation’s contribution to
the likelihood is the information that the event did not happen until t and
the event happening at t, formally S(t|xi,t)h(t|xi,t). If the data is censored,
its contribution is the information that the event has not happened until t,




We estimate parameters β and κ, maximizing the likelihood function. All
coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table 3.7, of which we present a
subset in Table 3.3.
Again, we include a quadratic term and control for demand as well as for
production factors. Results are significant and as predicted by our theory.
The interest rate affects stability non-monotonically; precisely, stability is
U-shaped in the interest rate.
The rest of our estimates are qualitatively similar to Hellwig and Hüschel-
rath (2018); we refer to their work for further information. More interestingly,
Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) and Levenstein and Suslow (2016) use dif-
ferent datasets and include a linear term for the interest rate in their studies.
They find opposing results: in Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) stability in-
crease with the interest rate, while in Levenstein and Suslow (2016) it goes
36This was the main analysis of Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Rate 0.61∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Table 3.3: Duration Models. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signifi-
cance levels indicated by ∗ for p < 0.05, ∗∗ for p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗ for p < 0.001. All
models include a constant and controls for infringement, industries, spacial scope,
members, members’ entry and exit, and leniency programs. All coefficients are
reported in Table 3.7.
down. According to our theory, both effects may arise. On the one hand,
low interest rates increase the time value of money, resulting in more patient
players stabilizing cartels. On the other hand, low interest rate lowers in-
vestment costs, thereby increasing a firm’s profit when it deviates from the
collusive agreement, destabilizing cartels. The second effect directly affects
a firm’s balance sheet by increasing outside capital. Levenstein and Suslow
(2016) control for firms’ outside capital.37 Consequently, the second effect is
silenced; their estimates are in line with our theory.
By incorporating a quadratic term, we allow for the interest rate’s non-
monotonic effect and find supporting evidence in the data collected by Hell-
wig and Hüschelrath (2018). We also use the data collected by Levenstein and
Suslow (2016) and introduce a quadratic term for the interest rate.38 How-
ever, the dataset does not contain information about investigation reasons
and, accordingly, no information about a cartel’s natural break-up. More-
over, there are only around 2’000 cartel-year observations, resulting in no ad-
ditional significant empirical support. Future research may use firm-specific
data to quantify the two opposing channels identified in our theory.39
37They rely on industry averages due to the lack of firm-specific data.
38The data is accessible at https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/130650/
version/V1/view (last accessed March 15, 2021).
39We used aggregated investments in the Euro area in construction and equipment
available at the Ameco database. However, construction and equipment usually do not
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According to our estimates, cartel stabilization is the lowest when inter-
est rates are around 3%. Estimates are, however, very noisy. Confidence
intervals range from below 1% up to 10%. Current real interest rates are,
nonetheless, below our estimates. Accordingly, cartels become less stable if
interest rates increase. The estimates should, however, be taken with caution.
Some remarks are in order. The dataset only contains convicted cartels;
thus, there is an obvious selection bias that we are not able to address. Fur-
thermore, a firm’s duration in a cartel may be underestimated because of
lacking evidence. We relied on aggregate data, whereas we neglected firm-
specific risk premia. We, therefore, abstain from interpreting any estimates
coefficient’s size, which is generally challenging in the used models. Nonethe-
less, our results are in line with the literature and support our theory.40
3.4 Conclusion
We have shown that the interest rate affects a cartel’s stability non-monoton-
ically. More precisely, stability is U-shaped in the interest rate, and for
a sufficiently large interest rate, it decreases; the overall shape resembles
a negative cubic polynomial. Two opposing effects are at work. On the
one hand, the time value of money implied by the interest rate makes firms
more patient when interest rates are low, increasing cartel stability. On the
other hand, low interest rates give rise to additional investment opportunities
resulting in more profitable deviations from the collusive agreement. With
high interest rates, firms lack the investments to capture a large market
share. Cartel stability is, thus, weakened when interest rates are low. The
first effect dominates for relatively low interest rates; otherwise, the second
effect dominates. For sufficiently large interest rates, the second effect is
exhausted, and only the first remains. For reasonable interest rates, stability
is U-shaped in the interest rate.41
For simplicity, we assumed a symmetric set-up. However, firms may
have different risk premia or technologies, resulting in a heterogeneous cost
depreciate heavily and are therefore different from the investments that we theoretically
model.
40For a detailed discussion of the sample bias and related problems for empirical work
on cartels, see Harrington (2006a).
41The U-shape is not robust to different forms of competition in the stage game. We
used, for example, price competition with differentiated products similar to Collie (2006).
The larger the interest rate, the higher opportunity costs and the lower the critical discount
factor. However, stability decreases monotonically in the interest rate. The main difference
is that colluding firms produce less than competitive firms; in our set-up, they produce
the same quantity.
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structure. Rothschild (1999) discusses collusion when firms have asymmetric
costs. In his set-up, high or low cost firms have ambiguously more incentives
to deviate. An inefficient firm’s profits are relatively small, but so are the
gains from deviating. In our set-up, the interest rate affects the opportunity
cost multiplicatively, thereby increasing asymmetries. The more asymmetric
firms are, the more challenging it is for them to agree on the collusive price,
resulting in a negative effect of the interest rate on cartel stability.42
We used a dataset collected by Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) containing
615 firms participating in 114 cartels convicted by the European Commis-
sion during 1999 and 2016 to test our theoretical prediction. Using a logit
model on the cartel level yields significant estimates in line with our theory.
Additionally, we estimated a Weibull model and quantified the interest rate’s
effect on a firm’s participation duration in a cartel.
Interestingly, Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) and Levenstein and Sus-
low (2016) find opposing linear effects of the interest rate on cartel stability.
According to our theory, both findings are possible. By incorporating the in-
terest rate’s non-monotonic effect, we find in the former datasets supporting
evidence for our predicted U-shape. In the latter dataset, there is, unfortu-
nately, no information to control for investigation reasons. We do not find
additional supporting evidence. Nonetheless, future empirical work should
consider using a quadratic effect of the interest rate. As we have shown, the
interest rate does not only affect the players’ patience.
We conclude that the interest rate affects cartel stability non-monotonically.
The current time of unusually low interest rates favors collusion by increasing
cartel stability and the likelihood of cartel formation.
Generally, when the opportunity cost is relatively high, cartels are more
stable. Firms have fewer incentives to deviate because it is costly to serve
large shares of the market. When consumers have a poor outside option,
cartels are less stable. Deviation is more profitable since consumers have a
high willingness to pay, offering a high potential to extract by a deviating
firm. Our theory predicts that cartels are less stable in highly competitive
markets. When products become almost homogeneous, their individual at-
tributes become irrelevant, and consumers react to little price differences.
Thus by a deviation, a firm can capture almost the entire market, making it
harder to collude. All factors also affect the collusion’s profitability relative
to the competitive outcome; however, these effects are relatively small to the
one on deviation.
42For more on collusion with heterogeneous firms, see Harrington (1989) and Harrington
(1991). The former discusses different (rational) discount factors, the latter heterogeneous
costs. Products are homogeneous, and firms determine collusive prices according to the
Nash Bargaining Solution.
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Finally, our model contains another interesting mechanism helping to
detect cartels, which may be explored in future research: Competitive prices
react differently than collusive ones. While collusive ones react stronger
to an increase in the consumers’ willingness to pay, competitive prices react
stronger to cost shocks. Moreover, if consumers’ perception changes such that
firms become less heterogeneous, competitive prices go down; by contrast,
cartelists increase their prices.43
43Changes may be due to new regulation or new technologies. For example, quality
regulation may result in less heterogeneous products. Hefti et al. (2020) present a model
where firms manipulate the consumers’ distribution, for example, by advertising.
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3.A Extensions
Catel’s Stability. In the main text, we used the simplifying assumption that
firms collude on the price maximizing their joint profit. The monopoly price
is a reasonable focal point and implies the payoff dominating equilibrium.
However, in reality, the payoff dominating collusion is rarely observed. It has
to be acknowledged that a monopolist’s price is unknown. We present in this
appendix rational reasoning why firms collude on less than the monopoly
price.
Formally, let pt ∈ [pc, U− t] be the price chosen by colluding firms. In the
main text, we assumed it is equal to the upper bound. The critical discount





where πt(pt) = (pt−C)/2, πd(pt) = 2tF 2((pt−pd(pt))/2t)/f((pt−pd(pt))/2t),
and πc as in the main text, whereby pd(pt) = p
∗
i (pt), as in the main text’s




∂πd/∂pt(πt(pt)− πc)− ∂πt/∂pt(πd(pt)− πc)
(πd(pt)− πc)2
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whereby δ∗0 is the minimal necessary discount factor to sustain collusion. The















Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive dpd/dpt = (f
2−Ff ′)/(2f 2−
Ff ′) and thus ∂πd/∂pt = F ((pt − pd(pt))/(2t)) ∈ [1/2, 1]. The deviation’s
marginal profit is larger when firms collude on high prices.45 For example, if
44In our set-up, the condition simplifies to ∂2πd/∂pt





3/(2t(2f2 − Ff ′)) ≥ 0.
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firms collude close the lower bound pt = pc, the deviation’s marginal profit
goes to 1/2 and the critical discount factor thus goes to zero. The higher
the collusive price, the higher is the critical discount factor, i.e., the harder
it is to sustain the cartel’s stability. Cartelists face trade-off between high
profits and their agreement’s stability. Our main insights do not change if
firms collude on a lower price.
Transportation Costs. Here we show, that our results are qualitatively the
same when consumers have quadratic transportation costs instead of linear
ones.
With quadratic transportation costs, the utility function of consumer
x ∈ [−1, 1] becomes U − pi − t(xi − x)2, when she buys the good at firm i,
remind that i is located at the lower bound. Thus, she only participates if
U − pi − t(x + 1)2 ≥ 0 ⇔ x ≤
√
(U − pi)/t − 1. Moreover, she prefers to
buy at firm i if U − pi − t(x+ 1)2 ≥ U − pj − t(1− x)2 ⇔ x ≤ (pj − pi)/4t.
Accordingly, the demand function in the main text differs slightly. A local
monopolist sets a price
















Competing firms set prices











again, there exists a unique interior equilibrium at prices pc = C + 2t/f(0),
resulting in firms’ profits πc = t/f(0), which are double the profits in the
main text. Competition is weaker since consumers’ transportation costs when
buying at the competitor are higher. Colluding firms choose prices to set
consumers indifferent between buying the good or not. Thus they set a price
pt = U − t, which is the same as in the main text. Thus cartelists make the
same profit πt = (U − t− C)/2.
A deviating firm sets a price of
pd = p
∗
i (pt) = C + 4t
F ((U − t− pd)/4t)
f((U − t− pd)/4t)
and makes a profit of πd = 4tF
2((U − t− pd)/4t)/f((U − t− pd)/4t). Similar
as in the main text, deviation is only profitable when opportunity costs are
low. πc = πt = πd, if C = U − t − 2t/f(0). Moreover, a deviating firm
cannot capture the entire market if opportunity costs are high, formally
C ≥ U − 3t− 2t/f(0).
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We immediately get that πc is constant in C, πt is linearly decreasing and
πd decreases convexly. For the last part we can show ∂πd/∂C = −F ((U −
t − pd)/4t) and ∂2πd/∂C2 = (f(.)/4t)dpd/dC. Since C = (1 + r)c, Lemma
3.1 does qualitatively not change.
Next, note that πc is constant in U , πt increases linearly and πd increases
convexly. Again, for the last part we can show ∂πd/∂U = F ((U − t −
pd)/4t) and ∂
2πd/∂U
2 = f 3(.)/4t(2f 2(.)−F (.)f ′(.)). Moreover, we πc linearly
increases, πt linearly decreases and πd decreases convexly in t. Again, for the






4tF (.)f(.) + (U − pD)(f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.))
2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.) +
(U − pd)F (.)
t2
.
Since the proof of Proposition 3.1 only relies on the profit’s functional
form, which is the same as in the main text, it does qualitatively not change.
To study δ∗’s concavity, we can use the same steps as in the main text.
The necessary condition used in the proof of Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.2
becomes
f 3[4F 2f(0)− f ][f(0)(U − t− C)− 2t]
8F 2ff(0)[f(0)(U − t− C)− 2t]− 8Ff(0)[4F 2f(0)− f ] ≤ 2f
2 − Ff ′,
where we have neglected the functions argument (U − t− pd)/4t. Note that
for C → U − t− 2t/f(0) firms become local monopolists, similar to the main
texts’ condition r → r̄. The left-hand side goes to zero since the product
decreases faster than the difference, while the right-hand side is positive by
F ’s log-concavity. Thus, Lemma 3.2 does qualitatively not change, i.e., when
F is sufficiently log-concave δ∗ is concave for any interior solution.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2, the slope of δ∗ when firms
become local monopolists is −cπ′′d/4(π′d)2 → −cf(0)/8t; δ̂’s slope is −c2/(U−
t−t/f(0))2, thus if c ≤ (U−t−2t/f(0))2f(0)/8t, δ∗ decreases stronger, which
shows that Proposition 3.2 remains qualitatively the same. Our results are
thus robust to quadratic transportation costs.
Degree of Differentiation. It is well known that with linear transportation
costs, there does not exist an equilibrium when firms can choose their de-
gree of differentiation, e.g., Anderson (1988). With quadratic transportation
costs, price competition leads to inefficiently high product differentiation.
Firms choose to differentiate their product to avoid fierce price competition.
A cartel silences the price competition’s effect. Cartelists choose product
differentiation to minimize consumers’ transportation costs in order to in-
crease the consumer’s willingness to pay, resulting in the efficient degree of
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differentiation.46 Accordingly, cartelists choose less differentiated products
than competing firms, i.e., they are not located at the boundaries of the
distribution’s support.
Lower price cuts are therefore necessary to capture the entire market.
A cartel’s stability goes down if cartelists offer less differentiated goods –
deviation is more profitable, see for example Chang (1991). The trade-off
between stability and profitability is similar to the one with prices discussed
above.
When firms can choose their degree of differentiation endogenously, a
natural question is how rigid the firms’ product characteristics (location)
are. Can they only be chosen at the beginning of the game, or can they be
adjusted? If they can be adjusted, how often can a firm adjust its prod-
uct characteristics? And is it costly to change the product’s characteristics
(choose a different location)?
Friedman and Thisse (1993) assume that locations are fixed at the be-
ginning of time and can not be adjusted. They show that firms choose the
minimal degree of differentiation. Their result depends, however, on their
profit-sharing rule. Jehiel (1992) shows that the result of minimal differenti-
ation only holds if there is no transfer between cartelists.
A costly and rigid adjustment of firms’ locations seems most realistic. A
formal analysis is although beyond the scope of this appendix.
NPV versus IRR. In our set-up, δ∗ implies an Internal Rate of Return by
δ∗ = 1/(1 + IRR). Our evaluation criterion is thus based on the comparison
between the IRR and the interest rate r. Figure 3.1 shows the shaded area
for δ∗ ≥ δ̂ ⇔ IRR ≤ r, i.e, where firms do not join a cartel.
The problem, however, with the IRR as an evaluation criterion is the
implicit assumption that firms can invest their returns at the same interest
rate. In reality, rarely a project satisfies this assumption. An alternative
evaluation criterion that does not rely on this assumption is the Net Present






where ct is the cash flow at time t and rt the interest rate. In our set-up,
we make the simplifying assumption that rt = r; thus, the interest rate is
constant over time. Formally, the IRR is defined by setting the NPV to zero.
In our model, a project is continuing with the cartel or deviate. The cash
46In our framework, welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits) is accord-
ingly higher with collusion. Similar, Fershtman and Pakes (2000) argue that consumer
surplus goes up when firms collude if product quality is taken into account.
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flow from staying in a cartel is constant, while by deviating, the firm gets a
large cash flow in period t = 0 and a smaller constant one for t ≥ 1. The














In our simplified set-up, the two evaluation criteria are therefore equiv-
alent. Whenever the NPV is positive given by (3.6), it follows directly that
IRR ≥ r and vice versa. Firms choose the project with the highest NPV,
which is in our set-up equivalent to choose to project with the highest IRR.
Microfoundation. Many different factors outside the model affect a firm’s
decision to collude. For example, some decision-makers may have stronger
moral conflicts to break the law by forming a cartel than others. Yet, the
larger the profits from a cartel, the more is one tempt to build one. Here, we
present a formal microfoundation for our stability measure.
Let I be the set of industries. In each industry i ∈ I, there are two hor-
izontally differentiated firms as in the main text. Industries differ in their
cost of collusion k(i). The difference may arise from a different perceived
likelihood to be prosecuted by the competition authorities, resulting in het-
erogenous expected fines, or simply different morality costs of the decision-
makers. Let the industries be sorted such that k(i) is a strictly increasing
function. Cost of collusion are relative to its gains: when firms do not gain




δτ (1− k(i))(πt − πc) ≥ πd − πt,
resulting in a critical discount factor depending on the industry. Formally,
δ∗(i) = 1− (1− k(i))πt − πc
πd − πc




where δ∗ is given by equation (3.4) in the main text. Note that the functional
form does not change since δ∗(i) = (1− k(i))δ∗ + k(i) is a strictly monotone
transformation of δ∗; hence, all our proofs remain valid. The larger the costs,
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the higher is the critical discount factor. Accordingly, the critical discount
factor differs across industries and increases in i.





where 1(.) is the indicator function. In this framework, our stability measure
is simply the number of cartels. To an observer, who does not know the
industry’s cost k(i), yet knows its distribution, the number of cartels equals
the likelihood of observing a cartel when the total mass of firms is normalized
to one.
Alternatively, industries may also differ in the parameters, t, c, or U .
Following Proposition 3.1, δ∗ is again industry-specific and we reach the
same conclusion.
Finally, one could also think that industries have different risk premia.
The relevant interest rate on the financial market for a firm in industry
i ∈ I is r(i) = r + σ(i), where σ(i) is an industry specific risk premium.
Consequently, δ̂(i) = 1/(1 + r(i)) depends on the industry. Again, firms in




The above technical arguments can alternatively be interpreted in the fol-
lowing way. The antitrust authorities have less information about the market,
i.e., do not exactly know the parameter values. However, the antitrust au-
thorities have a belief about the parameters’ distribution. Using this belief,
it can calculate the probability that a cartel is formed. Introducing different
industries is thus not necessary.
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3.B Proofs
Proof Lemma 3.1. With a symmetric and log-concave distribution πc, πt, and
πd are uniquely determined. The first and second part follows directly from
π′c := ∂πc/∂r = 0 and π
′










and use the implicit function theorem to derive dpd/dr = cf
2(.)/(2f 2(.) −
F (.)f ′(.)), hence,
π′d = −cF
(





















since F ’s log-concavity implies dpd/dr ≥ 0, i.e., larger costs increase prices.
The last part follows from equating profits πc = πt = πd, which implies
C = U − t− t/f(0). Using C = (1 + r) and rearranging yields the result.
Proof Proposition 3.1. We start with proofing the second part. Remind that
C = (1 + r)c, i.e., the profit functions’ derivatives with respect to C have the
same sign as with respect to r. Therefore, we can use the derivatives derived
in Lemma 3.1 and prove the statement with respect to r. Remind that at r̄
πd = πc. Thus, by the Mean Value Theorem and πd’s convexity in r, there
exists a unique γ(r) ∈ (r, r̄) such that
π′d(γ(r)) =
πd(r)− πd(r̄)
r − r̄ , (3.7)
where we have written the profit functions’ argument explicitly. Using the
implicit function theorem we can derive γ′(r) = (π′d(r) − π′d(γ(r)))/((r −
r̄)π′′d(γ(r))) ≥ 0. Using πt(r) − πc(r) = π′t(r)(r − r̄) and (3.7) we can write
the critical discount factor as








2 ≤ 0. Moreover, we
have shown in Lemma 3.1’s proof that π′t = −c/2 and π′d ∈ [−c,−c/2], hence,
δ∗ ∈ [0, 1/2].
3.B. Proofs 95
For the first part, we use a similar trick. First, we derive the profit
functions’ derivatives: ∂πc/∂U = 0, ∂πt/∂U = 1/2, and ∂πd/∂U = (1 −
dpd/dU)(2F (.)f
2(.)−F 2(.)f ′(.))/f 2(.). We use the implicit function theorem
to derive dpd/dU = 1− f 2(.)/(2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.)) ≤ 1 and plugging in yields


















2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.) ≥ 0.
Thus πc is constant, πt linearly increasing and πd convexly increasing in U .
Similar as in Lemma 3.1 we can state πc = πt = πd at U = C+t+t/f(0) =: U .
We can thus write πt − πc = (U − U)/2. Next, by the Mean Value Theorem







U − U ,
where we have written the profit function’s argument explicitly. Since πd(U) =
πc, we can write



















γ(U) goes up in U since πd increases convexly. This concludes the first part.
For the third part, we start again with the profit functions’ derivatives:
∂πc/∂t = 1/(2f(0)), ∂πt/∂t = −1/2, and ∂πd/∂t = 2F 2(.)/f(.) − ((U −
pd)/t + dpd/dt)(2F (.)f
2(.) − F 2(.)f ′(.))/f 2(.). Using the implicit function





2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.) −
U − pd
t
f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.)
2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.)
and plugging in yields ∂πd/∂t = −F (.)(U − pd)/t ≤ 0. Thus, deviation is


















2tF (.)f(.) + (U − pd)f 2(.)
2f 2(.)− F (.)f ′(.) +
(U − pd)F (.)
t2
≥ 0.
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Hence, πc linearly increases, πt linearly decreases and πd convexly decreases
in t. Similar as in Lemma 3.1, πc = πt = πd if t = (U −C)/(1 + 1/f(0)) =: t̄.


























We can simplify the left-hand side by using πt−πc = (t̄− t)∂(πt−πc)/∂t
and by the Mean Value Theorem there exists γ ∈ (t, t̄) such that πd − πc =
(t̄ − t)∂(πd − πc)/∂t, where the right-hand side is evaluated at γ. Plugging










which is satisfied since πd decreases convexly and γ ≥ t. This concludes the
third part.
Proof Lemma 3.2. We start with an interior solution, i.e., r ∈ [r, r̄]. In this




















Using that ∂δ∗/∂r = (1− δ∗)π′d/(πd−πc)−π′t/(πd−πc), simplifies the right-
hand side to π′d/(πd−πc)−π′t/(πt−πc). Plugging in, yields that δ∗ is concave
if and only if
−cf 3
2tF (2f 2 − Ff ′) ≥
−2cFff(0)
t(4F 2f(0)− f) +
cf(0)
f(0)(U − t− (1 + r)c)− t
⇔ f
3[4F 2f(0)− f ][f(0)(U − t− (1 + r)c)− t]
8F 2ff(0)[f(0)(U − t− (1 + r)c)− t]− 4Ff(0)[4F 2f(0)− f ] ≤ 2f
2 − Ff ′.
We simplified notation, precisely the argument of f and F is neglected, it is
(U − t − pd)/2t, where pd is a function of r and implicitly defined by (3.2).
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Note that the expressions in the square brackets go to zero when r → r̄:
Firms do have no incentive to deviate, i.e., F → 1/2. Since the product goes
faster to zero than the difference, the expression on the left-hand side goes
to zero. By log-concavity, the right-hand side is strictly larger than zero,
thus for r close to r̄, the critical discount factor δ∗ is concave. Whenever the
distribution is sufficiently log-concave, i.e., the right-hand side is sufficiently
large, δ∗ is concave for any r ∈ [r, r̄].
Note that πd = 2t/f(1) is constant if r ≤ r, hence, δ∗ linearly increases
in r. Hence, if δ∗ is concave for r ∈ [r, r̄], it is concave for r ≤ r̄.
Proof Proposition 3.2. Since s is a strictly increasing function, we can di-
rectly prove all statements in terms of the difference δ̂ − δ∗. Formally, if
δ̂ ≥ δ∗, ∂S/∂r = s′(.)(∂(δ̂ − δ∗)/∂r) and since s′(.) > 0, all results follow
from ∂(δ̂ − δ∗)/∂r.
To prove the first part, first note that for r → 0, δ̂ = 1 and δ∗ ≤ 1/2, as
shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Hence, S(δ̂, δ∗) = s(δ̂− δ∗). Next, we
show for r → 0, ∂δ∗/∂r ≥ ∂δ̂/∂r. If r < r, δ∗ increases and the inequality is




π′d(πt − πc)− π′t(πd − πc)
(πd − πc)2
=
π′dcr̄/2− c(πd − πc)/2
(πd − πc)2
,
at r = 0. Furthermore, we know π′d ∈ [−c,−c/2], and πd − πc ∈ [cr̄/2, cr̄].










where x ∈ [−1/2,−1/4], y ∈ [1/4, 1/2], and z ∈ [1/4, 1]. The expression is
thus bounded by the interval [−1, 1]. The slope of δ̂ is −1 for r = 0. This
proofs the first part.
For the second part, note that δ∗ = 0 when r → r̄ and δ̂ > 0 since r̄ <∞.
Hence, S(δ̂, δ∗) = s(δ̂ − δ∗). Next, we show for r → r̄, ∂δ∗/∂r ≤ ∂δ̂/∂r, if
c ≤ f(0)(U − t− t/(2f(0)))2/4t.


















d (πt − πc) + π′′dπ′t
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Next, note that for r → r̄ we have pd → U − t. Since F (0) = 1/2 and
f ′(0) = 0 by symmetry, the expression simplifies to −cf(0)/(4t).
The slope of δ̂ at r = r̄ is −1/(1 + r̄)2 = −c2/(U − t− t/(f(0)))2. Hence,
if c ≤ f(0)(U − t − t/(2f(0)))2/4t, δ∗ decreases stronger than δ̂ hat r = r̄.
This proves the second part.
Whenever F (.) is sufficiently log-concave Lemma 3.2 implies a concave δ∗
for r ≤ r̄. The difference δ̂ − δ∗ is thus the difference of a convex decreasing
function and a concave function, which is quasiconvex. Accordingly, S is a
quasiconvex function, which may be bounded from below if δ∗ > δ̂, resulting
in a quasiconvex function.
Suppose first, δ̂ ≥ δ∗ for all r. Formally, s(δ̂ − δ∗) is quasiconvex for
r ∈ (0, r̄) if R = {r|δ̂(r) − δ∗(r) ≤ s−1(x)} ∩ (0, r̄) is a convex set for any
x ∈ R, where s−1(.) is the inverse function of s(.). Take r1, r2 ∈ R, thus
δ̂(r1) ≤ δ∗(r1) + s−1(x) and δ̂(r2) ≤ δ∗(r2) + s−1(x). Hence, for α ∈ (0, 1) is
has to hold that αδ̂(r1) + (1− α)δ̂(r2) ≤ αδ∗(r1) + (1− α)δ∗(r2) + s−1(x).
By δ̂(r)’s convexity and δ∗(r)’s concavity it follows αδ̂(r1)+(1−α)δ̂(r2) ≥
δ̂(αr1 + (1−α)r2) and αδ∗(r1) + (1−α)δ∗(r2) ≤ δ∗(αr1 + (1−α)r2). Accord-
ingly, αr1 + (1 − α)r2 ∈ R, which proofs that R is a convex set and hence,
s(δ̂ − δ∗) is quasiconvex.
Now suppose that there exit r ∈ (0, r̄) such that δ̂(r) < δ∗(r). Let this set
be denoted by Q = {r|δ̂(r) < δ∗(r)}. Since δ̂(0) > δ∗(0) and δ̂(r̄) > δ∗(r̄),
the area where the inequality holds has to be intermediary, i.e., Q ⊂ (0, r̄).
Since s(0) = 0, S is continuous and decreases in the neighborhood of Q’s
lower bound. By the same argument, S increases in the neighborhood of
Q’s upper bound. Thus to the left of Q, S is quasiconvex, for r ∈ Q, S
is constant and then it becomes quasiconvex again. Since it is continuous,
overall S is quasiconvex. This concludes the proof.
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3.C Empirical Results.
Our results are generally in line with Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018), al-
though we use real instead of nominal terms to control for macroeconomic
factors. Moreover, we control for each leniency program’s revision. The main
insight of Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) is robust to these changes: firms’
enter and exit create a dynamic within the cartel. For a detailed discussion,
we refer the reader to their paper.
Table 3.4 presents the logit model from the main text with a treatment
effect of less than 5%. Estimates are mostly insignificant. Table 3.5 uses
averaged yearly data instead of quarterly data; the treatment effect is around
12%. However, heterogeneity is lost, and results are still insignificant. Except
when we control for GDP p.c., estimates are significantly different from zero
and in line with our theoretical prediction.
In Table 3.6 we use a probit model instead of a logit model. The proba-
bility of the cartel ending is accordingly
P (Yi,t = 1|xi,t) = Φ (βᵀxi,t + εi) ,
where Φ(.) is the standard cumulative normal. Results are similar.
Table 3.7 presents the estimates from the main text’s Weibull model.
Estimates are similar to Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018). Moreover, the
estimates yield significant support for our theory. In Table 3.8 we restrict
the data to a subsample after 1995. Results are similar yet less significant.
In Table 3.9 we present estimates with an alternative measure for GDP.
Following Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2018) we use the Production and Sales
(MEI) data for the Euro Area from OECD, which is quarterly available.
Estimates are again similar to the main results.
Alternatively to the Weibull model, we estimate an exponential duration
model in Table 3.10. This basically assumes κ = 0, i.e., the survival function
and hazard rate are
S(t|xi,t) = exp(− exp(βᵀxi,t)t)
h(t|xi,t) = exp(βᵀxi,t).
This has the advantage of estimating one less parameter. However, the model
loses some flexibility: the baseline hazard is constant over time.
Table 3.11 presents results of a Cox regression model. Similar to the
duration models above, this assumes a proportional hazard rate
h(t|xi,t) = h0(t) exp(βᵀxi,t).
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However, the Cox model uses a different approach to estimate the coefficient
vector β. Let Ct be the set of active cartels. Thus, firms in Ct are at risk of
leaving the cartel. The Cox model relates the firms leaving at time t to all







By contrast to the other proportional hazard models, the baseline hazard is
not estimated. The results are similar to the above.
The proportional hazard models discussed assume that the covariates
act multiplicatively on the hazard rate. Alternatively, the covariates may
act multiplicatively on duration. We present some models with accelerated
failure-time. Above, in a proportional hazard model, βᵀxi,t > 0 increased the
probability that a firm leaves a cartel given that it has not left it before. Now,
in the accelerated failure-time models, βᵀxi,t > 0 increases a firm’s duration
staying in a cartel. Thus, the estimates’ signs should be the opposite as
before, to be in line with our theory.




1 + (t exp(−βᵀxi,t))1/σ
,
where σ is an ancillary parameter estimated additionally to β. Estimates are
significant and in line with our theory.
In Table 3.13 we assume a lognormal model instead of a loglogistic model.
Formally, the survival function is






Results are similar and yield significant support for our theory.
Finally, we assume the most flexible model. Table 3.14 presents the results





1− I(γ, u) ifκ > 0;
1− Φ(z) ifκ = 0;
I(γ, u) ifκ < 0
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This model nests the lognormal model if κ = 0. Moreover, it nests the Weibull
distribution for accelerated failure-time if κ = 1. Accordingly, it also nest
the exponential distribution for accelerated failure-time if κ = 1 and σ = 1.
Again, estimates are significant and in line with our theory. Moreover, we
can reject κ = 1 on the 0.01 significance level. Therefore, we can reject the
Weibull and exponential distribution for accelerated failure-time.
All estimates are in line with our theory. We, therefore, abstain from
testing which model fits the data best since all models yield significant results
in line with our theoretical prediction: Cartel stability is U-shaped in the
interest rate.
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Table 3.4: Logit Models II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.56∗ 0.53∗ 0.55∗ 0.53∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Market Sharing 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.34
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 0.54∗ 0.54∗ 0.54∗ 0.53∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.18 -0.23 -0.18 -0.22
(0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
Transportation and Storage -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.48
(0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.33)
Others -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48
(0.37) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25
(0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Some Countries 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
Members -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Natural Break-Up 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Leniency Program 96 1.19∗∗ 0.48 0.94∗ 0.51
(0.42) (0.55) (0.44) (0.54)
Leniency Program 02 0.62∗ 0.19 0.63 0.18
(0.27) (0.34) (0.32) (0.39)
Leniency Program 06 0.74∗∗ 0.29 0.73∗∗ 0.33
(0.23) (0.30) (0.24) (0.32)
Interest Rate 0.61 0.70∗ 0.62 0.69∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Interest Rate2 -0.13∗ -0.12∗ -0.14∗ -0.12∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -5.07∗∗∗ -12.71∗∗∗ -5.04∗∗∗ -11.86∗∗
(0.65) (3.61) (1.38) (4.26)
ln(σ2u) -13.26 -13.70 -13.25 -12.30
Observations 3’232 3’232 3’078 3’078
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.5: Logit Models with Yearly Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.52∗ 0.47 0.50∗ 0.47
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
Market Sharing 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.38
(0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.40
(0.39) (0.28) (0.39) (0.28)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.33 -0.42 -0.31 -0.42
(0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55)
Transportation and Storage -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.53 0.63 0.57 0.63
(0.35) (0.38) (0.36) (0.39)
Others -0.65 -0.62 -0.64 -0.62
(0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.41)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23
(0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
Some Countries 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Members -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Natural Break-Up 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Leniency Program 96 1.25∗∗ 0.12 0.90 0.14
(0.43) (0.66) (0.52) (0.68)
Leniency Program 02 0.69∗ 0.06 0.75 0.06
(0.31) (0.37) (0.38) (0.42)
Leniency Program 06 0.98∗∗ 0.17 0.99∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.30) (0.42) (0.30) (0.43)
Interest Rate 0.67 0.90∗ 0.72 0.89∗
(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗ -0.11∗ -0.15∗ -0.11∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01)
Constant -3.95∗∗∗ -17.34∗∗ -4.36∗ -16.93∗∗
(0.75) (5.33) (1.70) (5.81)
ln(σ2u) -14.26 -12.91 -14.25 -12.91
Observations 892 892 852 852
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Probit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.27∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Market Sharing 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 0.29∗ 0.28∗ 0.29∗ 0.28∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Transportation and Storage -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Others -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Some Countries 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Members -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Natural Break-Up 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Leniency Program 96 0.48∗∗ 0.14 0.34 0.14
(0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22)
Leniency Program 02 0.30∗ 0.07 0.32∗ 0.09
(0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19)
Leniency Program 06 0.37∗∗ 0.16 0.37∗∗ 0.17
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
Interest Rate 0.27 0.34∗ 0.29 0.33∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Interest Rate2 -0.06∗ -0.05∗ -0.06∗ -0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -2.58∗∗∗ -6.38∗∗∗ -2.82∗∗∗ -6.19∗∗∗
(0.29) (1.65) (0.65) (1.88)
ln(σ2u) -15.58 -15.96 -15.57 -15.98
Observations 3’232 3’232 3’078 3’078
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: Duration Models II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.78∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Market Sharing -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 1.22∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.55 -0.62 -0.59 -0.63
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46)
Transportation and Storage 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.33
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.44
(0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Others -1.35 -1.39 -1.37 -1.38
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.60∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.56∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Some Countries -0.38∗∗ -0.38∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.39∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Members -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry -0.56∗ -0.56∗ -0.53∗ -0.52∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Exit 0.85∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Leniency Program 96 0.78∗∗∗ -0.02 0.17 -0.15
(0.23) (0.34) (0.32) (0.36)
Leniency Program 02 0.38∗∗ -0.08 0.66∗∗∗ 0.26
(0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Leniency Program 06 0.20 -0.28 0.07 -0.23
(0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20)
Interest Rate 0.61∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -5.69∗∗∗ -14.06∗∗∗ -8.00∗∗∗ -13.52∗∗∗
(0.42) (2.04) (0.92) (2.34)
ln(κ) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
106 Cartel Stability in Times of Low Interest Rates
Table 3.8: Duration Models Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Market Sharing -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.61 -0.63 -0.62 -0.64
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46)
Transportation and Storage 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.36
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Others -1.39∗ -1.40∗ -1.39∗ -1.40∗
(0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.59∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Some Countries -0.38∗∗ -0.37∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.38∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Members -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.48 -0.48
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Exit 0.80∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Leniency Program 96 -0.66 -0.74∗ -0.70 -0.74∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Leniency Program 02 0.30 0.13 0.53∗∗ 0.38
(0.15) (0.20) (0.19) (0.24)
Leniency Program 06 0.19 0.00 0.10 -0.02
(0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22)
Interest Rate 0.58∗ 0.60∗ 0.53 0.55∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Interest Rate2 -0.15∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.13∗ -0.12∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP p.c. 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.02∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -3.98∗∗∗ -7.61∗∗ -5.99∗∗∗ -8.36∗∗
(0.51) (2.82) (1.07) (2.85)
ln(κ) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 10’975 10’975 10’975 10’975
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Duration Models with Alternative GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.78∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Market Sharing -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 1.22∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.29) (0.32) (0.30)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.55 -0.66 -0.59 -0.64
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
Transportation and Storage 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.33
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.45
(0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Others -1.35 -1.36 -1.37 -1.36
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.60∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Some Countries -0.38∗∗ -0.41∗∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.41∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Members -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry -0.56∗ -0.54∗ -0.53∗ -0.53∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Exit 0.85∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Leniency Program 96 0.78∗∗∗ 0.13 0.17 0.04
(0.23) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34)
Leniency Program 02 0.38∗∗ 0.09 0.66∗∗∗ 0.37
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23)
Leniency Program 06 0.20 -0.24 0.07 -0.14
(0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21)
Interest Rate 0.61∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Economic Indicator 0.03∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -5.69∗∗∗ -11.73∗∗∗ -8.00∗∗∗ -10.56∗∗∗
(0.42) (1.60) (0.92) (1.79)
ln(κ) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 16’264 16’166 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: Duration Models with Exponential Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.61∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Market Sharing -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 0.76∗ 0.72∗ 0.75∗ 0.74∗
(0.31) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.65 -0.72 -0.68 -0.72
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
Transportation and Storage 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
Others -1.32∗ -1.33∗ -1.31∗ -1.32∗
(0.67) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.51∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Some Countries -0.34∗ -0.33∗ -0.35∗ -0.34∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Members -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry -0.77∗∗ -0.78∗∗ -0.75∗∗ -0.76∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Exit 0.94∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Leniency Program 96 0.85∗∗∗ 0.05 0.26 -0.06
(0.23) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35)
Leniency Program 02 0.35∗ -0.11 0.59∗∗ 0.20
(0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Leniency Program 06 0.27 -0.19 0.15 -0.14
(0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
Interest Rate 0.64∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -4.84∗∗∗ -12.99∗∗∗ -6.91∗∗∗ -12.39∗∗∗
(0.36) (1.99) (0.88) (2.31)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.11: Cox Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing 0.69∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Market Sharing -0.14 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05
(0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 1.08∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 1.09∗∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.52 -0.60 -0.58 -0.62
(0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
Transportation and Storage 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.35
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.40
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44)
Others -1.25 -1.33 -1.20 -1.26
(0.66) (0.69) (0.65) (0.67)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide 0.58∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Some Countries -0.37∗∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.39∗∗ -0.40∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Members -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry -0.76∗∗ -0.75∗∗ -0.72∗∗ -0.72∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Exit 0.77∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Leniency Program 96 0.74∗∗ -0.14 0.10 -0.26
(0.23) (0.35) (0.31) (0.36)
Leniency Program 02 0.42∗∗ -0.08 0.72∗∗∗ 0.28
(0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23)
Leniency Program 06 0.19 -0.33 0.07 -0.27
(0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)
Interest Rate 0.62∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Interest Rate2 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.12: Duration Models with Loglogistic Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing -0.63∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Market Sharing 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.35
(0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing -0.53 -0.54 -0.54 -0.55
(0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.31)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.73 0.83∗ 0.60 0.67
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Transportation and Storage -0.22 -0.25 -0.30 -0.30
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
Financial and Insurance Activities -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
(0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38)
Others 1.29∗ 1.32∗ 1.31∗ 1.33∗∗
(0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.51)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide -0.72∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
Some Countries 0.29∗ 0.27∗ 0.27∗ 0.26∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Members 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry 0.48∗ 0.47∗ 0.46∗ 0.46∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Exit -1.03∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27)
Leniency Program 96 -0.56∗∗ 0.14 0.19 0.41
(0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27)
Leniency Program 02 -0.32∗ 0.12 -0.72∗∗∗ -0.43
(0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.22)
Leniency Program 06 -0.83∗ -0.38 -0.83∗ -0.59
(0.40) (0.43) (0.41) (0.44)
Interest Rate -0.61∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
Interest Rate2 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP p.c. -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.40∗∗∗ 12.27∗∗∗ 8.01∗∗∗ 12.12∗∗∗
(0.38) (2.02) (0.92) (2.24)
ln(σ) -0.54∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.13: Duration Models with Lognormal Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing -0.64∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Market Sharing 0.45∗ 0.44∗ 0.39 0.40
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing -0.43 -0.41 -0.48 -0.47
(0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.83∗ 0.92∗ 0.73∗ 0.79∗
(0.38) (0.38) (0.35) (0.36)
Transportation and Storage -0.15 -0.20 -0.24 -0.25
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Others 1.34∗∗ 1.40∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 1.36∗∗
(0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide -0.60∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗ -0.56∗∗ -0.56∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Some Countries 0.32∗ 0.27∗ 0.31∗ 0.28∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Members 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry 0.40∗ 0.40∗ 0.38∗ 0.38∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Exit -1.06∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Leniency Program 96 -0.61∗∗∗ 0.10 0.08 0.32
(0.17) (0.24) (0.22) (0.26)
Leniency Program 02 -0.29 0.19 -0.67∗∗∗ -0.35
(0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.22)
Leniency Program 06 -0.66∗∗ -0.21 -0.55∗ -0.31
(0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27)
Interest Rate -0.54∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Interest Rate2 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.23∗∗∗ 12.29∗∗∗ 7.61∗∗∗ 11.98∗∗∗
(0.34) (2.00) (0.81) (2.20)
ln(σ) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.14: Duration Models with Generalized Gamma Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infringement (base: Multiple)
Price Fixing -0.62∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Market Sharing 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.33
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Industry (base: Manufacturing)
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing -0.67∗ -0.63∗ -0.58 -0.58
(0.30) (0.29) (0.33) (0.32)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.65 0.74 0.68 0.73
(0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.37)
Transportation and Storage -0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.22
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Financial and Insurance Activities -0.22 -0.22 -0.17 -0.17
(0.34) (0.34) (0.38) (0.38)
Others 1.16∗ 1.21∗ 1.24∗∗ 1.26∗∗
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48)
Spacial Scope (base: EU-wide)
Worldwide -0.57∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗ -0.54∗∗ -0.55∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Some Countries 0.32∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.32∗ 0.30∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Members 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Entry 0.43∗ 0.43∗ 0.39∗ 0.39∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Exit -0.89∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.26)
Leniency Program 96 -0.60∗∗∗ 0.08 0.04 0.27
(0.17) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26)
Leniency Program 02 -0.31∗ 0.11 -0.64∗∗∗ -0.33
(0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21)
Leniency Program 06 -0.37 0.03 -0.41 -0.15
(0.26) (0.27) (0.38) (0.38)
Interest Rate -0.51∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗ -0.75∗∗
(0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23)
Interest Rate2 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP p.c. -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic Indicator -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.33∗∗∗ 11.67∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗ 11.59∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.84) (0.99) (2.20)
ln(σ) -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
κ 0.41 0.38 0.17 0.19
(0.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.29)
Observations 16’264 16’264 15’631 15’631
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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